Coen v. Runner

• Decision Date: 16 August 1988
• Docket Number: No. 86-1708,86-1708
• Citation: 854 F.2d 374
• Parties: George COEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William RUNNER, Superintendent of Brand Inspectors for Fremont County, Wyoming; Dean Prosser, Chief Brand Inspector for the State of Wyoming; the Wyoming Stockgrower's Association, a non-profit Wyoming corporation; William Lassiter, Deputy Sheriff of Fremont County, Wyoming; Tim McKinney, Sheriff of Fremont County, Wyoming; and the Fremont County Sheriff's Department, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 374

854 F.2d 374

George COEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William RUNNER, Superintendent of Brand Inspectors for

Fremont County, Wyoming; Dean Prosser, Chief Brand

Inspector for the State of Wyoming; the Wyoming

Stockgrower's Association, a non-profit Wyoming corporation;

William Lassiter, Deputy Sheriff of Fremont County,

Wyoming; Tim McKinney, Sheriff of Fremont County, Wyoming;

and the Fremont County Sheriff's Department, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 86-1708.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Aug. 16, 1988.

Charles E. Hamilton, of Hamilton Law Associates, P.C., of Riverton, Wyo., for plaintiff-appellant.

James L. Applegate (Glenn Parker and John J. Metzke, of Hirst & Applegate, of Cheyenne, Wyo., with him on the brief), of Hirst & Applegate, of Cheyenne, Wyo., for defendants-appellees William Runner, Dean Prosser, and the Wyoming Stock Growers Ass'n.

Elizabeth Z. Smith, of Freudenthal, Salzburg, Bonds & Rideout, P.C., of Cheyenne, Wyo., for defendants-appellees William Lassiter, Tim McKinney, and the Fremont County Sheriff's Dept.

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, and McWILLIAMS, and TACHA, Circuit Judges.

TACHA, Circuit Judge.

George Coen appeals from the district court's order granting summary judgment for defendants on qualified immunity grounds. We affirm.

I.

These facts were undisputed at the time of the district court's summary judgment order. In 1983 William Runner, a cattle brand inspector in Fremont County, Wyoming, and William Lassiter, a deputy sheriff for the county, were investigating a series of cattle rustling incidents. During that investigation, one of the suspects implicated Coen. Runner and Lassiter expanded their investigation to determine whether Coen was involved in the rustling. In August 1983 Coen called Runner and asked that Runner go to Coen's house the next day to inspect some horses. Runner agreed to go, and when he arrived, he saw that another inspector, Boyd Whitman, was already there. After Coen complained to the two inspectors about the treatment he was receiving from inspectors, he threatened to kill both Runner and Whitman.

When the inspectors left Coen's home, they decided to contact Lassiter about Coen's threat to kill them. After discussing the incident with Lassiter, they passed the information on to William Eichelberger, who was a deputy county attorney. Eichelberger advised Runner and Lassiter to submit affidavits concerning the incident and to file a criminal complaint. Based upon the affidavits submitted by Runner and Lassiter, Judge Donald Hall issued a criminal warrant charging Coen with violation of section 6-5-305(a) of the Wyoming statutes. Under the statute, it is a felony to "influence, intimidate or impede a juror, witness or officer in the discharge of his duty."

Coen was arrested, and Fremont County Sheriff Tim McKinney issued a press release that contained information regarding Coen's arrest. The charges against him were dismissed when Judge Hall concluded that the statute under which Coen was charged referred to only those "officers" performing court-related duties. Coen then instituted this lawsuit in which he alleged that Runner and Lassiter acted under color of state law to abridge his first and fourth amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983; he also seeks damages for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Coen also asserted claims against McKinney and Dean Prosser, the Chief brand inspector for the state of Wyoming, for their alleged failure to properly train and supervise their subordinates. In addition, he pursued claims against the Wyoming Stockgrowers Association and the Fremont County Sheriff's Department, which are apparently based on a respondeat superior theory. Finally, Coen alleged that by issuing the press release describing Coen's arrest, McKinney acted under color of state law to deprive him of rights secured by the fifth amendment in violation of section 1983.

After some discovery, the defendants submitted motions for summary judgment. The district court granted the summary judgment motions on all counts. Two of the section 1983 claims were based on the first and fourth amendments. On those claims the court granted judgment for Runner and Lassiter on qualified immunity grounds. The court also held that those same defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Coen's malicious prosecution claim, either because they were shielded by qualified immunity or because Coen had failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution under Wyoming law. Regarding Coen's abuse of process claim against Runner and Lassiter, the court determined that Coen had failed to state a cause of action. Next, the court held that the claims against McKinney and Prosser for failure to properly train and supervise Runner and Lassiter were state claims upon which no basis for independent federal jurisdiction was stated. Similarly, the court held that the claims against the Wyoming Stockgrowers Association and the Fremont County Sheriff's Department were pendant state claims for which no independent federal jurisdiction existed. Because summary judgment was granted regarding the federal section 1983 claims, the court exercised its discretion and dismissed these pendant state claims. Coen appeals the district court's summary judgment order. We affirm the order granting summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants.

II.

We first address Coen's objection to the district court's disposition of the qualified immunity claims asserted by Runner and Lassiter. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that protects government officials from personal liability unless their actions violate clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Once the defense has been raised and the plaintiffs have met their burden of identifying both the clearly established law that the government official is alleged to have violated and the conduct that violated that law, the defendant must demonstrate that no material issues of fact remain as to whether his or her actions were objectively reasonable in light of the law and the information he or she possessed at the time. Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 (10th Cir.1988). A defendant who makes such a showing of objective reasonableness is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that there are factual disputes relevant to the defendant's claim to immunity. DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Co., 844 F.2d 714, 719 (10th Cir.1988) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)).

Coen's contention that Runner and Lassiter acted under color of state law to abridge his clearly established constitutional rights is threefold. First, he alleges that they violated his fourth amendment rights by procuring a warrant for his arrest without probable cause. Second, he contends that the decision to procure the arrest warrant was motivated by a desire to retaliate for Coen's exercise of his first amendment free speech rights. Third, he claims that Runner and Lassiter are liable for malicious prosecution which denied him of his fourteenth amendment due process rights. Lassiter and Runner contend that qualified immunity shields them from liability for each of these claims, and, like the district court, we agree.

In Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), the Supreme Court examined the availability of qualified immunity to law enforcement officials sued because of their decision to seek an arrest warrant. The Court said that even though officers may not rely on a judicial officer's probable cause determination to shield them from liability when that determination is erroneous, the officers who requested the warrant cannot be held liable if the magistrate's mistaken determination is within the range of professional competence. Id. at 345, 106 S.Ct. at 1098. Only where the law enforcement officer's warrant application is "so...