Gil v. Sessions
Decision Date | 17 March 2017 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 15-3134-ag,August Term 2016 |
Citation | 851 F.3d 184 |
Parties | July Rafael Bueno GIL, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, United States Attorney General, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Joshua E. Bardavid , New York, New York, for Petitioner.
Lisa M. Damiano , Trial Attorney, Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Before: Walker, Hall, and Chin, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner July Rafael Bueno Gil ("Gil") seeks review of a September 10, 2015 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirming the decision of an Immigration Judge ("IJ") finding him ineligible for derivative citizenship and denying his motion to terminate removal proceedings. Gil was born in the Dominican Republic and was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident. His parents never married. Gil contends that he became a U.S. citizen derivatively when his father was naturalized in 1980, when Gil was eleven years old. The IJ and the BIA determined that Gil was not a "child" eligible for derivative citizenship because he was not "legitimated" within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the "INA"). We agree and, accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review.
The facts are undisputed. Gil was born out of wedlock on December 6, 1968 in the Dominican Republic to two Dominican citizens. His parents never married. In December 1974, his father appeared before a State Civil Official of the National District of the Dominican Republic, publicly acknowledged Gil as his biological son, and declared paternity over him. Gil's mother died in January 1976. Gil entered the United States in February 1978, when he was nine years old, as a lawful permanent resident and lived with his father.
Gil's father became a naturalized U.S. citizen in November 1980, when Gil was eleven years old. Gil thereafter received a Certificate of Citizenship on the basis that he derived citizenship as a result of his father's naturalization.
Gil was convicted in New York state court of first-degree robbery in January 1987 and was convicted in federal court of a controlled substance offense in August 1995. In September 2010, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") determined that Gil's Certificate of Citizenship was unlawfully or fraudulently obtained because he was not a qualifying "child" under the INA's requirements for derivative citizenship and, as a result, it canceled his Certificate of Citizenship. The Department of Homeland Security instituted removal proceedings, served Gil with a Notice to Appear, and charged him as an alien removable under sections 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i), based on his convictions.
On November 18, 2013, the IJ rejected Gil's claim to derivative citizenship through his father's naturalization on the basis that Gil did not "legitimate" under Dominican or New York law before reaching the age specified in the INA. The IJ found him removable as charged, denied his motion to terminate the removal proceedings, and ordered him removed to the Dominican Republic. On September 10, 2015, the BIA agreed that Gil did not become a legitimated child before turning sixteen years old, affirmed the IJ's finding that Gil did not derive citizenship through his father, and affirmed the denial of the motion to terminate removal proceedings.
This petition followed.
We review the question of derivative citizenship de novo where, as here, "the petitioner claims to be a national of the United States" and the record presents "no genuine issue of material fact about the petitioner's nationality." Morales-Santana v. Lynch , 804 F.3d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A) ).1
To determine whether an alien obtained derivative citizenship through a parent's naturalization, we look to "the law in effect when [petitioner] fulfilled the last requirement for derivative citizenship." Poole v. Mukasey , 522 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Ashton v. Gonzales , 431 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2005) ).
In 1980, when Gil's father became a naturalized citizen, former section 321(a) of the INA provided that:
8 U.S.C. § 1432(a), repealed by Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106–395, § 103, 114 Stat. 1631, 1632 (2000); see also Smart v. Ashcroft , 401 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2005). The parties agree that former § 321(a) applies here. See Smart , 401 F.3d at 122 .
8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1). The statute "make[s] clear, for derivative citizenship purposes, [that] a person born out of wedlock is considered a ‘child’ of his United States citizen parent or parents only if he was "legitimated" under the law of his own residence or domicile (or that of his father) before turning 16." Matter of Cross , 26 I. & N. Dec. 485, 487 (BIA 2015) (emphasis added).
Cross , 26 I. & N. Dec. at 485–86.
Gil's claim to derivative citizenship turns on whether he qualified as a legitimated "child" within the meaning of § 101(c)(1). The issue on appeal is whether, before he reached the statutory age of sixteen years old, Gil was "legitimated" under the laws of the Dominican Republic or New York, i.e. , whether in that time frame Dominican or New York law had eliminated all legal distinctions between children born in and out of wedlock. The burden falls on Gil to show he met this requirement. See Grant v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. , 534 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2008) (); see also Berenyi v. Dist. Dir., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. , 385 U.S. 630, 637, 87 S.Ct. 666, 17 L.Ed.2d 656 (1967) ().
Gil concedes he was not a legitimated child under Dominican law at the time his father became a naturalized citizen in 1980. He argues instead that, due to the retroactive application of a subsequently enacted law, the Dominican Republic now treats him as gaining legitimating status at the time of his birth, well before his father received naturalized citizenship. We are not persuaded.
In 1980, the Dominican law in effect accorded different succession rights to children born out of wedlock based on whether their parents later married each other. See De Los Santos , 690 F.2d at 58 ( ). Under that law, a child born out of wedlock to unmarried parents was entitled to only half the inheritance share attributable to a child born in wedlock or a child born out of wedlock to subsequently married parents. See id. (describing Law 985, art. 10).
In 1994, the Dominican Republic enacted the Code for the Protection of Children (the "Code"), which "changed the Dominican law on parentage and filiation to eliminate all legal distinctions between children born in wedlock and those born out of wedlock." In re Martinez-Gonzalez , 21 I. & N. Dec. 1035, 1038 (BIA 1997) (...
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