Reel v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc.

Citation855 N.E.2d 343
Decision Date18 October 2006
Docket NumberNo. 49A02-0601-CV-27.,49A02-0601-CV-27.
PartiesMaureen REEL and Thomas Dullen on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. CLARIAN HEALTH PARTNERS, INC., Appellee-Defendant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Indiana

Ronald E. Weldy, Abrams Weldy Drummond & Huiras, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellants.

Kim F. Ebert, Dane A. Mize, Ogletree Deakins Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

SHARPNACK, Judge.

Maureen Reel and Thomas Dullen (collectively "Named Plaintiffs") bring this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's order setting a hearing on Clarian Health Partners, Inc.'s ("Clarian") motion for summary judgment and granting Clarian's motion for a protective order. The Named Plaintiffs raise one issue, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court erred by setting a hearing on Clarian's motion for summary judgment before addressing class certification.1 We affirm.

The relevant facts follow. On July 11, 2005, the Named Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Clarian as a class action pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of "all former employees of [Clarian] who involuntarily separated from employment with [Clarian] and were paid their PTO wages on or after July 11, 2003." Appellee's Appendix at 1. The Named Plaintiffs' complaint stated that the class "consists of hundreds of members." Id. The Named Plaintiffs alleged that Clarian did not timely pay the members of the class their agreed wages as required by the Wage Claims Statute, Ind.Code §§ 22-2-9. Id. at 2. The Named Plaintiffs served their first set of interrogatories and request for production of documents on Clarian. In September 2005, Clarian filed a motion for summary judgment and argued: (1) that members of the class who failed to file a wage claim with the commissioner of labor are precluded from bringing a direct private action under the Wage Claims Statute; and (2) that Clarian's policy does not violate the wage claims statute. Clarian also filed a motion for protective order, which requested an order "preventing Plaintiffs' counsel from conducting any discovery regarding the identity and contact information of the purported Class until such time as the Court has ruled on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment." Appellant's Appendix at 68.

On November 10, 2005, the trial court granted Clarian's motion for protective order and set a hearing on Clarian's motion for summary judgment for December 16, 2005. The trial court entered an order, which stated in part:

[T]he Court now having heard arguments on some of the issues on November 2, 2005 now re-sets this matter for a hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment on the 16th day of December, 2005 at 9:00 AM for one half (1/2) hour.

Further, the court finds that the Motion for Protective Order should be GRANTED. Therefore, the court orders that any discovery regarding the identity and contact information for the purported class is STAYED until the court has ruled on the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Id. at 6.

On November 29, 2005, the Named Plaintiffs filed a motion to correct error and a motion to continue the summary judgment hearing and to compel discovery. On December 7, 2005, the Named Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the trial court's November 10, 2005, order for appeal pursuant to Ind.App. Rule 14(B) and to stay proceedings in the trial court pending certification and appeal. On December 12, 2005, Clarian filed an objection to the Named Plaintiffs' motions to continue the summary judgment hearing, compel discovery, and interlocutory appeal.2 Clarian argued that the Named Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery sought "onerous and burdensome class discovery." Id. at 9. The trial court certified the order for interlocutory appeal and stayed the proceedings. Thereafter, we accepted jurisdiction of the interlocutory appeal pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 14(B).

The sole issue is whether the trial court erred by setting a hearing on Clarian's motion for summary judgment before addressing class certification. The Named Plaintiffs argue that Ind. Trial Rule 23 requires class certification to be completed prior to addressing Clarian's motion for summary judgment. "Because construction of the trial rules is a question of law, we review this issue de novo."3 Higgason v. State, 789 N.E.2d 22, 27 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003) (relying on Keene v. Elkhart County Park and Recreation Bd., 740 N.E.2d 893, 896 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), reh'g denied).

The resolution of this case depends on the interpretation of Ind. Trial Rule 23, which provides, in pertinent part:

* * * * *

(C) Determination by order whether class action to be maintained — Notice-Judgment—Actions conducted partially as class actions.

(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court, upon hearing or waiver of hearing, shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.

* * * * *

The Named Plaintiffs argue that "Indiana law dictates that class certification is to take place prior to a ruling on the merits of a class action." Appellant's Brief at 8. The Named Plaintiffs rely on Bowen v. Sonnenburg, 411 N.E.2d 390 (Ind.Ct. App.1980), and State v. Doody, 556 N.E.2d 1357 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), reh'g denied, trans. denied, for this proposition. In Bowen, the plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that they "were entitled to be paid for all services performed in accord with the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act." Bowen, 411 N.E.2d at 393. The defendants filed an answer and raised affirmative defenses. Id. at 394. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment "in which they sought judgment that this was a proper class action; that the defendants were obligated to pay the minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . and a declaratory judgment that the plaintiffs had performed valuable services for the defendants." Id. at 394. "The defendants' response, among other things, questioned the propriety of a class action. In addition they moved for a partial summary judgment to the effect that the Patient's Remuneration Act provided an administrative remedy that must be utilized before a civil action could be maintained." Id. The trial court considered the motions for summary judgment and "determined that the plaintiffs' motion should be granted and the defendants' denied." Id. The trial court then entered an order, which stated in part:

(a) the action was properly maintainable as a class action;

(b) a proper class consisted of "all patient workers who have labored in the State of Indiana institutions for the mentally handicapped or mentally retarded since the enactment of the Patient Remuneration Law (L.C.(sic) 16-13-12.8-1, et seq.);"

Id. Bowen brought an interlocutory appeal. Id.

On appeal, this court held that the trial court "erred both in its handling of the class action determination and the substantive issues decided on summary judgment." Id. at 395-396. We held:

[W]e must make two observations about the procedure provided by the rule for determining the class issues.

TR 23(C)(1) provides,

"As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court, upon hearing or waiver of hearing, shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits." (our emphasis)4

The companion section of the federal rule is identical except that it omits the emphasized phrase.5 Thus, the Indiana rule not only plainly expresses a hearing requirement, but being adopted some four years after its federal counterpart, it must be presumed that the framers of our rule intended to change the consequences existing under the otherwise identical federal rule. We conclude that unless waived by the parties, our rule requires the court to conduct a hearing upon whether the action should be permitted as a class action.

Moreover, we find this approach is supported by sound reason. What we have said so far points up the substantial questions that exist in determining the various elements necessary to proper maintenance of a class action and the significance of correctly identifying the type of class action involved. We believe that an adequate hearing is a valuable safeguard against permitting some of these critical considerations from being submerged by the overall magnitude of the issues the litigation seeks to reach. However, we reject the state's assertion that it is incumbent upon the potential class plaintiff at this hearing to establish the likelihood that it will ultimately succeed upon the merits. While some of the decisions prior to Eisen IV [, 417 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974),] so held, for the purpose of allocating the burdens of giving notice, the Supreme Court in Eisen IV resolved the problem by placing the burden upon the party asserting class status and expressly rejecting consideration of the ultimate merits at this stage as inimical to both the purpose of subsection (C)(1) and the substantial rights of the defendant. 417 U.S. at 178, 179, 94 S.Ct. at 2152, 2153.

Secondly, and with respect to the language of the rule indicating the hearing and determination should be made "(a)s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action . . . ." we are in accord with Judge (now Mr. Justice) Stevens' comment in his dissent to Sprogis v United Air Lines[, Inc.], (7th Cir.1971) 444 F.2d 1194, 1207, cert. den. 404 U.S. 991, 92 S.Ct. 536, 30 L.Ed.2d 543:

"At a minimum, this rule requires the class to be defined before the merits of the case have been decided . . . . A procedure which permits a claim to be treated as a class action if plaintiff wins, but merely as an...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Lawane Chaney On Behalf of Himself v. Clarian Health Partners Inc.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • September 29, 2011
    ...federal cases regarding class actions applying Federal Rule 23 or Indiana Trial Rule 23. For example, in Reel v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 855 N.E.2d 343, 356 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), this court held that, under Indiana Trial Rule 23, just as occurred here, a trial court may decide a disposi......
  • Reel v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • September 5, 2007
    ...MAY, J. and BAILEY, J. concur. 1. The trial court set a hearing on Clarian's motion for summary judgment. Reel v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 855 N.E.2d 343, 345 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). The Named Plaintiffs then filed a motion to certify the trial court's order setting a hearing on Clarian's ......
  • Reel v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • December 8, 2009
    ...trial court from hearing Clarian's motion for summary judgment before addressing class certification. Reel v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 855 N.E.2d 343, 349, 356 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). 3. Named Plaintiffs argue that the standard of review is actually for summary judgment, not a Trial Rule 1......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT