Wiehoff v. GTE Directories Corp.
Decision Date | 22 June 1993 |
Docket Number | No. CV 3-91-770.,CV 3-91-770. |
Citation | 851 F. Supp. 1312 |
Parties | James W. WIEHOFF, Plaintiff, v. GTE DIRECTORIES CORP., GTE Directories Sales Corp., and GTE Directories Service Corp., d/b/a GTE Sun Community Directories, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
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Joseph W. Hammell and Catherine R. Landman, Dorsey & Whitney, Minneapolis, MN, for plaintiff.
John W. Polley and Patricia K. Oakes, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, MN, for defendants.
Before the Court is defendant GTE Directories Corporation, GTE Directories Sales Corporation, and GTE Directories Service Corporation's (collectively "GTE") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. GTE moves for partial summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff James W. Wiehoff's ("Wiehoff") claims of age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1985) ("ADEA")1 are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
GTE terminated Wiehoff's employment as a sales representative on or about August 29, 1988.2 He was notified of his termination on August 22, 1988.
On December 8, 1988, Wiehoff filed a charge with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights ("MDHR") alleging age discrimination and reprisal in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn.Stat. § 363.01 et seq. ("MHRA"). Oakes Aff., Exh. B. The MDHR cross-filed the charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and the EEOC informed Wiehoff that the MDHR would process his charge pursuant to a worksharing agreement between the EEOC and the MDHR. Oakes Aff., Exh. C () . This letter also stated:
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended (ADEA) provides that an individual may file suit in federal court upon the expiration of 60 days from the date of the charge was filed and up to two years after the date of the alleged violation (three years where the violation was willful). However, the ADEA does limit the recovery of back wages to a period of two years prior to the date suit is filed (or three years, if a willful violation is proven). The applicable statute of limitations is determined by the court. Thus, if you intend to pursue this matter through litigation, it is important that suit be filed within two years from the date of the alleged discrimination.
Id. At the same time, the EEOC informed GTE of the age discrimination and retaliation charge filed by Wiehoff and of MDHR's processing of the charge and encouraged GTE to cooperate with the MDHR. Landman Aff., Exh. 5.
On June 19, 1989, the MDHR completed its investigation of Wiehoff's charge and informed both Wiehoff and GTE that "a determination has been made that probable cause exists to credit the allegation that an unfair discriminatory practice has been committed." Landman Aff., Exhs. 8 and 9. The parties' subsequent efforts to conciliate, at the invitation of the MDHR, were unsuccessful, and on December 7, 1989, the MDHR informed the parties that the case would be forwarded to the Minnesota Attorney General's office for litigation. Landman Aff., Exhs. 11 and 12. On or about December 7, 1990, Wiehoff received a form letter from the EEOC explaining the Age Discrimination Claims Assistance Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. 100-283, 102 Stat. 78, as amended Pub.L. 101-504, 104 Stat. 1298, reprinted in 29 U.S.C.A. § 626 (note) (hereinafter "1990 ADCAA"), and its possible effect on his charge. The letter stated in part:
Oakes Supplemental Aff., Exh. D (Emphasis in original).
The attached Fact Sheet summarized the application of the 1990 ADCAA and the requirements set forth in section three of that act. The Fact Sheet included the following statements:
Oakes Supplemental Aff., Exh. D (Emphasis in original).
On or about November 8, 1991, Wiehoff commenced this action, alleging violation of the MHRA and the ADEA based on age discrimination and retaliation. Complaint, ¶¶ 13-24. Wiehoff seeks damages for pain and suffering and emotional distress; an award of past and future compensation; an order restoring his pension benefits; and an award of punitive damages and civil penalty. Complaint, Prayer for Relief.
In its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment4, GTE asserts that Wiehoff has alleged a willful violation of the ADEA for which there is a three year statute of limitations for filing a lawsuit. GTE argues that the cause of action accrued upon notification of termination (August 22, 1988) and is therefore time-barred. Furthermore, GTE argues that Wiehoff's ADEA claim is not revived by the 1990 ADCAA as it does not meet all the requirements for revival.
Wiehoff contends that his ADEA claim includes allegations of both willful and non-willful violations, and that the claim is timely because the statute of limitations was tolled during conciliation with the MDHR. Alternatively, Wiehoff argues that the 1990 ADCAA does revive his claim of willful violation because the 1990 ADCAA applies a two-year statute of limitations in all cases, whether or not the allegations are of non-willful violation.
The moving party is not entitled to summary judgment unless the movant can show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a summary judgment motion, a court must determine whether "there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The role of the court is not to weigh the evidence but instead to determine whether, as a matter of law, a genuine issue of material fact exists. Agristor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732, 733 (8th Cir.1987). "In making this determination, the court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and to give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts." Id. at 734.
"To withstand a motion for summary judgment, a party need not prove in its favor an issue of material fact; all that is required is sufficient evidence supporting a material factual dispute that would require resolution by a trier of fact." Unigroup v. O'Rourke Storage & Transfer, 980 F.2d 1217, 1220 (8th Cir.1992) (citations omitted). The non-moving party may not merely rest upon the allegations or denials of the party's pleading, but must set forth specific facts, by affidavits or otherwise, showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 585 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010, 108 S.Ct....
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Wiehoff v. GTE Directories Corp.
...of limitations barred Wiehoff's age and retaliation claims. The district court granted GTE's motion in part. Wiehoff v. GTE Directories Corp., 851 F.Supp. 1312 (D.Minn.1993). The court held that the applicable statutes of limitations were two years for basic violations of the ADEA, and thre......