Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State

• Decision Date: 15 June 1995
• Citation: 655 N.E.2d 661,631 N.Y.S.2d 565,86 N.Y.2d 307
• Parties: , 655 N.E.2d 661, 103 Ed. Law Rep. 1158 CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL EQUITY, INC., et al., Appellants, v. STATE of New York et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 565

631 N.Y.S.2d 565

86 N.Y.2d 307, 655 N.E.2d 661, 103

Ed. Law Rep. 1158

CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL EQUITY, INC., et al., Appellants, v. STATE of New York et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 15, 1995.

Michael A. Rebell Associates, New York City (Michael A. Rebell and Robert L. Hughes, of counsel), and Teitelbaum, Hiller, Rodman, Paden & Hibsher, P.C., for appellants.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney-General, New York City (Mark G. Peters, Victoria A. Graffeo, Andrea Green, Harvey J. Golubock, Jeffrey I. Slonim and Clement J. Colucci, of counsel), for respondents.

Donald Shaffer, Helen Herskhoff, Arthur Eisenberg and Beth Haroules, New York City, for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation and others, amici curiae.

DeGraff, Foy, Holt-Harris, Mealey & Kunz, Albany (Robert E. Biggerstaff and Glen P. Doherty, of counsel), for New York State Association of Small City School Districts, Inc., amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CIPARICK, Judge.

Thirteen years after we decided Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359 (hereinafter Levittown ), we are again faced with a challenge to the constitutionality of New York State's public school financing system. We are called upon to decide whether plaintiffs' (Campaign for Fiscal Equity et al.) complaint pleads viable causes of action under the Education Article of the State Constitution, the Equal Protection Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions, and title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its implementing regulations.

Judges Titone, Bellacosa, Smith and I conclude that the nonschool board plaintiffs plead a sustainable claim under the Education Article. ¹ Judge Levine concurs in a separate opinion. The Court is unanimous that, as to the nonschool board plaintiffs, a valid cause of action has been pleaded under title VI's implementing regulations. The remainder of this complaint should be dismissed.

I.

Plaintiffs in this case are (1) Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. (CFE), a not-for-profit corporation whose membership consists of community school boards, individual citizens, and a number of parent advocacy organizations; (2) 14 of New York City's 32 school districts; and (3) individual students who attend New York City public schools and their parents. The defendants are New York State, the Governor, the Commissioner of Education, the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, and the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate and Assembly.

Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking a declaratory judgment against the State defendants, claiming that the State's public school financing system is unconstitutional under the Education Article of the State Constitution (art. XI, § 1), the Equal Protection Clauses of the State (art. I, § 11) and Federal Constitutions (U.S. Const. 14th Amend.), the Antidiscrimination Clause of the State Constitution (art. I, § 11), ² and is unlawful under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.) and the United States Department of Education's regulations implementing title VI (34 C.F.R. § 100.3[b][2].

Three defendants--the State of New York, the Senate Majority Leader, and the Assembly Minority Leader--brought the instant motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(3) and (7), contending "that certain plaintiffs lack the right to bring this action and that the complaint fails to state a cause of action."

Supreme Court granted defendants' motion to the extent of dismissing all claims asserted on behalf of the plaintiff school districts on the ground that they lacked the legal capacity to sue. ³ As to the remaining plaintiffs--CFE and the individual students and parents--the court dismissed their equal protection and title VI claims for failure to state a cause of action, but ruled that the complaint stated valid claims under the Education Article, the Antidiscrimination Clause of the State Constitution, and title VI's implementing regulations.

The Appellate Division modified the order of Supreme Court by fully granting defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissing the claims made under the Education Article, the Antidiscrimination Clause, and the title VI regulations for failure to state causes of action. The Appellate Division concluded that plaintiffs' allegations that reduced resources have resulted in the failure to provide New York City school children with an opportunity to receive a minimally adequate education were conclusory in nature, and, in any event, embodied a theory "virtually identical to that advanced, fully tried and ultimately rejected on appeal in Levittown." (205 A.D.2d 272, 276, 619 N.Y.S.2d 699.) The Court also concluded that the prohibition in title VI's regulations against methods of administration which have an unlawful impact on racial and ethnic minorities was not violated by the State's role in allocating a lump sum of education aid to the New York City school system.

II.--Education Article

The first cause of action in plaintiffs' complaint essentially alleges that the State's educational financing scheme fails to provide public school students in the City of New York, including the individual plaintiffs herein, an opportunity to obtain a sound basic education as required by the State Constitution.

Discussion of the constitutional issues raised in this case necessarily takes place against the backdrop of our decision in Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359, supra. The Levittown plaintiffs consisted of 27 property-poor school districts, boards of education of 4 of the State's 5 largest cities (including New York City), and a number of school children and their parents residing in the property-poor school districts. After a 122-day trial, Supreme Court issued a judgment declaring that the 1974 school financing system violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions and the Education Article of the State Constitution. The Appellate Division agreed, except as to the Federal equal protection claim. This Court modified, by substituting a declaration "that the present statutory provisions for allocation of State aid to local school districts for the maintenance and support of elementary and secondary public education are not violative of either Federal or State Constitution." (Id., at 50, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359.)

We rejected the Levittown plaintiffs' Federal equal protection challenge based on the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (id., at 41, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359). The State equal protection challenge was rejected after we applied the rational basis test (id., at 43-46, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359). Finally, the Education Article challenge was found lacking, as the plaintiffs advanced no claim of a deprivation of "minimal acceptable facilities and services" or "a sound basic education" (id., at 47, 48, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359).

Article XI, § 1 of the State Constitution, the Education Article, mandates that "[t]he legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated." In Levittown, this Court examined the Education Article's language and history and rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the provision was intended to ensure equality of educational offerings throughout the State (57 N.Y.2d 27, 47, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359, supra ). Rather, we stated, "[w]hat appears to have been contemplated when the Education Article was adopted at the 1894 Constitutional Convention was a State-wide system assuring minimal acceptable facilities and services in contrast to the unsystematized delivery of instruction then in existence within the State." (Id. [emphasis added].) In order to satisfy the Education Article's mandate, the system in place must at least make available an "education", a term we interpreted to connote "a sound basic education" (id., at 48, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359).

The Court in Levittown acknowledged the existence of "significant inequalities in the availability of financial support for local school districts, ranging from minor discrepancies to major differences, resulting in significant unevenness in the educational opportunities offered." (Id., at 38, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359.) Nonetheless, such unevenness of educational opportunity did not render the school financing system constitutionally infirm, unless it could be shown that the system's funding inequities resulted in the deprivation of a sound basic education (id., at 47-48, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359).

The gravamen of the plaintiffs' complaint in Levittown was that "property-rich districts have an ability to raise greater local tax revenue enabling them to provide enriched educational programs beyond the fiscal ability of the property-poor districts." (57 N.Y.2d, at 36, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359). Indeed, we specifically noted:

"No claim is advanced in this case, however, by * * * plaintiffs * * * that the educational facilities or services provided in the school districts that they represent fall below the State-wide minimum standard of educational quality and quantity fixed by the Board of Regents; their attack is directed at the existing disparities in financial resources which lead to educational unevenness above that minimum standard." (Id., at 38, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359.)

We recognized in Levittown that the Education Article imposes a duty on the Legislature to ensure the availability of a sound basic education to all the children of the State. Contrary to the dissenting expression of Judge Simons, we are unable to adopt the view that the constitutional language at issue is, in effect, hortatory. Indeed, we should not do so in the face of Levittown's unambiguous acknowledgment of a...