Del A. v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 28 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 88-3154,88-3154
• Citation: 855 F.2d 1148
• Parties: DEL A., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Edwin EDWARDS, Individually and as Governor of the State of Louisiana, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1148

855 F.2d 1148

57 USLW 2239

DEL A., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Edwin EDWARDS, Individually and as Governor of the State of Louisiana, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 88-3154.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 28, 1988.

William A. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, David A. Dalia, Asst. Atty. Gen., Emile W. Schneider, Mary Beck Widmann, Section Chief, Office of Gen. Counsel, Lemann, O'Hara, Miles & White, Arthur A. Lemann, III, New Orleans, La., for defendants-appellants.

Steven Scheckman, ACLU of La., Ann Maclaine, Mark A. Moreau, New Orleans Legal Assistance Corp., New Orleans, La., Christopher A. Hansen, ACLU, Christopher T. Dunn, Marcia Robinson Lowry, New York City, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before THORNBERRY, WILLIAMS, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge:

This appeal questions the district court's conclusion that the individual defendants in this case are not entitled to qualified immunity from this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 suit. The complaint in this case alleges that the defendants violated various statutory and constitutional rights of the plaintiffs. Concluding that the asserted federal statutory rights were clearly and particularly established at the time of the alleged wrongs, we affirm without reaching the constitutional issues.

I.

In 1980, Congress amended portions of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program in Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 608. These amendments, known as the Adoptive Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 620-628, 670-679, (the "Child Welfare Act") require that state foster care systems meet certain minimum conditions to qualify for federal funds. These conditions include, among others, requirements that the state develop a "case plan" for each child and a "case review system." Id. Sec. 671(a)(16).

A case plan is defined in the Act as a written document containing a description of the type of home or institution into which the child is placed, the appropriateness of the placement, and how the state plans to carry out the placement of the child. Id. Sec. 675(1). Additionally, a case plan must provide a method for assuring that the child receives proper care and that services are provided to the child, the parents, and foster parents to improve conditions in the parents' home to facilitate the return of the child to that home or to facilitate other permanent placement of the child. Id. The plan must also include a discussion of the appropriateness of the services provided in the plan. Id.

The Act defines the required case review system as a procedure for assuring that each child's case plan is designed to place the child in the "least restrictive (most family like) setting available and in close proximity to the parents' home." Id. Sec. 675(5)(A). The system must have in place periodic reviews of the child's status, and the reviews must occur at least once every six months. Id. Sec. 675(5)(B).

The Child Welfare Act also requires that after October 15, 1983, the state must make "reasonable efforts" to prevent the need for the removal of children from their homes or to make it possible for children to return to their homes. Id. Sec. 671(a)(15).

The plaintiffs in this case are 15 children who have been or are at risk of being taken involuntarily into custody by the Louisiana Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) as foster children. ¹ In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants--various Louisiana state officials sued in their individual and official capacities--violated various provisions of the Child Welfare Act as well as various provisions of the United States Constitution. The suit seeks damages for the named plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The suit also seeks class-wide injunctive relief.

The individual defendants raised the defense of qualified immunity from damages and moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The motion stated that (1) the Child Welfare Act did not create substantive rights enforceable under Section 1983, and, if it did, the rights were not clearly established at the time of the alleged violations; and (2) the complaint failed to set forth a claim for the violation of recognizable constitutional rights, and, if it did, the rights were not clearly established at the time of the alleged violations. The district court denied the motion, holding that because the alleged illegal actions violated clearly established statutory and federal constitutional rights, qualified immunity was not available. The individual defendants filed this immediate appeal pursuant to Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (holding that a denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an appealable "final decision").

II.

In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the Supreme Court held that government officials performing discretionary functions are immune from civil damages for conduct that does not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights. The Court also said that this immunity is one "from suit rather than a mere defense to liability...." Mitchell, 105 S.Ct. at 2816 (emphasis deleted). It is this characteristic--immunity from suit--that justifies immediate appeal of the denial of qualified immunity, for requiring officials to wait until after trial for review would effectively destroy this aspect of the immunity. See Mitchell, 105 S.Ct. at 2816; Sorey v. Kellett, 849 F.2d 960, 961 (5th Cir.1988).

Because qualified immunity is designed to protect discretionary functions of officials, it is not available when the official acts in such a way that it is clear that the actions will violate a person's rights. When the law is unclear, however, the official does require protection so that fear of suit will not cloud the decision-making process. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the proper focus of our review on the question of qualified immunity should be whether the alleged conduct violated "legal principals that were 'clearly established' " at the time. Anderson v. Creighton, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

The Supreme Court has provided us with a framework in which we are to determine whether rights are clearly established. See id. 105 S.Ct. at 3038-39. To illustrate the framework, the Court used as an example the rights supplied by the due process clause. The Court noted that "the right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates that Clause (no matter how unclear it may be that the particular action is a violation) violates a clearly established right." Id. at 3038. It concluded, however, that such a broad definition of "clearly established" would defeat the policy behind qualified immunity--shielding officials from suit for the exercise of discretion in circumstances in which "their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the [plaintiff's] rights...." Id. Thus, the concept of "clearly established" had to be defined narrowly to serve the goals of qualified immunity.

To achieve the proper scope for the immunity, the Court focused on the application of the right to the particular circumstances faced by the official at the time of the exercise of discretion. The Court said:

The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has been previously held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent.

Id. at 3039 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). By particularizing qualified immunity to the facts of the case, the Court was able to protect officials in those many situations in which it is unreasonable to expect an official to know with complete certainty whether his actions will be unlawful. This method, however, also enabled the Court to remove the protection in cases in which the official should know that the proposed action would violate someone's rights.

In this case, then, to decide whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, we must determine whether an objectively reasonable official would understand that the alleged improper actions were unlawful. If so, these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

III.

The officials first argue that the Child Welfare Act does not create substantive rights enforceable under Section 1983 because the Act was enacted pursuant to Congress' spending power. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1545, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981) ("[T]he typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the State."). But see Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 107 S.Ct. 766, 770-71, 773, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987) (discussing Pennhurst and stating that the federal government's power to audit state housing authorities and to cut off federal funds is "insufficient to indicate a congressional intention to foreclose Sec. 1983 remedies"); L.J. ex rel. Darr v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that violations of the Child Welfare Act are privately enforceable under Section 1983), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3769 (U.S. May 2, 1988) (No. 87-1796). Next, the officials argue that if a private Section 1983 right of action exists, the right is limited to injunctive relief and that damages may not be recovered. Compare Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, ...