People v. Tanner

• Decision Date: 23 June 2014
• Docket Number: Docket No. 146211.,Calendar No. 7.
• Citation: 496 Mich. 199,853 N.W.2d 653
• Parties: PEOPLE v. TANNER.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

496 Mich. 199

853 N.W.2d 653

PEOPLE

v.TANNER.

Docket No. 146211.

Calendar No. 7.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Nov. 6, 2013.

Decided June 23, 2014.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, William J. Vailliencourt, Jr., Prosecuting Attorney, for the People.

Mark A. Gatesman, Howell, for defendant.

Kym L. Worthy and Timothy A. Baughman, Detroit, for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.

Eve Brensike Primus, Daniel S. Korobkin, and Michael J. Steinberg, for the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan and the American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan.

MARKMAN, J.

This Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the rule announced in People v. Bender, 452 Mich. 594, 551 N.W.2d 71 (1996), should be maintained. Bender requires police officers to promptly inform a suspect facing custodial interrogation that an attorney is available when that attorney attempts to contact the suspect. If the officers fail to do so, any statements made by the suspect, including voluntary statements given by the suspect with full knowledge of his Miranda rights,¹ are rendered inadmissible. Because there is nothing in this state's Constitution to support that rule, we respectfully conclude that Bender was wrongly decided and that it must be overruled. We therefore reverse the trial court's suppression of certain incriminating statements made by defendant, which suppression was justified solely on the grounds of Bender, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS

Defendant George Tanner was arrested for murder and taken to jail on October 17, 2011. He was read his Miranda rights, and when police officers attempted to interview defendant at the jail, he invoked his right to counsel. As a result, the officers informed defendant that he would have to reinitiate contact if he subsequently changed his mind and wished to speak to them. The next day, while a psychologist employed by the jail to interview inmates was speaking with defendant, he said that he wanted to “get something off his chest.” The psychologist told defendant that he should not further discuss the case with her, that he might wish to speak to an attorney, and that she could make arrangements for him to speak to the police officers. Defendant again stated that he wanted to “get things off his chest,” so the psychologist told defendant that she would inform jail staff of his request. She then contacted the jail administrator and informed him that defendant wished to speak to police officers about his case.

The administrator spoke with defendant, told him that the psychologist had indicated that he wanted to “get something off his chest,” and inquired whether he still wished to speak to someone about his case. Defendant replied “yes” and asked if the administrator could obtain an attorney for him. The administrator responded that he could not, because this was not his role, but explained that he could contact the police officers who were handling the case. Defendant replied that this would be fine, and the administrator contacted the officers. The administrator also called the prosecutor, who advised him that the court would appoint an attorney for defendant should he request one. The prosecutor apparently informed the court of defendant's request, as a result of which an attorney was sent to the jail.

One of the police officers testified that he was contacted by the administrator and apprised that defendant might now be amenable to speaking with the officers. The police officer further testified that he confirmed with the administrator that defendant had not requested that an attorney be present during the interview, and that the administrator believed an attorney had been appointed merely as a contingency in the event defendant sought an attorney during the interview. Subsequently, both the police officers and an attorney appeared at the jail. Apparently unsure of his role, the attorney asked the officers and the administrator if they knew why he was there. The administrator responded and told him to wait in the jail lobby while he took the officers back to speak with defendant and determine his intentions.

Defendant was again read his Miranda rights, which he waived this time without requesting an attorney and without being made aware of the attorney's presence. The administrator then instructed the attorney that he could leave. Defendant shortly thereafter made incriminating statements concerning his involvement in the murder. He was eventually charged with open murder, MCL 750.316, and mutilation of a dead body, MCL 750.160. Defendant was bound over to circuit court following a preliminary examination. During this process, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress defendant's statement to the police, alleging that because he had not been informed that an attorney had been appointed for him before his interrogation, his Miranda waiver was invalid under this Court's decision in Bender. A hearing was held on October 12, 2011, after which the trial court suppressed defendant's statement. The court determined that defendant had requested an attorney at his October 17, 2011 interrogation, but that he had affirmatively reinitiated contact with police officers on October 18, 2011, without reasserting his right to counsel. However, it also determined that defendant's statement required suppression under Bender, because the police officers had failed to inform him that an attorney was present at the jail and had established contact with the officers.

The prosecutor filed an application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, which was denied for lack of merit, and he then filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court, requesting that Bender be reconsidered. We granted this application, People v. Tanner, 493 Mich. 958, 828 N.W.2d 384 (2013), and heard oral argument on this case on November 6, 2013.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court “review[s] a trial court's factual findings in a ruling on a motion to suppress for clear error. To the extent that a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress involves an interpretation of the law or the application of a constitutional standard to uncontested facts, our review is de novo.” People v. Attebury, 463 Mich. 662, 668, 624 N.W.2d 912 (2001).

III. BACKGROUND

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const., Am. V. See also Const. 1963, art. 1, § 17 (containing an identical Self–Incrimination Clause). This federal constitutional guarantee was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). Prior to 1966, a suspect's confession was constitutionally admissible if a court determined that it was made “voluntarily.” ² Despite the apparent textual emphasis on the voluntariness of a suspect's confession (“no person shall be compelled”), the United States Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–445, 477–479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), that the accused must be given a series of warnings before being subjected to “custodial interrogation” in order to protect his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. ³ The right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation is, in the words of the United States Supreme Court, a corollary of the right against compelled self-incrimination, because the presence of counsel at this stage affords a way to “insure that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion.” Id. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602. See also id. at 470, 86 S.Ct. 1602. If a suspect is not afforded Miranda warnings before custodial interrogation, “no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.” Id. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (citations omitted).

Once a suspect invokes his right to remain silent or requests counsel, police questioning must cease unless the suspect affirmatively reinitiates contact.⁴Id. at 473–474, 86 S.Ct. 1602. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (citations omitted), the United States Supreme Court created “additional safeguards” for when the accused invokes his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation:

[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.... [H]aving expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [an accused] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.

However, when a suspect has been afforded Miranda warnings and affirmatively waives his Miranda rights, subsequent incriminating statements may be used against him. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602. A suspect's waiver of his Miranda rights must be made “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The United States Supreme Court has articulated a two-part inquiry to determine whether a waiver is valid:

First, the relinquishment of the right must have been “voluntary,” in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Mir...