Griffiths v. Cigna Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 June 1994
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 91-2356.
• Citation: 857 F. Supp. 399
• Parties: Jackey B. GRIFFITHS, Plaintiff, v. CIGNA CORPORATION and Marlene Graham, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

857 F. Supp. 399

Jackey B. GRIFFITHS, Plaintiff, v. CIGNA CORPORATION and Marlene Graham, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 91-2356.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

June 27, 1994.

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Alan B. Epstein, Jablon, Epstein and Wolf, Philadelphia, PA, for plaintiff.

Stephanie A. Middleton, Susan D. Salisbury, James B. Herman, CIGNA, Philadelphia, PA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VanARTSDALEN, Senior District Judge.

I. Brief Procedural History

After his May 1990 discharge by defendant CIGNA Corporation (CIGNA), plaintiff Jackey Griffiths filed this action on April 11, 1991, alleging claims of racial and national origin discrimination and retaliatory discharge from employment in violation of federal and Pennsylvania statutory law, as well as several common law claims, all stemming from plaintiff's denial of promotion and subsequent discharge from defendant CIGNA's employ.¹ (See Complaint, Filed Doc. No. 1.) After a trial in March 1992, the jury returned a verdict against defendants on plaintiff's claims for retaliatory discharge and for malicious prosecution.² The jury awarded plaintiff $377,500.00 in damages. (Filed Doc. No. 45.) Defendants filed a motion for a new trial and an amendment of judgment which I denied in an order entered May 13, 1992. (Filed Doc. Nos. 50, 57.)

Defendants appealed from that order, and in an opinion filed March 17, 1993 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of defendants on the malicious prosecution claim and directed a new trial on the retaliation claim. See Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 472 (3d Cir.1993). The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury that, under the evidence presented in the case, plaintiff had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the sole cause of his discharge was retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint.³ Plaintiff then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, which was denied on October 4, 1993. See Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 186, 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993).

After a four day retrial beginning on April 11, 1994 on the retaliatory discharge claim, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. In response to relatively simple and straightforward interrogatories — crafted to comport with the Third Circuit's mandate on remand and approved by counsel for both sides — the jury found that plaintiff had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the sole cause of plaintiff's discharge was retaliation for his having filed a claim of employment discrimination with the EEOC after he was denied a promotion.⁴ The jury awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $485,000.00⁵ and punitive damages in the amount of $750,000.00.⁶ In accord with the prior agreement of counsel, the judgment was entered only against defendant CIGNA.

Defendant CIGNA filed the present motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, for a new trial and/or remittitur, on April 28, 1994. (Filed Doc. No. 102.) For the reasons set forth below, the motions will be denied.

II. Judgment as a Matter of Law

Defendant premises its motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b)⁷ on two grounds: 1) the claim under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) should have been dismissed, because this court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over that claim; and 2) "no reasonable jury could find based on the evidence that (i) CIGNA's reason for Plaintiff's discharge was false and that retaliation was the sole cause of the discharge; or (ii) that Plaintiff was entitled to any damages, compensatory or punitive." (Filed Doc. No. 102 at 2.)

A judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only where the jury's verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence to allow reasonable jurors to arrive at the verdict. Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir.1993); Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N.A., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 921 (3d Cir.1986). Although a scintilla of evidence is not enough to withstand a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law is proper unless the record "is critically deficient of that minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief." Denneny v. Siegel, 407 F.2d 433, 439-40 (3d Cir.1969); see also Walter, 985 F.2d at 1238; Simone v. Golden Nugget Hotel and Casino, 844 F.2d 1031, 1034 (3d Cir.1988). The court is not free to weigh the evidence or to pass on the credibility of witnesses or to substitute its judgment of the facts for that of the jury. Lightning Lube v. Witco Corp., 802 F.Supp. 1180, 1885 (D.N.J.1992), aff'd by 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir.1993). Moreover, a court "considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law must view the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict winner." Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir.1992). The fundamental principle guiding the court when considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law is that there must be a minimum of interference with the jury and its deliberative processes. Lightning Lube, 802 F.Supp. at 1185. A case may not be taken away from the jury merely because "a measure of speculation and conjecture is required" when facts are in dispute and fair-minded individuals may draw differing inferences. Id. (quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 66 S.Ct. 740, 744, 90 L.Ed. 916 (1946)). Therefore, this court must determine only whether the evidence and the justifiable inferences in favor of the prevailing party afford any rational basis for the verdict.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendant premises its motion for judgment as a matter of law in part on its contention that plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies under the PHRA deprived this court of subject matter jurisdiction.⁸ This contention was the subject of a motion to amend defendants' answer to the complaint⁹ and a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants, both of which were denied by order entered March 30, 1994. (See Filed Doc. Nos. 81, 82, 85, 86, 87.) For the reasons set forth in the memorandum accompanying that order, as well as those set forth in the discussion below, I find that the contention that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies is similarly unavailing in the context of a motion for judgment as a matter of law.

In the order entered March 30, 1994, defendants were denied leave to amend their answer to the complaint by which they admitted to exhaustion of remedies. (Filed Doc. No. 87 at 12.) Both federal and Pennsylvania courts urge leniency in allowing amendment, except in cases "where unfair surprise or some comparable prejudice" would result. Pilotti v. Mobil Oil Corp., 388 Pa.Super. 514, 565 A.2d 1227, 1229 (1989); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); Pa.R.Civ.P. 1033; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330, 91 S.Ct. 795, 802, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971); Cornell & Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 573 F.2d 820, 823-24 (3d Cir.1978). I found that defendants' proposed amendment would "cause great prejudice, would cause further undue delay, and was of questionable good faith." (Filed Doc. No. 87 at 12.) The motion to amend was denied.

Although defendant's contention — that plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies under the PHRA deprived this court of subject matter jurisdiction — has some support in Pennsylvania case law, these cases have never dealt with the effect of an unqualified admission of subject matter jurisdiction in the answer to the complaint. Defendant correctly asserts that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has characterized "PHRC exhaustion as an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction which may not be waived." (Filed Doc. No. 102 at 10; see also, e.g., Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 522 Pa. 86, 559 A.2d 917 (1989); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 506 Pa. 549, 486 A.2d 388 (1985).) This strict approach has a certain superficial appeal that belies the complexity of the issue. As one commentator noted, it is "sometimes difficult to tell whether a given restriction on a court's authority is one of subject matter jurisdiction or one relating to jurisdiction of the person, jurisdiction over property, venue, or some procedural restriction on the manner of invoking jurisdiction." Robert C. Casad, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions 1-6, § 1.011 (1991) (emphasis added).

In many other contexts, Pennsylvania courts have demonstrated willingness to suspend the exhaustion requirement in exceptional cases, thereby suggesting that failure to exhaust administrative remedies is more accurately characterized as a procedural, rather than a jurisdictional, issue. See, e.g., Ohio Casualty Group of Ins. Cos. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 514 Pa. 430, 525 A.2d 1195 (1987) (stating that the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is not intended to set up procedural obstacles to recovery, and that the rule should be applied only where available administrative remedies are adequate); Feingold v. Bell of Pa., 477 Pa. 1, 383 A.2d 791 (1977) ("As with all legal rules, the exhaustion of administrative remedies rule is neither inflexible nor absolute, and this court has established exceptions to the rule.").

Exhaustive research uncovered no case in which a Pennsylvania court, confronted by an unqualified admission of record of exhaustion of administrative remedies, decides that failure to exhaust cannot be waived or that the defendant cannot be estopped from later altering the admission by contending plaintiff failed to exhaust his state administrative remedies. I conclude that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a procedural restriction to the right to bring suit under the PHRA that may be subject to estoppel and waiver due to unqualified admission in an answer that all...