Wise v. Pea Ridge School Dist.
| Citation | 855 F.2d 560 |
| Decision Date | 26 August 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-1029,88-1029 |
| Parties | 48 Ed. Law Rep. 1098 Daniel WISE, et al., Appellants, v. PEA RIDGE SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Charles S. Trantham, Fayetteville, Ark., for appellants.
Constance Clark, Fayetteville, Ark., for appellees.
Before BOWMAN, Circuit Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and STUART *, Senior District Judge.
Appellants, two students in the Pea Ridge School District and their parents, appeal the order of the district court 1 granting summary judgment to the Pea Ridge School District, employees of the school district, and members of the school board in this case involving the administration of the school district's corporal punishment and in-school suspension policies.
On February 20, 1986, Daniel Wise, a sixth grade student, was playing "dodge ball" with six other boys. The school coach, Coach Larry Walker, had previously told the boys not to play the game on two separate occasions and when he saw them continuing to play the game he required the boys to sit out for the remainder of the physical education class. After class Coach Walker gave each of the boys two "licks" on the buttocks with a wooden paddle. The paddle was approximately one-half inch thick, three inches wide, and twenty-two inches long. 2 Corporal punishment is authorized by the school district's policies and Coach Walker complied with them by administering the punishment in the presence of two witnesses.
After school, Daniel's father took Daniel to see a doctor. The doctor did not treat Daniel but suggested that he take Tylenol for any pain. Daniel developed bruises on his buttocks as a result of the paddling. Daniel's father also filed a complaint with the local police department stating that the punishment administered by Coach Walker was excessive. The police investigated the complaint but apparently no criminal charges were filed.
The other school action challenged in this appeal involves a form of in-school suspension called the Special Assignments Class (SAC). Michael Decker, also a student in the Pea Ridge School District, was placed in the SAC classroom for three days because he was tardy seven times.
Michael is a seventh grade special education student who has a reading disorder. The Special Education Committee determined that the school district's disciplinary policies would not adversely affect Michael's education. This determination was made with special reference to the school district's in-school suspension policies.
The description of the SAC classroom given by the appellants gives one the impression that students are disciplined by placing them in an unsupervised cubicle or storage closet. In fact, the SAC classroom is quite roomy, providing thirty-four square feet per child--the minimum recommended under Arkansas law is thirty square feet per child. The SAC classroom contains eight study carrels, a teacher's desk, windows, and is located next to the restroom. SAC students are allowed three regularly scheduled restroom breaks throughout the day and at other times students are allowed to visit the restroom after getting permission from the supervising SAC teacher. Michael stated that he has never asked for permission to use the restroom and had his request denied.
We begin our analysis by noting that the district court decided this case on summary judgment. When reviewing a grant of summary judgment this court is bound by the same legal standards that bound the district court. First, we must consider all of the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties. Second, we must reverse unless we determine that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Portis v. Folk Constr. Co., 694 F.2d 520, 522 (8th Cir.1982). We have carefully reviewed the entire record in this case and we do not believe that there are any genuine issues of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. Further, we believe that the school district is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Daniel and Michael have failed to establish a violation of their substantive due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
Appellants have submitted several affidavits by nonparties that discuss the manner in which other students were corporally punished and other methods of in-school suspension. We do not believe that any of the evidence regarding the school's corporal punishment and in-school suspension policies and their administration with respect to nonparties is properly before this court. Daniel cannot use prior instances of alleged excessive corporal punishment in order to bootstrap his claim into a constitutional violation. 4 His claim must rise or fall on its own merits. The same is true with respect to the school district's in-school suspension policies. Michael presents evidence suggesting that other students were placed in cubicles and storage closets, yet he does not allege that he was subjected to any form of in-school suspension other than the SAC classroom. Accordingly, in reviewing the evidence that was before the district court we have only considered that evidence which specifically relates to Daniel and Michael.
If appellants had proved a violation of their constitutional rights then the extraneous evidence relating to the school's policies may have been properly admitted to show a custom or practice on the part of the school district in order to hold it liable. But since appellants' rights were not violated this extraneous evidence is not properly before this court.
This was noted by the district court when it stated:
[A]ffidavits [of nonparties] cannot be used to bypass the requirement that the plaintiffs themselves must have suffered constitutional deprivations at the hands of the defendants. Had the plaintiffs themselves been able to withstand a summary judgment motion, such evidence may have proved helpful to the plaintiffs in establishing the "policy" or "custom" alleged.
Daniel Wise argues that his substantive due process rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when Coach Walker used corporal punishment to discipline him. The undisputed facts are that Coach Walker gave Daniel two licks with a paddle in the presence of two witnesses. The paddling was given after two previous warnings failed to deter Daniel and the other boys from misbehaving. After the paddling Daniel's buttocks became reddened and slightly bruised. We do not believe that these facts rise to the level of a substantive due process violation.
In Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 (3rd Cir.1988), the Third Circuit noted that "[a] decision to discipline a student, if accomplished through excessive force and appreciable physical pain, may constitute an invasion of the child's Fifth Amendment liberty interest in his personal security and a violation of substantive due process prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment." See also Garcia, 817 F.2d at 653; Woodard v. Los Fresnos Indep. School District, 732 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir.1984); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 611 (4th Cir.1980); cf. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673-74, 97 S.Ct. at 1413-14. We agree that at some point the administration of corporal punishment may violate a student's liberty interest in his personal security and substantive due process rights, however, we do not believe that the conduct in the instant case even comes close to that point.
We believe that a substantive due process claim in the context of disciplinary corporal punishment is to be considered under the following test: 1) the need for the application of corporal punishment; 2) the relationship between the need and the amount of punishment administered; 3) the extent of injury inflicted; and 4) whether the punishment was administered in a good faith effort to maintain discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
This circuit has applied a similar test in the analogous context of police brutality cases. See Davis v. Forrest, 768 F.2d 257, 258 (8th Cir.1985). See also Hall, 621 F.2d at 613 ().
Applying this test, we do not believe that Daniel's substantive due process rights were violated. Coach Walker's use of corporal punishment was not at all unreasonable in light of the circumstances. Daniel and the other boys were verbally warned to stop playing dodge ball prior to the administration of the punishment yet the boys did not heed the Coach's warning. The relationship between the need to use force and the amount of force used was also reasonable under the circumstances. Daniel only received two licks for his mischevious behavior and while the punishment did cause his buttocks to redden and resulted in some discomfort we do not believe that the force was excessive or administered for improper reasons.
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Daniel we remain convinced that Coach Walker administered the punishment in a good faith effort to maintain discipline in the gymnasium and not for the malicious or sadistic purpose of causing harm. This is highlighted by the fact that Coach Walker administered the punishment at the conclusion of his class--allowing time for the boys to reflect on their behavior and providing a period of time to cool off before punishing the boys. 5 The punishment was also administered uniformly to all of the boys involved in the dodge ball game. Finally, Coach Walker punished the boys in the presence of two witnesses in compliance with school district policy.
Moreover, under Arkansas law educators have a common law privilege to administer disciplinary corporal punishment. Berry v. Arnold School District, 199 Ark ...
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