Walker v. Schaeffer, 87-3383

• Citation: 854 F.2d 138
• Decision Date: 12 August 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-3383,87-3383
• Parties: 26 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 763 Doak WALKER and Maurice Turner, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. R. SCHAEFFER, Patrolman, and J. Sheridan, Patrolman, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Page 138

854 F.2d 138

26 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 763

Doak WALKER and Maurice Turner, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. R. SCHAEFFER, Patrolman, and J. Sheridan, Patrolman Defendants-Appellants.

No. 87-3383.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Feb. 25, 1988.

Decided Aug. 12, 1988.

Richard R. Strong, Roetzel & Andress, Akron, Ohio, Drew Carson (argued), Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants-appellants.

Harry W. Schmuck (argued), Canton, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before KRUPANSKY and WELLFORD, Circuit Judges, and GILMORE, District Judge. ^*

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs, Doak Walker and Maurice Turner, sued two police officers, defendants Schaeffer and Sheridan, under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for false arrest, detention, and imprisonment in violation of their constitutional rights. Walker was arrested for disorderly conduct in a McDonald's parking lot following a high school football game, and Turner was arrested for reckless driving following Walker's arrest. The plaintiffs' arrests were related to the presence and actions of a primarily white crowd in the parking lot that apparently threatened the plaintiffs, both of whom are black. The defendant police officers, who are white, moved for summary judgment following discovery, claiming that on the basis of undisputed facts they had probable cause to make the arrests and thus were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, finding that there existed genuine issues of material fact in dispute that bore on the question of whether a reasonable police officer would have believed that probable cause existed for the arrests of plaintiffs effectuated by the defendants. The parties' versions of the facts of this episode differ considerably.

Walker and Turner, both of Canton, Ohio, pulled into the parking lot of a McDonald's in Austintown, Ohio, at approximately 10:30 on a Friday night following a high school football game between a Canton high school and Austintown. Walker parked his car and was going to leave Turner in the car and go into the McDonald's. Officer Sheridan, according to Walker's deposition, grabbed Walker by the chest through the open car window and told him to repark the car properly in a lined space. Walker complied by realigning his car.

Walker started to go into the McDonald's, but turned back before he went inside. At the time, a crowd of several hundred white Austintown high school students was gathered in the McDonald's parking lot. Again, according to Walker's deposition, as he started to walk back toward his car, the crowd closed behind him hindering his return. He heard members of the crowd making racial comments. In order to get back to the car he was forced to push his way through the crowd. Officer Sheridan's police report and affidavit, by contrast, stated that Walker was shouting at people in the crowd and pushing them in an attempt to pick a fight.

Walker testified that once he got back in his car, he planned to leave, but that the crowd had completely surrounded his car and was kicking, pounding, and spitting on his car. Officer Sheridan then approached the car and allegedly ordered Walker to leave the premises. Walker said that he put his car into reverse, but could not back up without striking one of the crowd around the car. According to Walker's testimony, Officer Sheridan again grabbed him by the chest and ordered him out of the car. As he was getting out of the car in response to these directions, the crowd was chanting "Arrest the nigger. Arrest the nigger." Sheridan arrested Walker for disorderly conduct and led him inside the McDonald's restaurant. Sheridan's statement was that he advised Walker several times to get into his car and leave, and that Walker's failure promptly to leave in light of the threatening circumstances resulted in his arrest for disorderly conduct.

As Walker was being arrested, Turner, according to his own deposition, got out of the car and asked Officer Sheridan what was going on. Sheridan told Turner that Walker was being arrested and that Turner had better get out of there before he was arrested also. Turner then got back into the car, which was still surrounded by the crowd, and as Sheridan led Walker into the McDonald's, Turner decided to try to get away from the threatening crowd. Turner backed the car up and then pulled out into traffic as people from the crowd were running alongside the car and throwing objects at it. As Turner backed up and then left the lot, he allegedly struck several members of the crowd. Turner stated that he soon realized he was heading the wrong direction on the street and turned around in a parking lot about 700 yards away from the McDonald's. He asserts that as he drove back past the McDonald's, members of the crowd came back out on the street to throw things at his car and that he swerved across the center line in order to avoid hitting them or being hit. Defendants by affidavit asserted that Turner twice spun the car completely around in traffic and drove away in the wrong lane of traffic. Turner denied spinning the car.

Turner in due course drove to the Austintown police station to inquire about his companion, Walker. He was then arrested for reckless driving and held in a cell for four hours. Both plaintiffs assert separate claims arising out of the alleged false arrest and wrongful imprisonment.

The complaint sets out that in response to the charges placed against them they appeared in Mahoning County Court for a trial. Both were represented by an attorney, and prior to the hearing there was a conference among the prosecutor, the attorney or attorneys for Walker and Turner, and Schaeffer and Sheridan, defendants in the instant action. Plaintiffs assert that defendants stated that they ordered plaintiffs away from the McDonald's premises "solely in order to save the lives of Doak Walker and Maurice Turner." (Complaint, paragraph 15.) The complaint proceeds to admit that both plaintiffs agreed to enter "no-contest pleas in open court." The complaint goes further to admit that plaintiffs did enter the pleas and that "the Court found [them] guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a fine." (Complaint, paragraph 16.) In their depositions each plaintiff admitted paying the fine assessed. The complaint asserts that plaintiffs "have appealed their convictions." (Complaint, paragraph 16.) Although more than two years have since elapsed, we are not advised whether the alleged appeal was pursued or of its outcome. We are not advised as to the contentions made or asserted on appeal or whether plaintiffs may have abandoned the appeal. In any event, there is no contrary assertion but that plaintiffs, by their own actions on advice of counsel, in effect admitted a factual basis for the as yet undisturbed determination of guilt on the offenses charged against them.

Defendants argue that the district court, as a matter of law, should have found, based on the material facts that are not essentially disputed in this case, that the officers acted reasonably in believing that probable cause existed for the arrests of both Walker and Turner. They assert that summary judgment for Sheridan and Schaeffer on qualified immunity grounds was appropriate. The district court, however, determined that the pleadings and plaintiffs' depositions raised genuine issues of material fact regarding the applicability of qualified immunity.

The Court must determine whether a reasonable officer, knowing what Officer Sheridan and Officer Schaeffer knew at the time of the arrest and the issuance of the citation, would have known that no probable cause supported the arrest or the issuance of the citation, in deciding whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Where the facts depicting the events leading up to the arrest are disputed by the parties, and are as markedly different as the versions are in this case, the Court is unable to determine whether a reasonable officer would have acted as Officer Sheridan did when he arrested plaintiff Walker, and as Officer Schaeffer did when he issued the citation to plaintiff Turner. Thus, there being a genuine dispute about the facts, the Court is unable to determine on the record before it whether a reasonable police officer would have known that no probable cause to arrest or to issue a citation existed under the circumstances. Accordingly, the Court denies summary judgment to defendants Sheridan and Schaeffer on their claim of qualified immunity.

In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), the Supreme Court described the points before trial at which a government defendant may be entitled to the defense of qualified immunity:

Unless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery. Even if the plaintiff's complaint adequately alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly established law, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the defendant in fact committed those acts.

Id. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815 (citation omitted). Thus, the trial court in a case like this one must decide whether--if the plaintiffs are able to prove all of their allegations--the defendants' conduct violated a clearly established right of the plaintiffs. The question before the court, therefore, is essentially a legal question: whether the defendants' actions violated the plaintiffs' clearly established constitutional rights. See Dominque v. Telb, 831 F.2d 673, 677 (6th Cir.1987).

In the instant case, Walker and Turner assert that Sheridan and Schaeffer violated their clearly established rights by arresting them without probable cause and then placing them in jail. Sheridan and Schaeffer point to several undisputed facts (e.g., that Walker did not...