State v. Soto, A13–0997.

• Citation: 855 N.W.2d 303
• Decision Date: 22 October 2014
• Docket Number: No. A13–0997.,A13–0997.
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jose Arriaga SOTO, Jr., Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

855 N.W.2d 303

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent

v.Jose Arriaga SOTO, Jr., Appellant.

No. A13–0997.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Oct. 22, 2014.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant Polk County Attorney, Crookston, MN, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.

OPINION

LILLEHAUG, Justice.

In sentencing, district courts have a great deal of discretion. Rarely do we hold that it has been abused. But rarely is not never. This is such a rare case.

Appellant Jose Soto pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct for a violent rape. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines called for an executed sentence of 12 years in prison. Instead, the district court stayed Soto's prison sentence and put him on supervised probation. The State appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for execution of the 12–year sentence. State v. Soto, No. A13–0997, 2013 WL 6570073 (Minn.App. Dec. 16, 2013). Although we reject some of the court of appeals' reasoning, we agree that the district court abused its discretion when it stayed Soto's sentence. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for resentencing and, in the district court's discretion, further fact-finding if necessary.

I.

Late one night in May 2012, M.F. left a bonfire with Soto and two of Soto's friends. They all had been drinking and went to an apartment nearby. M.F. thought they were stopping at the apartment briefly. At the apartment, one of Soto's friends continued drinking and eventually passed out. Soto and the other friend, Ismael Hernandez, began making sexual comments to M.F., touching her, and trying to lift her dress. Soto pushed M.F. into a bedroom. Hernandez followed them and shut the door.

According to M.F., Soto and Hernandez then took off her clothes and forced her onto the bed. One of the two held her down while the other penetrated her anally. Soto then told Hernandez to leave because M.F. “was [Soto's] for the rest of the night.”

After Hernandez left, Soto penetrated M.F. vaginally and orally, slapped her face, and choked her. The sexual assault lasted about 2 hours. The next morning, M.F. went to the emergency room and reported the assault. The examining nurse observed bruises, scrapes, a swollen cheek, cut lips, and a torn anus

.

The State charged Soto with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. See Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (2012). Soto agreed to plead guilty in return for the State recommending the presumptive sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines—12 years executed, see Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.B—and not seeking an aggravated departure. The State acknowledged that Soto could seek a downward departure but did not agree to acquiesce if Soto did so.

At the plea hearing, Soto did not admit to assaulting M.F. but conceded that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find him guilty. He also claimed that he could not remember everything that had happened because he had been intoxicated. See generally North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (concluding that the U.S. Constitution allows a court to accept a guilty plea from a defendant who claims to be innocent); State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1977) (concluding that a Minnesota court can accept a guilty plea from a defendant who claims to be innocent); State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 261 Minn. 106, 113–14, 110 N.W.2d 867, 872 (1961) (concluding that a Minnesota court can accept a guilty plea from a defendant who claims not to remember what happened). The district court tentatively accepted Soto's plea and scheduled a sentencing hearing, but left the record open so the State could submit evidence to support the facts in the plea.

In preparation for the sentencing hearing, an agent for Tri–County Community Corrections conducted a presentence investigation and filed a report with the district court. Noting that Soto “has minimized his actions and blames the victim without taking any responsibility,” the agent submitted a transcription of Soto's version of the incident:

I had consensual sex with a female who was cheating on her boyfriend and to get out of it she said I raped her! I am not a violent person and do feel as [if] the woman I had sex with is a liar and a coward and I do not deserve to be in jail for something I didn't do!

The agent concluded that Soto “is a high risk to the community” and that “[c]ommunity safety may best be served by [Soto] serving his time in the Minnesota Correctional Facility.” She recommended the presumptive 12–year sentence and suggested that Soto “would also benefit from completing a sexual abuse treatment and cognitive behavior program while incarcerated.”

Soto also underwent a diagnostic assessment at the Upper Mississippi Mental Health Center. Soto completed the Sexual Adjustment Inventory, a test that measures sexually deviant behaviors, and the results indicated that he “engages in denial and minimization of the sexual offense.” The assessor noted that Soto “did not express any remorse or regrets about the sexual offense ... and was quick to point out that the contact was consensual and the victim made allegations against him out of fear that this would cause conflicts in her relationship.” Nonetheless, and without explanation, the assessor concluded that Soto “appears to be an appropriate candidate for participation in the outpatient Sexual Abuse Treatment program.” The assessor did not identify the characteristics that made Soto suitable for outpatient treatment and did not indicate that outpatient treatment was more appropriate than incarceration.

At the sentencing hearing, Soto's attorney argued for a stayed sentence and the State argued for the presumptive executed sentence. After the attorneys made their arguments, Soto personally apologized to M.F. and asked for a stayed sentence. The district court confirmed that it accepted Soto's plea, found him guilty, and convicted him. The district court sentenced Soto to 12 years in prison, but stayed the sentence and put Soto on supervised probation for 30 years.

The district court called this “the most difficult case of this nature that the Court has considered” and acknowledged that Soto had minimized his culpability and blamed M.F. According to the district court, the “sole reason” for departing from the presumptive disposition was Soto's “amenability to probation.” A significant factor in the district court's conclusion that Soto was amenable to probation was the statement in the Upper Mississippi Mental Health Center's diagnostic assessment that Soto was an “appropriate candidate” for its outpatient treatment program.

Telling Soto that he would have an opportunity to correct his behavior, the district court emphasized that Soto was “only 37 years of age,” that he did not have many serious crimes in his record, and that it was “primarily alcohol that night [that] was the problem.” The district court also remarked that Soto's attitude in court was “largely ... respectful” and that “this particular type of event seems largely out of character.” Finally, the district court noted that Soto “seem[ed] to have some family support” and that focusing on his 10–year–old son might motivate him to correct his behavior. The district court did not say anything about Soto's culpability in sexually assaulting M.F. or whether putting Soto on supervised probation would protect public safety.

The State appealed. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for execution of the presumptive 12–year prison sentence. Soto, No. A13–0997, 2013 WL 6570073, at *6. The court of appeals concluded that the district court had abused its discretion by staying Soto's sentence because probation “understate[d] the criminality of [Soto's] conduct” and “the record dictate[d] a different result.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We granted Soto's petition for review.

II.

We “afford the trial court great discretion in the imposition of sentences” and reverse sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.¹ State v. Spain, 590 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn.1999). The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, however, limit the sentencing court's discretion by prescribing a sentence or range of sentences that is “presumed to be appropriate.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1. A sentencing court “must pronounce a sentence within the applicable range unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances” that distinguish a case and overcome the presumption in favor of the guidelines sentence. Id.; see also id. cmt. 2.D.103. Accordingly, a sentencing court can exercise its discretion to depart from the guidelines “only if aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present,” State v. Best, 449 N.W.2d 426, 427 (Minn.1989), and those circumstances provide a “substantial [ ] and compelling” reason not to impose a guidelines sentence, Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1. Conversely, a departure is an abuse of discretion if the court's reasons are “ ‘improper or insufficient’ ” and there is “ ‘insufficient evidence of record to justify the departure.’ ” State v. McIntosh, 641 N.W.2d 3, 8 (Minn.2002) (quoting Williams v. State, 361 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn.1985) ).

A.

The Sentencing Guidelines contain a “nonexclusive list” of mitigating circumstances that can justify a downward departure—that is, a reduction in the severity of a sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a. In this case, the district court's “sole reason” for staying Soto's sentence was Soto's “amenability to probation,” which is not on the list. Id. We note at the outset that Soto's mere “amenability to probation,” as articulated by the district court, does not rise to the level of what we have previously held to justify a departure from the guidelines. To be sure, we have held that “a defendant's particular amenability to...