Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp. v. Norwest Bank of Jamestown, N.W.
| Decision Date | 26 August 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-5349,87-5349 |
| Citation | 854 F.2d 1122 |
| Parties | GREYHOUND LEASING & FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Appellant, v. NORWEST BANK OF JAMESTOWN, N.W.; Wimbledon Implement, Inc.; Russell Hoggarth; Henry K. Mackenzie; the partnership of Mackenzie, Jungroth, Mackenzie and Reisnour; the partnership of Jungroth, Mackenzie and Reisnour; and James R. Jungroth, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Thomas Darling, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant.
Mart R. Vogel, Fargo, N.D., for appellees.
Before HEANEY, Circuit Judge, McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, and HILL *, Senior District Judge.
In this opinion we affirm a district court judgment in favor of a lawyer charged with professional negligence.
Appellant Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corporation ("Greyhound"), among its other businesses, leases farm machinery and equipment to farmers and finances farmers' purchase of such equipment. In 1982, a loan broker named Kuehl brought to Greyhound a proposal to loan over $1 million to a Jamestown, North Dakota farmer named Mutschler. At the time Mutschler was regarded by banks and others in his home community as a successful, prosperous and reputable farmer who owned and farmed large valuable land holdings. The loan was to be secured by a first lien on many pieces of farm equipment. 1 After investigation, Greyhound decided The documents prepared by Greyhound for the transaction did not reveal its true nature. The documents were drawn so as to portray Greyhound as having bought the farm equipment in question, all new, from a local farm equipment dealer, Wimbledon Implement Inc. ("Wimbledon"), and, simultaneously with its purchase, leasing the equipment to Mutschler. Greyhound insisted on structuring the deal in this fashion, rather than as a loan or financing agreement, so that it could obtain both the investment tax credit and depreciation on the farm machinery. On a straight loan or financing deal, Greyhound would get neither tax advantage.
to go forward with the loan and began the preparation of appropriate documents.
In reality, none of the machinery and equipment covered by the loan was new, except for one tractor that had not yet been delivered to Mutschler. Mutschler had already owned and possessed all of the other equipment for many months, some for a year or more. He had bought some of it from Wimbledon and some from other vendors. Either at the time of his original purchase or during his months of possession, Mutschler had created liens on all of the already owned equipment. Among the lien holders were Wimbledon, John Deere and others.
The district judge 2 found that Greyhound employees knew or should have known that practically all of the equipment was old and had been owned and possessed by Mutschler for a long time. He further found that those facts were known to Greyhound's broker, Kuehl, whose knowledge he imputed to Greyhound. Both Greyhound and Kuehl, however, were unaware of the liens.
To evidence the purported purchase and lease transaction Greyhound created and prescribed a number of documents which it required be executed according to its directions. Among them was an attorney's opinion letter to be signed by the lessee's own local attorney. The text of the opinion letter which Greyhound prescribed is set forth in the appendix. The operative paragraph is a statement by the lawyer to Greyhound that the lawyer is "not aware of any liens or encumbrances ... created or suffered by the lessee nor have they granted or conveyed any liens or encumbrances of any nature with respect thereto ..." 3
Greyhound desired the lessee's own local lawyer to sign the opinion letter because it believed that such a lawyer would be familiar with the lessee's prior business activities. That expectation was not fulfilled in this case. Mutschler selected Mr. H.K. Mackenzie of the Jamestown, North Dakota firm of Jungroth, Mackenzie and Reisnour. Mackenzie had never done any work for Mutschler before. Mackenzie signed the opinion letter on the day he was first contacted by Mutschler.
Mutschler brought to Mackenzie not only the prescribed opinion letter form but also some other documents connected with the transaction, all in the form which Greyhound had required. Included was a lease agreement between Greyhound and Mutschler purporting to describe a lease of new equipment. Mackenzie orally inquired of Mutschler whether the equipment was in fact new. Mutschler assured him that it was. Mackenzie also orally inquired whether Mutschler had yet obtained possession of the equipment or any ownership interest in it. Mutschler answered in the negative. Mackenzie then, without further inquiry or checking, signed the opinion letter.
In North Dakota, liens on farm equipment are registered in the County Register of Deeds. There are no title documents for such equipment similar to the titles employed for automobiles. Under North Dakota law, one who has not acquired an ownership interest in farm equipment may not create a valid lien on it. Cf. N.D.C.C. Sec. 35-01-05. Relying on Mutschler's representations Greyhound was satisfied with Mackenzie's letter. Preparation and execution of other documents to consummate the deal moved on apace. The most important of these documents was an invoice from Wimbledon to Greyhound listing the equipment sold and listing it all as new. That invoice was redrafted several times at Greyhound's direction. The description and purchase price of various items were changed in the various drafts at Greyhound's request. The final version of the invoice was dated March 30, 1982, 13 days after Mackenzie signed the opinion letter. The invoice reflected an overall sales price of $1,046,160, exclusive of sales tax. Greyhound issued two checks to Wimbledon in April, 1982 which totaled that amount. One covered the purported purchase price of all of the equipment except the undelivered tractor. The second check covering the tractor's price was issued after the tractor was delivered.
that the equipment was new and not yet owned or possessed by him, Mackenzie believed that there was no possibility of any pre-existing lien. He could have ascertained the true facts, i.e., that Mutschler had owned the equipment for a considerable time and had placed several valid liens on it, by going to the Registrar's office about a block away or by telephoning that office. He did neither.
Wimbledon kept $106,965 of the proceeds for itself and transmitted the rest to Mutschler who deposited it in the Norwest Bank of Jamestown. About $300,000 of the deposited money was taken by the bank as an offset against Mutschler's pre-existing unsecured indebtedness to the bank. Mutschler used the rest for farming operations. None of the money was used to discharge any of the pre-existing liens on the equipment.
Not long after Greyhound's money was paid and deposited as above stated, Mutschler filed for bankruptcy. The true facts about Mutschler's prior purchase and possession of the equipment and the valid liens existing at the time of Greyhound's payment, then became known. Greyhound thus found itself with an obligation of over $1 million due from Mutschler, a bankrupt, with no collateral except for a first lien on one tractor. Greyhound recovered $30,000 on that collateral.
On March 1, 1984, Greyhound filed the instant case in the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota. Named as defendants were Wimbledon, Norwest Bank and Mackenzie. 4 After a six-day court trial, the Court on April 22, 1987 rendered its judgment in a lengthy oral unpublished opinion. Norwest Bank was found not liable to Greyhound. Greyhound was awarded a judgment against Wimbledon for $294,000. Greyhound's total loss was fixed at $490,000 and reduced because of comparative negligence. No appeal has been filed as to either of those judgments. Finally, the trial court held that Mackenzie was not liable to Greyhound and awarded a judgment to him. Greyhound's sole appeal involves the Mackenzie judgment.
There were many counts in Greyhound's complaint against Mackenzie. But all of them came down to a claim of negligence, i.e., that Mackenzie failed to make a lien search before signing the opinion letter. The district judge rejected Greyhound's claim on two alternative grounds. He held, first, that the wording of the opinion letter imposed no duty on Mackenzie to make any investigation as to the existence of liens. The trial judge construed the opinion letter as being only a representation that the lawyer personally was aware of no liens. Alternatively, the trial court held that even if the opinion letter form could be interpreted more broadly so as to require a reasonable investigation of the existence of liens, and even if Mackenzie was negligent in failing to make a lien search, the negligence of Greyhound exceeded any such negligence of Mackenzie.
Appellant argues quite persuasively that the trial court's construction of the opinion letter constituted error. But even if its
construction is viewed as erroneous, a reversal is not required. The judgment must nevertheless be affirmed if the trial court's alternative ground is correct and free from error.
Even if one assumes arguendo that Mackenzie was negligent in signing the opinion letter without an investigation of liens, there is ample evidence in the record to support the trial judge's conclusion that Greyhound was also negligent and that its negligence exceeded that of Mackenzie. A plaintiff is barred from recovery under North Dakota law where his contributory negligence is greater than the defendant's negligence. N.D.C.C. Sec. 9-10-07 (1973).
The negligence of Greyhound is obvious both from the knowledge and actions of the broker, Kuehl, and the knowledge and actions of certain of its full time employees. Mr. Kuehl, the broker,...
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