Nerren v. Livingston Police Dept.

Decision Date02 July 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95-40331,95-40331
Citation86 F.3d 469
PartiesPatrick Neal NERREN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LIVINGSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT; Billy Ray Nelson, Sheriff; and Bob Key, Defendants, and Matthew Parrish, and Robert Alston, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Patrick Neal Nerren, Livingston, TX, pro se.

William S. Helfand, Hirsch, Robinson, Sheiness and Glover, Houston, TX, for Parrish and Alston.

Patrick James Hast, Tyler, TX, for Key.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges:

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellee Patrick Neal Nerren filed this pro se civil rights action against various police and jail officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the denial of reasonable medical attention in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This appeal only involves Nerren's medical claims against the officers who arrested him. They contend that the district court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. As Nerren has stated a claim under clearly established law, we affirm.

I FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Nerren filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Livingston Police Department, Livingston Police Officer Matt Parish, Livingston Police Officer Robert Alston, Polk County Sheriff Billy Ray Nelson, and Polk County Officer Bob Key, alleging that he was denied medical care. This appeal, however, involves only the qualified immunity-based summary judgment motions of Officers Alston and Parish (Arresting Officers). Viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant Nerren, the facts are as follows. 1

On July 18, 1993, Nerren was involved in an automobile accident in Polk County, Texas. Several people were injured. By the time Officers Parish and Alston arrived at the accident scene, Nerren, the driver of one of the vehicles in the accident, had fled. Several hours later while on routine patrol, Officer Alston spotted Nerren. Alston radioed for back up and with the help of Officers Parish and Ken Bohnert, 2 arrested Nerren. At the time of the arrest, Nerren stated that he was in pain and requested medical attention. 3 One of the Arresting Officers told Nerren that because he "didn't worry about the people he had the automobile accident The following day Nerren was released on bond and taken by a relative to the Lufkin Memorial Hospital. Medical records reveal that at the time of his admission to the hospital, Nerren had abrasions on his face and chest. Additionally, the records indicate that a laparoscopic examination revealed a large amount (1000 ccs) of intra-abdominal blood. Nerren had a torn liver and was taken to surgery.

                with the police where [sic] not worried about him."   Nerren was transported to the Polk County Jail without receiving any medical attention. 4
                

In this suit Nerren alleges that the Arresting Officers knowingly and willfully denied him reasonable medical attention in violation of his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Officers Parish and Alston moved for summary judgment, arguing that Nerren failed to state a claim for the denial of medical care because (1) there was no evidence that they knew Nerren needed medical care; (2) Nerren had not alleged causation of any injury by their actions; and (3) they were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that they had a duty to provide medical care in the absence of an obvious or expressed need for such care.

The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge. After a hearing, the magistrate judge recommended dismissing Nerren's claims against the Livingston Police Department and Sheriff Nelson as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), but recommended denying the Arresting Officers' qualified immunity based motions for summary judgment. Applying the reasonable medical care standard applicable to pretrial detainees at that time, the magistrate judge held that Nerren's right to medical attention was clearly established, and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendants knew of Nerren's need for medical attention.

Parish and Alston filed objections. The district court overruled the objections and adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, denying the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The court held that Nerren had stated a claim for the denial of reasonable medical care, a clearly established right. The Arresting Officers timely appealed.

II DISCUSSION
A. JURISDICTION

We must first determine whether the district court's denial of the Arresting Officers' motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity are immediately appealable orders. 5 In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 6 the Supreme Court held that "a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." 7 In Johnson v. Jones, 8 the Supreme Court appeared to narrow our interlocutory jurisdiction somewhat, holding that a district court's order, entered in a qualified immunity case, is not appealable if it determines a question of "evidence sufficiency." 9 More recently, in Behrens v. Pelletier, 10 the Supreme Court clarified that Johnson "permits [the defendant] to claim on appeal that all of the conduct which the District Court deemed sufficiently supported for purposes of summary judgment met the Harlow standard of 'objective legal reasonableness.' " 11 Thus, in Behrens, the district court's determination that "material issues of fact remain" did not preclude appellate review. 12

In the wake of Behrens, the Johnson modification (if any) on appellate review applies only when "what is at issue in the sufficiency determination is nothing more than whether the evidence could support a finding that particular conduct occurred." 13 Thus, we cannot review the "evidence sufficiency issue" (i.e., whether the nonmovant presented sufficient summary judgment evidence to create a dispute of fact). But we retain interlocutory jurisdiction to "take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed when it denied summary judgment" 14 and determine whether these facts state a claim under clearly established law.

Applying the Johnson- Behrens gloss on Mitchell to the instant case, we conclude that the disputes of fact in this case do not deprive us of jurisdiction. We have interlocutory jurisdiction to determine whether Nerren's summary judgment facts state a claim under clearly established law. Accordingly, we ignore the disputes of fact, take those facts assumed by the district court in a light most favorable to Nerren, and determine whether under those facts Nerren has stated a claim under clearly established law.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the denial of a public official's motion for summary judgment predicated on qualified immunity. 15 As Nerren is proceeding pro se, we will construe his complaint liberally. 16

C. NERREN'S CLAIM

First, we must parse Nerren's complaint. As already noted, Nerren alleges that by denying him medical attention, both police and jail officials, deprived him of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. This appeal, however, deals with but a single facet of Nerren's complaint--namely, the allegations that, in the time interval between his arrest and booking, the Arresting Officers denied him medical attention. 17 In other words, we here address only Nerren's claims that his substantive due process rights were violated while he was an arrestee.

D. ARRESTEES AND PRETRIAL DETAINEES

Today, we make explicit that which was heretofore either implicit or taken for granted in our case law: An arrestee's complaint for denial of substantive due process and a pretrial detainee's complaint for denial of substantive due process are evaluated under the same standards. 18 We discern no reason to carve out a separate standard for arrestees, a subset of pretrial detainees. 19 After the initial incidents of a seizure have concluded and an individual is being detained by police officials but has yet to be booked, an arrestee's right to medical attention, like that of a pretrial detainee, derives from the Fourteenth Amendment. 20

E. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Assessing the defense of qualified immunity is a two-step process. 21 First, using "currently applicable constitutional standards," 22 we determine whether the plaintiff has "allege[d] the violation of a clearly established constitutional right." 23 If so, we then decide if the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable, because " '[e]ven if an official's conduct violates a constitutional right, he is entitled to qualified immunity if the conduct was objectively reasonable.' " 24

1. Currently Applicable Law

Under currently applicable constitutional standards, Nerren has stated a claim for the denial of his substantive due process rights. Recently, we held that a state official's episodic act or omission violates a pretrial detainee's due process right to medical care if the official acts with subjective deliberate indifference to the detainee's rights. 25 We then defined subjective deliberate indifference as subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious medical harm, followed by a response of deliberate indifference. 26

In the instant case, Nerren has alleged that his face and chest were marred with abrasions, he was in pain, and he informed the Arresting Officers that he needed medical attention. Moreover, the police had subjective knowledge that Nerren had recently been involved in a multiple vehicle injury accident. Nevertheless, after allegedly acknowledging Nerren's request of and need for medical attention, the Arresting Officers denied his request for the express reason that he had fled the scene of the accident...

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