Bailey v. Sanford

Decision Date25 February 2004
Docket NumberNo. 27735.,27735.
Citation139 Idaho 744,86 P.3d 458
PartiesVirginia BAILEY and Jack Bailey, wife and husband, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Shalyn SANFORD, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Lerma Law Office, P.A., Boise, for appellant. John J. Lerma argued.

Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis, Chtd., Twin Falls, for respondents. John T. Lezamiz argued.

TROUT, Chief Justice.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case concerns a personal injury action brought by Respondents Virginia and Jack Bailey (Baileys) against Appellant Shalyn Sanford (Sanford) and Ralph Southwick (Southwick). Southwick, Sanford, and Virginia Bailey were involved in an auto accident in Twin Falls, Idaho, November 2, 1998. Bailey was stopped on the north side of Poleline Road, preparing to turn left out of a parking lot while Southwick was stopped on the south side of Poleline, preparing to cross Poleline to enter the parking lot from which Bailey was exiting. Sanford turned right off Blue Lakes Boulevard onto Poleline proceeding west toward Virginia Bailey and Southwick. Before Sanford had passed by the location of Virginia Bailey and Southwick, Southwick drove directly across Poleline, causing Sanford to collide with Southwick. Southwick's vehicle then impacted Virginia Bailey's vehicle. Officer Alex Quilantin (Quilantin) of the Twin Falls City police department investigated and issued a traffic citation to Southwick for failure to yield pursuant to I.C. § 49-807.

The Baileys filed a complaint against Southwick and Sanford April 23, 1999, alleging negligence and Jack Bailey included a claim for loss of consortium. During the course of the proceedings, the trial court ordered a settlement conference. At the settlement conference, Sanford advised the trial court she intended to defend the action on liability and refused to make a settlement offer. The Baileys and Southwick entered into a settlement agreement and the trial court dismissed Southwick. The trial court then set the matter for a jury trial beginning May 30, 2001.

On June 1, 2001, the jury found Sanford 10% responsible and assessed the following damages: 1) past and future medical expenses $40,000; 2) past and future lost wages—$482,000; 3) general damages— $325,000; and 4) $65,000 for loss of consortium. The damage award totaled $912,000.00, making Sanford liable for $91,200. The Baileys then requested costs and attorney fees, which Sanford opposed and she also filed motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial all of which the trial court denied.

At the hearing on the post trial motions, the trial court entered an order awarding the Bailey's attorney fees totaling $64,971. The trial court based the award on Sanford's failure to admit negligence under I.C.R.P. 37(c). The trial court also awarded $7,412.23 in discretionary costs. Sanford filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Quilantin's testimony

Between the accident and the trial, Quilantin moved to California. To preserve Quilantin's testimony for trial, Sanford filed a notice to take Quilantin's video deposition in California. In response, the Baileys filed a motion for a protective order to prevent the deposition, which the trial court granted. At trial, Sanford called Quilantin as a witness to testify, to which the Baileys again objected and the trial court agreed not to permit Quilantin to testify. This Court reviews the trial court's decision to grant a protective order preventing Sanford from taking Quilantin's video deposition under an abuse of discretion standard. Selkirk Seed Co. v. Forney, 134 Idaho 98, 996 P.2d 798 (2000). We review the exclusion of Quilantin's trial testimony under an abuse of discretion standard. Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 45 P.3d 810 (2002). To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court must consider whether the trial court: 1) correctly perceived that the issue is one of discretion; 2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and 3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). In the case of an incorrect evidentiary ruling, a new trial should be granted only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties. Clark, 137 Idaho at 156, 45 P.3d at 812.

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it prohibited Sanford from taking Quilantin's video deposition.

On April 24, 2001, Sanford sent the Baileys a notice of deposition indicating Sanford intended to take Quilantin's video deposition in California on May 17, 2001. The Baileys filed a motion for a protective order under I.R.C.P. 26(c) to prevent the deposition. According to I.R.C.P. 26(c), "upon motion by a party ... and for good cause shown, ... the court ... may make any order which justice requires to protect a party ... from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including ... 1) that the discovery not be had; ... 4) ... that the scope of discovery be limited to certain matters." The trial court granted the Baileys' motion on the grounds that "1) Quilantin is not an eye witness; 2) Quilantin cannot offer any additional testimony to assist the trier of fact; 3) Sanford unreasonably delayed taking the deposition of Quilantin who has resided in California for two years; and 4) Plaintiffs would be prejudiced by taking the deposition at this late date."

Sanford asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it issued the protective order because under I.R.E. 402, Quilantin's observations were relevant as they tended to make the fact that Sanford did not act negligently and Southwick acted negligently more probable than without his testimony. Sanford also argued Quilantin's testimony was different than a mere lay person's opinion because, as a police officer, he "had experience looking at other accidents and interviewing witnesses after the accident" and could present his perspective in a clear way. Finally, Sanford noted she gave notice of the deposition before the discovery deadline of May 10, 2001.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the protective order. The trial court correctly perceived that control of discovery is within its discretion and, therefore, the trial court had the discretion to prohibit Quilantin's video deposition because Sanford scheduled the deposition late in the proceedings. See Service Employees Int'l v. Idaho Dep't. of H & W, 106 Idaho 756, 761, 683 P.2d 404, 409 (1984)

. Sanford could have taken Quilantin's deposition at any time over the previous two years and it would be unduly burdensome to expect the Baileys to travel to California on short notice the week before trial to participate in the deposition. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Baileys' request for a protective order.

2. The trial court abused its discretion by excluding Quilantin's testimony at trial, but it is harmless error.

On May 14, 2001, the Baileys sent Sanford's counsel, Bret A. Walther, a letter asking him to identify witnesses he actually intended to call at trial. Walther notified the Baileys' in response that he reserved the right to call any witness on his witness list, including Quilantin.

The trial commenced May 30, 2001, and the parties continually discussed the witnesses Walther intended to call at trial, but Walther did not mention calling Quilantin again. On the last day of trial, Walther informed the trial court he intended to call Quilantin. The Baileys objected, citing unfair surprise and arguing the trial court had determined at the protective order hearing that Quilantin was not an eyewitness to the accident, nor an accident reconstructionist, and therefore he could not offer any additional useful testimony. Walther responded by arguing he did not have any obligation to inform the Baileys of his intention beyond the notice he had already provided in indicating Quilantin as a witness at trial and in a letter to the Baileys, and investigating officers routinely testify as to observations they make when investigating an accident. While the trial court acknowledged Walther properly disclosed Quilantin on his witness list, the court excluded Quilantin from testifying because the trial court believed Walther had engaged in an improper trial tactic because Walther could have told the Baileys he intended to call Quilantin.

Under the particular circumstances presented here, we believe the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Quilantin as a witness. Sanford disclosed Quilantin on her witness list and informed the Baileys in a letter that she reserved the right to call anyone on the witness list. Moreover, since the trial court prevented Sanford from taking Quilantin's video deposition at the Baileys' request, the Baileys should have contemplated Sanford would call Quilantin to testify, as that was the only option now available to her. Finally, while this Court does not endorse Walther's trial tactics, no rule required Walther to further inform the Baileys of his intention to call Quilantin.

However, the abuse of discretion amounts to a harmless error. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 61,

no error or defect in any ruling or order ... is ground for granting a new trial ... unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

See Martin v. Hackworth, 127 Idaho 68, 896 P.2d 976 (1995)

("An error in the exclusion of evidence is not grounds for granting a new trial unless refusal to do so is inconsistent with substantial justice. We will disregard the error if it does not affect the substantial rights of the parties"); Hake...

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