Rhoades v. Davis

• Citation: 852 F.3d 422
• Decision Date: 27 March 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16-70021,16-70021
• Parties: Rick Allen RHOADES, Petitioner-Appellant v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

852 F.3d 422

Rick Allen RHOADES, Petitioner-Appellant
v.
Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee

No. 16-70021

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed March 27, 2017

David R. Dow, University of Houston Law Center, Houston, TX, Georgette P. Oden, Crawford & Cruz, Austin, TX, for Petitioner–Appellant.

Jefferson David Clendenin, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Postconviction Litigation Division, Austin, TX, for Respondent–Appellee.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, HAYNES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Rick Allen Rhoades murdered two men on September 12, 1991. Roughly one month later, while in custody for burglarizing a school, he confessed to the murders. A Harris County jury convicted him of capital murder and sentenced him to die. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ("CCA") affirmed Rhoades's conviction and sentence on direct appeal.¹ He unsuccessfully petitioned a Texas state court for a writ of habeas corpus.² Having exhausted his state remedies, Rhoades petitioned a federal district court for federal habeas corpus relief. The district court rejected all of Rhoades's claims and declined to issue a certificate of appealability ("COA"). He now asks this court for a COA to appeal the district court's resolution of his claims. We will grant a COA in part.

852 F.3d 427

I.

"A state prisoner whose petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied by a federal district court does not enjoy an absolute right to appeal."³ Federal law requires that he first obtain a COA.⁴ A COA may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right."⁵ Until the applicant secures a COA, we may not rule on the merits of his case.⁶

The COA inquiry ... is not coextensive with a merits analysis. At the COA stage, the only question is whether the applicant has shown that "jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." This threshold question should be decided without "full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims." "When a court of appeals sidesteps [the COA] process by first deciding the merits of an appeal, and then justifying its denial of a COA based on its adjudication of the actual merits, it is in essence deciding an appeal without jurisdiction."⁷

We limit our examination " ‘to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of [the] claims,’ and ask ‘only if the District Court's decision was debatable.’ "⁸

"Where the petitioner faces the death penalty, ‘any doubts as to whether a COA should issue must be resolved’ in the petitioner's favor."⁹ When the district court denied relief on procedural grounds, the petitioner seeking a COA must further show that "jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling."¹⁰

II.

Rhoades seeks a COA on five claims for federal habeas relief:

(1) that the convicting court unconstitutionally prevented him from presenting mitigating childhood photographs of himself to the jury during the sentencing phase;

(2) that the convicting court unconstitutionally permitted the jury to hear testimony about the possibility of release on furlough for capital defendants sentenced to life in prison;

(3) that the convicting court unconstitutionally prevented him from informing the jurors about the parole implications of a life sentence;

(4) that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to (a) comments by the prosecutor supposedly implicating Rhoades's right not to testify and (b) the guilt/innocence-phase discussion of Rhoades's extraneous offenses; and

852 F.3d 428

(5) that the State violated Batson when it exercised racially motivated peremptory strikes against two prospective jurors.

We will grant a COA on Rhoades's claims 1, 2, and 5, but deny a COA on his claims 3 and 4.

1.

Rhoades's first claim is that the convicting trial court unconstitutionally prevented him from presenting mitigating childhood photographs of himself to the jury during the sentencing phase of his trial. During sentencing, the defense's theory was that Rhoades was generally nonviolent and would do well in a prison environment. Rhoades called his adoptive mother to testify about his troubled childhood. Prior to her testimony, the defense offered into evidence eleven photographs depicting a young Rhoades doing normal, happy childhood things (like fishing, holding a trophy, and going to a dance). The trial court excluded the photographs as irrelevant.

The CCA affirmed.¹¹ It said that Rhoades had no constitutional right to introduce the photographs because they were not relevant to Rhoades's moral blameworthiness for the murders, relying on Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Franklin v. Lynaugh .¹² Judges Clinton and Overstreet dissented, pointing out that the relevant-to-moral-blameworthiness standard embraced by the CCA majority had never been adopted by the Supreme Court in a majority holding.¹³ They further observed that Skipper v. South Carolina seems to say that mitigating evidence can be relevant even when it does not touch on the defendant's culpability for the crime committed.¹⁴ Those dissenting judges would have found that Rhoades had a constitutional right to introduce the photographs "even if the only purpose of their introduction was to solicit the mercy of the jury."¹⁵

Rhoades contends on federal habeas that the state court unreasonably applied the Supreme Court's standard for what mitigating evidence capital defendants have a right to present to the jury. The district court analyzed the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area and found that it permitted state courts "to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense."¹⁶ According to the district court, the state court could have reasonably applied that standard to find the photographs irrelevant, and in any event the exclusion of the photographs did not affect Rhoades's sentence, rendering any error harmless.

Persuaded that Rhoades has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, we grant a COA on this claim. In particular, we note the challenge of determining what information is "relevant to the sentencing decision" within the meaning of the Supreme Court's cases¹⁷ —a challenge that divided the Texas

852 F.3d 429

CCA on this issue. "When a state appellate court is divided on the merits of the constitutional question, issuance of a certificate of appealability should ordinarily be routine."¹⁸ A COA is granted on Rhoades's claim 1.

2.

Rhoades's second claim is that the State presented false or misleading sentencing evidence. During the sentencing phase of Rhoades's trial, the State put on testimony that Texas inmates convicted of capital murder but sentenced to life imprisonment are "eligible for furloughs"—the theory apparently being that the jury would be more likely to sentence Rhoades to death if it thought that sentencing him only to life imprisonment meant that he could take furloughs. Defense counsel objected, and the trial judge called for a bench conference to which the court reporter was evidently not invited; the record does not show what counsel said at the bench. At some point, the court reporter was summoned to the bench, whereupon defense counsel wrapped up his argument and the judge overruled any objection, noting "I don't know where your objection is in there."

Rhoades raised this point on his direct appeal to the CCA, but it found the objection not preserved because "he failed to object to the line of questioning with ample specificity to notify the trial court of his contention."¹⁹ Because the CCA held any objection to the furlough testimony defaulted, it did not reach the merits.²⁰ Rhoades nonetheless raised this claim on state habeas. The state habeas court recognized that the CCA's procedural ruling barred Texas habeas review, but went on to rule, in the alternative, that "the applicant fails to show that such claims have merit." On federal habeas, the district court avoided the procedural-bar issue, choosing instead to reject this claim on the merits.

Rhoades seeks a COA to challenge the district court's determination that his challenge to the furlough testimony lacks merit. Texas maintains that the claim is both procedurally barred and should be rejected on the merits. We grant a COA for both the merits and procedural issues.

Merits

Capital defendants have the constitutional right to reliable sentencing proceedings,²¹ which precludes the State from presenting false or misleading evidence to the sentencing jury.²² The merits issue is whether the state court's factual finding that the furlough testimony was not false or misleading was "an...