State v. Jackson
Decision Date | 22 November 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 40A05-0601-CR-20.,40A05-0601-CR-20. |
Citation | 857 N.E.2d 378 |
Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Misty JACKSON and Charles Jackson, II, Appellees-Defendants. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Dustin Houchin, Houchin Law Office, P.C., Salem, IN, Attorney for Appellee Misty Jackson.
Larry Medlock, Paoli, IN, Attorney for Appellee Charles Jackson, II.
The State of Indiana appeals the trial court's grant of the motions for discharge and dismissal filed by Misty Jackson ("Misty") and Charles Jackson, II ("Charles"). We affirm.
We restate the issue as whether the trial court erred in granting Misty's and Charles's motions for discharge and dismissal.
On June 18, 2004, the Washington County prosecutor's office charged Charles with class D felony escape. On July 1, 2004, the Washington County prosecutor's office charged Misty with class D felony conspiracy to commit escape. Warrants were issued for their arrest, and both were apprehended on April 11, 2005.
On April 18, 2005, Charles filed a motion for change of venue pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 12. On April 27, 2005, Misty filed a motion for change of venue and a motion for speedy trial pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B)(1), requesting that she be tried within seventy days. Misty also filed a notice of defense of mental disease or defect, requesting that the court appoint two or three psychiatrists or psychologists to examine her and notify counsel of the time and place of the examinations. Also on that date, Charles filed a motion for early trial pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B)(1). On May 2, 2005, the State filed motions for joinder, which both Misty and Charles opposed.
On May 5, 2005, the Washington Circuit Court held a hearing on the venue motions. On July 23, 2005, the court held a hearing on the joinder motions. On July 25, 2005, the court granted the venue and joinder motions and ordered the consolidation of Misty's and Charles's cases. After the parties filed their respective strikes pursuant to Criminal Rule 12(G), Jennings County was selected for venue.1 On October 13, 2005, the Washington Circuit Court issued an order venuing the case to Jennings County. On October 20, 2005, the clerk of the Jennings Circuit Court ("the trial court") issued a certification of venue stating that she had received the transcript of the case.
On January 3, 2006, Misty and Charles filed motions for discharge and dismissal pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(C). They asserted that the State had failed to bring them to trial within the seventy-day time frame of Criminal Rule 4(B)(1), which according to them started October 20, 2005, when the trial court clerk issued a certification of venue, and expired December 29, 2005. On January 6, 2006, the State filed a motion to set trial date. Also on that date, the trial court held a hearing on Misty's and Charles's motions for discharge and dismissal. On January 9, 2006, the trial court granted those motions. The State now appeals.
State v. Huber, 843 N.E.2d 571, 573 (Ind. Ct.App.2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. "To this end, the provisions of Indiana Criminal Rule 4 implement the defendant's speedy trial right." Id. Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B)(1) provides in pertinent part that a defendant
shall be discharged if not brought to trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of [a speedy/early trial motion], except where a continuance within said period is had on his motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such seventy (70) calendar days because of the congestion of the court calendar.
Under Criminal Rule 4(B), "the State has an affirmative duty to try an incarcerated defendant who requests a speedy trial within seventy days." McKay v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). "The defendant does not have an obligation to remind the State of this duty or to remind the trial court of the State's duty." Staples v. State, 553 N.E.2d 141, 143 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) ( ), trans. denied. Once the time period under Criminal Rule 4(B)(1) has elapsed, a defendant need only move for discharge. See State v. Hurst, 688 N.E.2d 402, 408 (Ind. 1997) (referring to Crim. R. 4(C)). Criminal Rule 4(B) "was designed to assure criminal defendants speedy trials, not to provide them with a technical means of avoiding trial." Smith v. State, 802 N.E.2d 948, 951 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).
None of the parties dispute that a defendant's motion for change of venue causes a delay in trial proceedings attributable to the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Mabrey, 199 Ind. 276, 278, 157 N.E. 97, 98 (1927) (). Also, none of the parties dispute that Criminal Rule 4(B)(1)'s seventy-day period begins to run following the change of venue. See, e.g., State ex rel. Banks v. Hamilton Superior Ct., 261 Ind. 426, 427, 304 N.E.2d 776, 776 (1973) ( ). The question raised by the State is, when is the change of venue perfected?
In State v. Grow, 255 Ind. 183, 263 N.E.2d 277 (1970), our supreme court stated,
Where a change of venue from the county has been granted, we have held the time begins to run anew when the court to which the venue is changed receives the transcript and original papers and assumes jurisdiction. State v. Mabrey (1927), 199 Ind. 276, 157 N.E. 97. It follows that the time begins to run anew where a change of venue is taken from a judge when the new judge qualifies and assumes jurisdiction.
Id. at 186, 263 N.E.2d at 278-79 (emphasis added). The State seizes upon the italicized language and argues that "there must be something more than the simple reception of documents by a clerk before a speedy trial period begins to run anew." Appellee's Br. at 7.
We disagree. Grow involved a change of venue from the judge, not the county, as in this case. Criminal Rule 13, which governs change of venue from judge, contemplates that a successor judge may recuse or be disqualified or excused from service, necessitating the assignment or appointment of yet another judge. As the trial court in this case correctly observed, however,
in neither the civil [nor] criminal forum is there allowance for the receiving county selected after a change of venue from the county is filed to reject or decline [its] selection. Thus, it must be assumed that the Court assumes jurisdiction when the Clerk receives the files, because the receiving court need not take any affirmative steps to accept or decline jurisdiction.
Appellant's App. at 136. This determination is consistent with Grow and other supreme court precedent involving change of venue from the county. See Cox v. State, 275 Ind. 688, 692, 419 N.E.2d 1279, 1282 (1981) ( ); Banks, 261 Ind. at 427, 304 N.E.2d at 776 ( ); Mabrey, 199 Ind. at 278, 157 N.E. at 98 (). In sum, we are bound by our supreme court's precedent on this issue. See Dragon v. State, 774 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (), trans. denied (2003).2
As a final matter, the State contends that the trial court improperly granted Misty's motion for discharge and dismissal because she had requested a psychiatric examination. In Ferguson v. State, 594 N.E.2d 790 (Ind.1992), our supreme court stated that Id. at 792. In this case, any delay was not caused by Misty's request for a psychiatric examination, which was never ruled upon by either court, but rather by the trial court's candidly admitted inattention to its docket and case files3 and the State's failure to track the case more closely. The trial court did not err in granting Misty's and Charles's motions for discharge and dismissal. We therefore affirm.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Rule 12(G) provides that the parties may either agree on a particular county or strike disfavored counties from a list provided by...
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