U.S. v. Vazquez, s. 87-1371

Citation857 F.2d 857
Decision Date08 June 1988
Docket Number87-1372,Nos. 87-1371,s. 87-1371
Parties, 26 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1121 UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jesus VAZQUEZ, Defendant, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Esteban PIZARRO, Defendant, Appellant. . Heard
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

Jose C. Romo Matienzo, Rio Grande, P.R., by Appointment of the Court, for defendants-appellants.

Ramon Garcia Garcia, San Juan, P.R., by Appointment of the Court, on brief, for defendant-appellant Jesus Vazquez.

Jose A. Quiles, Asst. U.S. Atty., Criminal Div., with whom Daniel F. Lopez-Romo, U.S. Atty., Hato Rey, P.R., was on brief, for appellee.

Before COFFIN, BOWNES and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judges.

COFFIN, Circuit Judge.

Defendants-appellants Jesus Vazquez and Esteban Pizarro were convicted on all four counts of an indictment for (1) conspiring to import cocaine into the customs area of the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 963; (2) aiding and abetting in the possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2; (3) aiding and abetting in the possession of cocaine aboard an aircraft arriving in the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 955 and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2; and (4) aiding and abetting in the importation of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 952 and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2. Vazquez challenges his conviction on all four counts; Pizarro limits his appeal to the charge of conspiracy. We affirm the convictions.

I. FACTS

On May 29, 1986, a Viasa Airlines flight originating in Venezuela arrived at the International Airport in San Juan, Puerto Rico. United States customs inspectors on duty at the airport observed appellants Vazquez and Pizarro separately disembarking from the aircraft. Appellants' behavior aroused the suspicions of the customs officials, who testified at trial as to the events that followed appellants' arrival in the United States.

Juan Hurtado Gelpi, a customs inspector working for the contraband enforcement team, observed Vazquez coming out of the gateway from the Viasa plane. Vazquez attracted his attention because he was carrying a bag that bore a logo from a town in Puerto Rico and yet held in his hand a Venezuelan passport. Hurtado stopped Vazquez and asked him if he previously had visited the United States. Vazquez denied any prior visits; his passport confirmed that denial. Hurtado then inquired as to how appellant had acquired the Puerto Rican bag that he carried off the airplane. Vazquez explained that the bag belonged to a Puerto Rican friend, Angel Santiago, whom he was to visit, and that he had decided to return the bag during his stay in Puerto Rico. When Hurtado then asked Vazquez to open the bag, he immediately noticed a pair of boxing gloves inside. The presence of the gloves surprised him because Angel Santiago is a well-known basketball player in Puerto Rico. Vazquez explained that the gloves were his own, and that he enjoyed boxing as a form of exercise.

Hurtado turned his attention back to the bag, and found a boxing license and social security card, both bearing the name of Esteban Pizarro. At that point, another customs inspector, Juan Arroyo, told Hurtado that he had noticed Pizarro, a well-known middleweight boxer, disembarking from the Viasa flight. Hurtado questioned Vazquez, who stated that he did not know Pizarro nor did he know why Santiago might have Pizarro's identification among his belongings. Hurtado ended his inspection at that time; however, he made a notation upon Vazquez's customs declaration card that called for a secondary inspection. Later, when Hurtado arrived in the secondary inspection area, he instructed another customs inspector to take Vazquez to a separate room for a search. At that time, Hurtado noticed that Vazquez was holding a customs declaration card other than the one he had marked earlier. The new card bore no notation requiring a secondary inspection. There is no evidence about what occurred in the search room, or how the decision was made to take Vazquez from that location to the supervisor's office.

The government's next witness, Inspector Arroyo, testified as follows. Arroyo noticed appellant Pizarro disembarking from the Viasa flight and stopped him for routine questioning. Pizarro told Arroyo that he had been on a pleasure trip in Venezuela, and that he was traveling with a friend. His passport confirmed that he had been in Venezuela for the three previous days. After a brief exchange, Arroyo allowed Pizarro to move on. Arroyo then noticed Inspector Hurtado stop Vazquez and he overheard their conversation. In light of Pizarro's presence on the flight, Arroyo found Vazquez's possession of Pizarro's identification coupled with a denial of any personal relationship to be suspicious. Arroyo therefore notified the supervisor, Inspector Maria Palmer, of the situation. Inspector Palmer stopped Pizarro, asked him a series of routine questions, and then sent him on for a secondary inspection.

Customs Inspector Felix Ramos performed the secondary inspection of Pizarro. Both Ramos and Arroyo were present at the inspection, which they described at trial. Ramos first asked Pizarro a series of questions in the customs enclosure area. Pizarro stated that he was traveling with a friend named Jesus. A few minutes later, Inspector Hurtado arrived and asked Pizarro if he knew Vazquez. Pizarro responded in the affirmative and explained that they were traveling together. When Hurtado told Pizarro that Vazquez denied any friendship, Pizarro responded: "How come he doesn't know me? He was traveling with me. I don't know why he says that. Where is he at? Do you want me to talk to him?" At that time, the inspectors decided to take Pizarro to "the search room" for a search. Ramos informed Pizarro that he was going to perform a physical search. Pizarro objected, and after a moment, he stated that he was carrying something illegal. He then removed three packages that were strapped to his body, which were identified later as containing cocaine. Ramos placed Pizarro under arrest, read him his rights, and moved him to a different room: the supervisor's office.

Inspector Ramos testified that after another five to ten minutes, an unnamed customs official brought Vazquez into the supervisor's office. Pizarro was there in the presence of both Ramos and Arroyo. Ramos testified that Vazquez immediately addressed Pizarro: "Listen, why you say you know me? I don't know you. I don't know you. I never seen you before." Pizarro responded: " 'No me joda.' You know me. Now I'm going to get all the blame and you guys are going to get out." Following this exchange, the customs officials moved Pizarro to a different room. The record does not reflect whether this was the same room in which Pizarro was taken initially for a body search or some other room.

Both Inspectors Arroyo and Ramos further testified that Pizarro and Vazquez subsequently were permitted to leave the customs enclosure area, under surveillance, in hopes that they would inadvertently identify anyone awaiting them in the airport. At first, Pizarro walked out alone, waited a few minutes without interacting with anyone, and then returned to the customs area. The two appellants then exited together, Vazquez walking behind Pizarro. At that time, Angel Santiago was standing outside the customs enclosure area. As the appellants approached Santiago, Vazquez moved ahead of Pizarro, said something to Santiago that the customs officials could not hear, and Santiago began to walk away. The customs officials stopped Vazquez and Pizarro and asked Santiago to accompany them to the customs enclosure area for questioning.

On June 4, 1986, Vazquez, Pizarro and Santiago were indicted. A three-day jury trial was held in February, 1987. At trial, the only additional evidence admitted relevant to this appeal was the testimony of Maribel Centeno Ortiz. Centeno explained that she had agreed to testify as part of a plea agreement with the government stemming from another indictment. On direct examination, Centeno testified that she had overheard a conversation between Vazquez and Santiago at her apartment complex in Puerto Rico in May 1986. She stated that Vazquez and Santiago were discussing whether to send Pizarro on a trip, and whether Pizarro would talk if he were caught. Her testimony was impeached on cross-examination, both by physical evidence (the passport of Vazquez did not support Centeno's assertion that he had been in Puerto Rico prior to his arrival on the Viasa flight) and by pointing out inconsistencies in her story.

At the close of the government's case, the court granted Santiago's motion for acquittal. Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a). The court denied similar motions by Vazquez and Pizarro. The jury found appellants guilty on all four counts of the indictment.

Vazquez argues that (1) the district court committed constitutional error by admitting into evidence the interchange between him and Pizarro in the supervisor's office; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions; and (3) he should have been granted a new trial due to newly discovered evidence. Pizarro joins Vazquez in his arguments that there was insufficient evidence on the conspiracy count and that the district court should have granted a new trial because of newly discovered evidence. We address each argument in turn.

II. ADMISSIBILITY OF DEFENDANTS' STATEMENTS

Vazquez objects on various grounds to the admission into evidence of the interchange between him and Pizarro in the supervisor's office. In that exchange, Vazquez said to Pizarro: "Listen, why you say you know me? I don't know you. I don't you. I never seen you before." Pizarro's retort was: " 'No me joda.' You know me. Now I'm going to get all the blame and you guys are going to get out." Because we find no error in the district court's evidentiary rulings on the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
25 cases
  • Davis v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • June 24, 1994
    ...113 S.Ct. 1835, 123 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993) (dism'g cert. as moot); United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343 (CA8 1990); United States v. Vazquez, 857 F.2d 857 (CA1 1988); United States v. Scalf, 725 F.2d 1272 (CA10 1984). Worse still, it may have produced — during an era of intense national conc......
  • State v. Davis
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • August 25, 2004
    ...88 S.W.3d 586, 603 (Tenn.Crim.App.2000) (citing Shedelbower v. Estelle, 885 F.2d 570, 573 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Vazquez, 857 F.2d 857, 861 (1st Cir.1988)). After reviewing the record, we agree with the trial court that there is no evidence that the Appellant was coerced by any of......
  • Nelson v. Fulcomer, P-8315
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • August 17, 1990
    ...is particularly well calculated to produce incriminating remarks. 6 The First Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Vazquez, 857 F.2d 857 (1st Cir.1988), merits special attention. In that case, the two defendants, Vazquez and Pizarro, were stopped and questioned by customs officials......
  • Ricketts v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • October 30, 2002
    ...(1993) (holding statement by co-defendant attributing ownership of drugs to defendant upon arrest admissible); United States v. Vazquez, 857 F.2d 857, 864-65 (1st Cir.1988) (rejecting Confrontation Clause objection regarding statement implicating defendant at time of 7. Under Texas case law......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • § 8.03 EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE AGAINST ONE PARTY
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Evidence (CAP) Title Chapter 8 Limited Admissibility
    • Invalid date
    ...460 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1972).[27] Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128 n.3.[28] Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).[29] See United States v. Vazquez, 857 F.2d 857, 864 (1st Cir. 1988) ("We already have held that Bruton does not present an obstacle to admission of a statement otherwise admissible as a spontaneou......
  • § 8.03 Evidence Admissible Against One Party
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Evidence (2018) Title Chapter 8 Limited Admissibility
    • Invalid date
    ...460 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1972). [27] Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128 n.3.[28] Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).[29] See United States v. Vazquez, 857 F.2d 857, 864 (1st Cir. 1988) ("We already have held that Bruton does not present an obstacle to admission of a statement otherwise admissible as a spontaneo......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT