Campbell v. White
| Decision Date | 29 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 80770,80770 |
| Citation | 856 P.2d 255,1993 OK 89 |
| Parties | Representative Grover R. CAMPBELL, Assistant Minority Leader of the Oklahoma House of Representatives; Representative Don Weese; Representative Carolyn Coleman; and Representative Joan Greenwood, Members of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, Petitioners, v. Jack WHITE, Director of State Finance, and, Claudette Henry, State Treasurer, Respondents. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
The petitioners, Representative Grover R. Campbell, Assistant Minority Leader, Representative Don Weese, Representative Carolyn Coleman, and Representative John Greenwood filed an original action challenging two bills passed during the second session of the 43rd Legislature. The Representatives assert that Senate Bill 142 and Senate Bill 725 contain multiple subjects in violation of the Okla. Const. art. 5, § 56. The respondents, Jack White, Director of State Finance and Claudette Henry, State Treasurer (collectively, State Officials), insist that the provisions of each of the Bills appropriate monies on a "functional basis" conforming with the one-subject mandate of art. 5, § 56. We find that because Senate Bill 142 and Senate Bill 725 contain multiple subjects, they are unconstitutional under art. 5, § 56 which requires special appropriation bills to contain a single subject.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED; DECLARATORY RELIEF GRANTED; PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION TO JUNE 30, 1994.
Representative Raymond L. Vaughn, Jr., Assistant Minority Leader, Oklahoma House of Representatives, Edmond and Representative Frank W. Davis, Former Minority Leader, Oklahoma House of Representatives, Guthrie, for petitioners.
Neal Leader, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for respondents.
The dispositive issue presented is whether Senate Bill 142 (S.B. 142) and Senate Bill 725 (S.B. 725) (Bills) contain multiple subjects in violation of the Okla. Const. art. 5, § 56. 1 We find that because Senate Bill 142 and Senate Bill 725 contain multiple subjects, they are unconstitutional under art. 5, § 56 which requires special appropriation bills to contain a single subject.
In appropriating state monies for fiscal year 1993, the Oklahoma Legislature passed fourteen appropriation bills covering various state functions. 2 On December Senate Bill No. 142 is styled "An Act Relating to State Cultural Entities." The bill contains appropriations for the State Arts Council, the Oklahoma Department of Libraries, the Will Rogers Memorial Commission, the J.M. Davis Memorial Commission, the Oklahoma Historical Society, the Oklahoma Tourism and Recreation Department, and the Oklahoma Education Television Authority. Senate Bill No. 725 contains numerous provisions relating to "State Business Regulatory Agencies." The bill appropriates monies to the following agencies: the Banking Department, the Department of Commerce, the Commission on Consumer Credit, the Department of Labor, the Liquefied Petroleum Gas Board and the Oklahoma Securities Commission.
16, 1992, the petitioners, Representative Grover R. Campbell, Assistant Minority Leader, Representative Don Weese, Representative Carolyn Coleman, and Representative John Greenwood (collectively, Representatives), filed an original action challenging two of the bills. The Representatives assert that S.B. 142 and S.B. 725 contain multiple subjects in violation of the Okla. Const. art. 5, § 56. On February 1, 1993, the State Secretary of Energy, Charles Nesbitt (Nesbitt/intervenor) filed an application to intervene challenging the twelve other bills passed by the 2nd Session of the 43rd Legislature. The intervenor agrees with the Representatives that S.B. 142 and S.B. 725 each contain a multiplicity of subjects. However, he alleges that the remaining bills also encompass multiple subjects and that they, too, are unconstitutional. 3 The State Officials responded on February 9, 1993, in support of the constitutionality of the Bills. They argue that because S.B. 142 and S.B. 725 each encompass a single "function" of state government, the bills are in compliance with the single-subject mandate of art. 5, § 56. Final pleadings were received February 23, 1993.
SENATE BILL 142 AND SENATE BILL 725 CONTAIN MULTIPLE SUBJECTS. THEY ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ART. 5, § 56 WHICH REQUIRES SPECIAL APPROPRIATION BILLS TO CONTAIN A SINGLE SUBJECT.
The funding for numerous state agencies and the efficacy of the Legislature's current model for appropriating state funds is challenged by the Representatives and by the intervenor. Their position is that the Bills are unconstitutional in toto. This argument is premised on the language of art. 5, § 56 of the Okla. Const. providing that all appropriations, except those found in a general appropriations bill, " ... shall be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject." (Emphasis provided.)
The State Officials contend that they have accomplished the mandate of art. 5, § 56, that special appropriation bills each contain only a single subject, by instituting a functional appropriation method. Under this method, each state "function" is funded through one special appropriations bill allowing the Legislature to consider the broad spectrum of a function rather than considering each agency individually. The State Officials argue the Bills each contain a single subject; that is, S.B. 142 covers the cultural functions of the State and S.B. 725 encompasses the business regulatory functions of Oklahoma.
The Representatives urge us to assume original jurisdiction and to issue a writ of prohibition freezing the funds appropriated in S.B. 142 and S.B. 725. They insist that the constitutionality of these bills, both of which encompass special appropriations, is of great public concern. 4 We find that the case before us presents one of those rare circumstances where this Court should grant a form of declaratory relief. Therefore, we assume original jurisdiction and grant the request in the form of declaratory relief. 5
THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE.
Most state constitutions contain some form of the single-subject rule. 6 Its purpose is to prevent the practice of log-rolling--the enactment of legislation through the combination of unpopular causes with popular legislation on an entirely different subject. 7 Not only does the single subject rule prohibit log-rolling, it also enables the public and the Legislature to understand the scope and effect of pending legislation. Generally, the only notice of pending legislation is a publication of its title. 8
The Courts which have considered what the State Officials refer to as a functional approach to addressing the requirement that special appropriation legislation contain a single subject, are divided on the efficacy of the method. 9 However, even if we were to adopt a more expansive approach to the application of the single-subject rule of art. 5, § 56, it is unclear that the result hoped for by the State Officials would be accomplished. Apparently, the State Officials' contention is that a functional approach to consideration of the single-subject mandate of art. 5, § 56 would lead to the upholding of more legislation than what they characterize as the "strict approach" applied in Johnson v. Walters, 819 P.2d 694, 698 (Okla.1991). 10
A review of the relevant case law does not support this proposition. Our recent The Representatives and the State Officials all rely upon Opinion of the Justices, 512 So.2d 72, 77 (Ala.1987) in support of their respective positions. In Justices, the Alabama court found that provisions providing appropriations for elementary and secondary schools, junior and technical colleges, and for colleges and universities all came within the single rubric of "appropriations for public education." However, the court held that appropriations within the same bill for non-state agencies violated Alabama's constitutional restrictions on general appropriation bills. The Alabama court allowed appropriations all relating to a single subject--public education--to stand. It struck the non-related provisions for non-state agencies. The holding in Justices is premised on a history of the funding practices of the Alabama Legislature rather than on any detailed one-subject analysis. It is not particularly instructive for our purposes. We must determine, under Oklahoma law, whether S.B. 142 and S.B. 725 violate the Oklahoma constitutional provisions prohibiting multi-subject legislation.
decision in Johnson v. Walters, 819 P.2d 694, 698 (Okla.1991) is dispositive of most of the arguments presented. In Johnson, we held that under art. 5, § 57 of the Okla. Const., general legislation bills and special appropriation bills are limited to one subject. Section 56 requires that general appropriation bills embrace nothing but appropriations. Here, special appropriation bills are presented--both Bills contain appropriations and general legislative provisions. Significantly, the Bills do not contain severability provisions; and the Oklahoma Constitution does not have a provision which allows the Governor to treat each subject of a multi-subject bill as a separate enactment. Nor does it have any provision authorizing this Court to excise offending provisions and to leave the balance standing. 11 Just as art. 5, § 56 requires that special appropriation bills contain a single subject, art. 5, § 57 mandates "(e)very act of the Legislature shall embrace but one subject ... except general appropriation bills, general revenue bills, and bills adopting a code, digest, or revision of statutes ...". 12 Except for limited exceptions--none of which apply here--s 57 requires that every act of the Legislature be limited to a solitary subject. The Bills cannot withstand a single-subject challenge under art. 5, § 56 or under art. 5, § 57.
Nor can the State Officials find a great deal of support for their adoption of the functional approach from other...
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