Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC
Decision Date | 05 October 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 100925.,100925. |
Citation | 857 N.E.2d 250,223 Ill.2d 1,306 Ill.Dec. 157 |
Parties | Donna M. KINKEL, Appellee, v. CINGULAR WIRELESS LLC, Appellant. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Kurt E. Reitz, Roman P. Wuller, Robert J. Wagner, Heath H. Hooks, of Thompson Coburn, L.L.P., Belleville, Evan M. Tager and David M. Gossett, of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for appellant.
L. Thomas Lakin, Bradley M. Lakin, Richard J. Burke, Gail G. Renshaw, of Lakin Law firm, Charles W. Chapman, Wood River, Paul M. Weiss, Tod A. Lewis, of Freed & Weiss, L.L.C., Malik R. Diab, Phillip A. Bock, of Diab & Bock, William R. Quinlan, James A. Niewiara, Lisa M. Hegedus and Brian J. Alesia, of Quinlan & Carroll, Ltd., Chicago, for appellee.
Defendant, Cingular Wireless, LLC (Cingular), provides cellular telephone service to consumers. Under Cingular's standard service agreement, its customers commit to a specified "service term" and agree to pay an early-termination fee if they withdraw from the service agreement before the end of the term. Plaintiff, Donna M. Kinkel, individually and on behalf of a class of those similarly situated, filed suit against Cingular in the circuit court of Madison County, alleging that the early-termination fee constitutes an illegal penalty and that imposition of the fee is both a breach of the service agreement and statutory fraud under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2002)).
Cingular filed a motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's individual claim, in accordance with the mandatory arbitration provision of the standard service agreement, which provides that "no arbitrator has the authority" to resolve class claims. The circuit court, after a hearing, denied the motion. Interlocutory appeal was taken by Cingular pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (188 Ill.2d R. 307(a)(1)). The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that although the arbitration clause is enforceable, the limitation on class arbitration contained therein is unconscionable and, thus, unenforceable. 357 Ill.App.3d 556, 293 Ill.Dec. 502, 828 N.E.2d 812. This court granted Cingular's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill.2d R. 315), to determine whether the prohibition of class arbitration is unconscionable.
In July 2001, plaintiff entered into a two-year service agreement with Cingular for cellular telephone service by signing defendant's standard service agreement. The "TERMS AND CONDITIONS" of the agreement appear on the back of the form that plaintiff signed. These terms and conditions are spelled out on a single, legal-size sheet of paper in small type. Certain provisions are emphasized by the use of capital letters. Topics or headings appear in boldface type.
Plaintiff cancelled her cellular telephone service in April 2002, although the two-year term was not scheduled to expire until July 2003. Pursuant to the early-termination provision in the service agreement, Cingular charged her an early-termination fee of $150, which she paid under protest.
In August 2002, plaintiff filed suit. Cingular filed a motion to compel arbitration of her individual claim and stay the litigation, invoking the arbitration clause of the service agreement and sections 2 and 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3 (2000)). In September 2003, plaintiff filed her first amended complaint, again alleging that the $150 early termination fee is an illegal penalty. She further alleged that the ban on class treatment contained in the mandatory arbitration provision is intended by Cingular to further an unlawful scheme to collect an illegal penalty from her and other members of the class she purports to represent and that it prevents her and others from "effectively vindicating their statutory and common law causes of action and facilitates rather than remedies Cingular's fraudulent and unlawful conduct." (Because provisions barring class treatment in arbitration are generally referred to in the case law and the literature as "class action waivers," we will use the term "waiver," even though the provision at issue is phrased as a limitation on the scope of the arbitrator's authority, rather than as a waiver by the customer of her ability to file a claim on behalf of a class.)
After a hearing, the trial court denied Cingular's motion to compel arbitration finding, inter alia, that the arbitration clause was unenforceable on the basis of unconscionability. Interlocutory appeal was taken by Cingular.
The appellate court concluded that the class action waiver was unconscionable, but that it was severable from the remainder of the arbitration clause, which, in keeping with "the strong policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements," should be enforced. 357 Ill.App.3d at 569, 293 Ill.Dec. 502, 828 N.E.2d 812. The appellate court remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, noting that the effect of its ruling would be to stay plaintiff's lawsuit while her class claim proceeded to arbitration. 357 Ill.App.3d at 569, 293 Ill.Dec. 502, 828 N.E.2d 812.
The second sentence of the standard service agreement states that service is "subject to CINGULAR's standard business policies, practices and procedures that CINGULAR may change at any time without notice." The fourth sentence states:
The provision that is the subject of plaintiff's claim provides:
The arbitration clause provides, in pertinent part:
Defendant's brief states that the service agreement also provides that "all fees and expenses of the arbitration shall be equally borne by [the customer] and CINGULAR." Repeated reading of the fine print of the "TERMS AND CONDITIONS" page, however, has failed to reveal the existence of this provision. The only provision relating to the cost of arbitration incorporates the WIA Rules by reference and informs the customer that fee information is available from Cingular or the AAA "upon request."
Under the WIA Rules promulgated by the AAA, a claimant must pay a fee at the time he or she files a claim. If, as in the present case, the claim does not exceed $10,000, the claimant must pay one-half of the arbitrator's fees, up to a maximum of $125. Any funds not used are refunded to the claimant. For claims under $10,000, the business pays all fees that are not the responsibility of the claimant. Wireless Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration...
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