Cain v. Lane, 87-1901
| Decision Date | 07 October 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-1901,87-1901 |
| Citation | 857 F.2d 1139 |
| Parties | James L. CAIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael P. LANE, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Howard B. Eisenberg, Southern Illinois Univ., Carbondale, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
William Henry London, Civ. Appeals, Atty. Gens. Office, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and COFFEY and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.
James Cain appeals from the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants in a civil rights action against Menard Correctional Center ("Menard") administrators and guards arising out of events which occurred while the plaintiff was incarcerated there. Cain raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because his complaint raised a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether the defendants disciplined the plaintiff in retaliation for his constitutionally protected speech. Second, Cain asserts that the disciplinary procedures utilized by Menard did not provide him with adequate due process protections.
The district court failed to address Cain's claim that the prison officials issued disciplinary tickets to him in retaliation for his participation in protected speech. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings on this issue. We find, however, that Illinois statutes and regulations do not create a liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population, and that, therefore, the defendants were not required to afford Cain due process protections before placing him in segregation. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed in part and affirmed in part.
On March 7, 1985, Cain met with Warden James H. Thieret, Assistant Warden James Buch, and Major Donald McDonough, all of whom are Menard prison administrators. Prior to this meeting, the general inmate population at Menard had compiled a list of grievances regarding conditions of confinement at Menard, and selected the L.I.F.E. Committee, composed of Cain as well as three other prisoners, to present their grievances to Menard's administrative officials. The inmates hoped to present their grievances in a nonconfrontational manner and to reach agreement with prison officials on possible solutions. Cain asked the administrators to meet with all four members of the L.I.F.E. Committee, but Warden Thieret insisted on meeting only with Cain.
Cain alleges that he presented a copy of the list of grievances to Warden Thieret, Buch, and McDonough at the meeting. Following a general discussion of the grievances, the parties focused on the issue of medical care in the prison. According to the plaintiff's affidavit, McDonough told Cain that he wanted a list of all officers who were ignoring prisoners' requests for medical care. Cain asserts that he then told McDonough that in order to collect specific grievances about correctional officers, he would need to enter cellhouses other than his own to talk to all of the inmates. According to Cain, McDonough then told him to get a pass or permission before entering other cellhouses. After further discussion of various grievances on the list, the meeting ended.
On March 10, 1985, the plaintiff approached Correctional Officer Cox at the entrance of Menard's South Cellhouse and sought permission to enter the cellhouse to collect information about prisoner medical care. Cain claims that Cox patted him down and allowed him to enter. While on Gallery S of the cellhouse, Sergeant Novara and Lieutenant Ramsey approached Cain and asked to see his identification card. They patted him down and confiscated an empty cigarette lighter that he was carrying. They then told Cain to return to his cellhouse.
En route, the plaintiff met Captain Betuski. Betuski asked Cain where he had been, and Cain replied he was returning from the South Cellhouse. Betuski also asked Cain who had given him permission to enter the South Cellhouse. Cain replied that Officer Cox had, and recounted McDonough's directive to collect prisoner grievances in the South Cellhouse. According to Cain, Betuski then radioed McDonough and asked McDonough if he had given the plaintiff permission to enter the South Cellhouse on that specific date--March 10, 1985. McDonough replied in the negative and told Betuski to "write that trouble-making black motherfucker a ticket." Betuski then ordered Cain back to his cellhouse. Cain arrived at his cellhouse without further incident, and Officer Brown escorted him to his cell.
According to Cain, Brown approached the plaintiff that evening at 6:00 p.m. and told him to pack his property because he was going to segregation. Cain asked why, and requested a meeting with Betuski. Immediately thereafter, Lieutenant Fulks arrived at the plaintiff's cell and told him that McDonough had called Betuski and ordered him to have all of the officers Cain had seen that day write Cain disciplinary tickets. Fulks also said that McDonough told Betuski to transfer the plaintiff to segregation. Cain was then taken to segregation, strip-searched, and placed in a cell. Between that evening and the following day, the plaintiff received five disciplinary tickets all arising out of his activities on the morning of March 10, but written so as to appear to be five unrelated infractions. Menard's Adjustment Committee (the "Committee") met on March 15, 1985 to adjudicate all of Cain's disciplinary tickets. The hearing consisted of the Committee members reviewing a disciplinary investigator's written reports which were not disclosed to the plaintiff. On the basis of the disciplinary report, the Committee rejected Cain's exculpatory statements 1 and found him guilty of all the charged infractions, expressly finding him guilty of five separate incidents. The plaintiff subsequently filed a grievance with the State of Illinois Administrative Review Board (the "Board") contesting the validity of the Committee's proceedings. The Board met at Menard on September 18, 1985 and denied the plaintiff's grievance. 2
On February 27, 1986, Cain filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. He sued the defendants on two related but separate claims. First, he alleged that the defendants had conspired to harass and punish him for his participation in the work of the L.I.F.E. Committee, which he contends was "speech" protected by the first amendment. Second, he claimed that his transfer to segregation and the disciplinary proceedings that followed denied him his right to due process. On May 21, 1987, United States Magistrate Gerald B. Cohn entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal on June 3, 1987. 3
Cain argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants for two reasons. First, he asserts that he raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was disciplined in retaliation for exercising his first amendment rights. Second, Cain alleges that he was deprived of due process. On his due process claim, Cain argues both that the district court erred in concluding that Illinois statutes and regulations do not create a liberty interest in remaining in Menard's general prison population, and that his Adjustment Committee proceedings were constitutionally deficient.
Because the district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, we must review the record to determine if there is a genuine issue with regard to any material fact and whether the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). We will view the entire record in the light most favorable to Cain, the non-moving party. International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Associated Gen'l Contractors, 845 F.2d 704, 705 (7th Cir.1988). If the prison administrators and guards demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact, Cain cannot rely on conclusory allegations; instead, he must provide evidence of specific factual disputes. Id. at 708. See also Duffey v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 829 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir.1987). Finally, because Cain proceeded pro se in the district court, that court was obliged to read the complaint liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam ); Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir.1980).
The district court construed the plaintiff's complaint narrowly as an attack on the procedures used by the prison officials who issued and adjudicated Cain's disciplinary tickets. The district court's order reads in part:
The plaintiff alleges violations of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the five disciplinary tickets issued to him by various defendants on March 10, 1985, and the subsequent Adjustment Committee Hearings held on March 13, 1985, violated the aforementioned rights. 4
A review of Cain's pleadings, however, discloses that he made two distinct claims: (1) retaliatory discipline, and (2) denial of due process. Although the district court addressed Cain's second claim, it failed to note Cain's allegation that he was disciplined in retaliation for engaging in protected speech. His complaint claimed that the named defendants,
conspired willfully, knowingly, wantonly, arbitrarily, and capriciously to harass Cain solely because Cain attempted to bring about, nonviolent, changes of the inhumane and unconstitutional conditions which existed, and still exist within Menard Correctional Center, thereby subjecting Cain to cruel and unusual punishment.
Even without reading this complaint expansively, it is clear that Cain stated a cause...
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