Auriemma v. Montgomery

Decision Date01 December 1988
Docket NumberNo. 88-1072,88-1072
Citation860 F.2d 273
PartiesJohn AURIEMMA, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. James MONTGOMERY and Donald Hubert, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

John Gubbins, John L. Gubbins & Associates Ltd., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before WOOD, Jr., and MANION, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.

MANION, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs filed a civil suit against several defendants, including two municipal attorneys, alleging violations of the Fair Credit

Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681 through Sec. 1681t. The municipal attorneys filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims against them, contending that they were absolutely immune from suit. The district court denied their motion. We affirm.

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

This FCRA action arises out of two lawsuits filed by current or former members of the Chicago Police Department against the City of Chicago and various city officials. The first lawsuit, Maloney v. Washington et al., No. 84 C 0689 (N.D.Ill. filed Jan. 25, 1984), was filed by a single plaintiff, William Maloney. Maloney alleged that he had been unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of his race and political affiliation. He further alleged that several other members of the police department had been victims of unlawful employment practices and, like Maloney, had suffered financial harm as a result. James Montgomery, Corporation Counsel for the City of Chicago, and Donald Hubert, Special Assistant Corporation Counsel, entered appearances on behalf of the City of Chicago and the defendant city officials.

Approximately two weeks after Maloney filed suit, many of the persons named in Maloney's complaint as having suffered from unlawful employment practices also sued the City of Chicago and various city officials. This suit, Auriemma et al. v. City of Chicago et al., No. 84 C 1224 (N.D.Ill. filed Feb. 8, 1984) (Auriemma I ), filed on behalf of eighteen plaintiffs, alleged that the plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. James Montgomery filed an appearance on behalf of the defendants. The district court subsequently consolidated the Maloney and Auriemma I cases for discovery purposes.

Based on actions allegedly taken on behalf of the defendants in Maloney and Auriemma I, a third lawsuit, Auriemma II, soon appeared. Sixteen of the eighteen Auriemma I plaintiffs filed a civil suit against, among others, Montgomery, Hubert, and Investigative Consultants, Inc. (Investigative Consultants). The complaint alleged that Montgomery and Hubert violated the FCRA by hiring Investigative Consultants to obtain credit reports on the plaintiffs from a credit reporting agency through the use of false pretenses. See 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681q. 1 According to the complaint, Investigative Consultants then obtained oral and written credit reports on plaintiffs for an unauthorized purpose under the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681b. 2

The complaint further alleged that Montgomery and Hubert intended to use the information to embarrass and intimidate the plaintiffs and that the information was, in fact, subsequently disseminated.

Hubert and Montgomery filed a motion to dismiss, contending that even if the complaint's allegations were true, they were absolutely immune from civil liability because the alleged misconduct took place as part of their representation of the City of Chicago and the defendant municipal officials in the Auriemma I and Maloney suits. The district court denied their motion to dismiss. This appeal followed. 3

II. DISCUSSION

Hubert and Montgomery argue on appeal that government attorneys are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for actions taken in preparing and presenting their clients' defense. They contend that public policy requires that they be able to prepare and present the defense of their government clients without the fear of being subjected to lawsuits filed by opposing parties. Plaintiffs contend, however, that public policy does not require granting the defendant attorneys absolute immunity from suit. According to plaintiffs, acquiring information from an extrajudicial source does not constitute the type of "quasi-judicial" function entitled to absolute immunity from suit. Rather, plaintiffs contend, the actions Hubert and Montgomery allegedly took fall within the category of administrative or investigatory acts for which executive officials are only entitled to qualified immunity. As we explain below, the district court correctly denied the defendants' motion to dismiss.

A.

Absolute immunity from civil liability for damages is of a "rare and exceptional character." Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202, 106 S.Ct. 496, 501, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985). Public officials seeking absolute immunity from civil liability bear the burden of showing that overriding considerations of public policy require that they be exempt from personal liability for their alleged unlawful conduct. See Forrester v. White, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 538, 542, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2910, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). To determine whether public policy requires that the actions of particular government officials be immune from suit, the Supreme Court has adopted a functional approach that looks at the nature of the functions an official performs and "the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions." Forrester, 108 S.Ct. at 542. This functional approach does not allow for mechanical rules but instead requires the analysis of several factors. Three factors that have been found to be particularly important in determining whether absolute immunity bars a suit are: (1) whether an historical or common law basis exists for granting an official absolute immunity from suit for performing a particular function; (2) whether performing the function poses special risks of vexatious litigation; and (3) whether sufficient safeguards exist to prevent abuses of power. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 521-23, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2812-13, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).

Under this approach, the Supreme Court has extended to federal legislation the common law rules granting participants in judicial proceedings absolute immunity from civil liability. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (witnesses); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (judges). This extension includes attorneys who appear on behalf of the government. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), the Supreme Court held that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability in suits challenging their decision to initiate criminal prosecutions as well as suits challenging their decisions concerning the conduct of trial and the presentation of evidence. The Court reasoned that the nature of a prosecutor's duties is likely to provoke many retaliatory lawsuits that would hamper the effective functioning of the criminal justice system by discouraging prosecutors from initiating prosecutions and presenting relevant evidence. Id. at 424-28, 96 S.Ct. at 992-94. As the Court explained:

Attaining the system's goal of accurately determining guilt or innocence requires that both the prosecution and the defense have wide discretion in the conduct of the trial and the presentation of evidence.... If prosecutors were hampered in exercising their judgment as to the use of ... witnesses by concern about resulting personal liability, the triers of fact in criminal cases often would be denied relevant evidence.

Id. at 426, 96 S.Ct. at 993. The Court acknowledged that granting absolute immunity does impose a significant cost upon society in that some persons who are genuinely wronged are denied redress for their injuries. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the broader public interest in the effective functioning of the criminal justice system required that prosecutors perform their duties without fear of having all their decisions relitigated in suits seeking monetary damages against them. Id. at 427-28, 96 S.Ct. at 993-94. Moreover, the Court noted that the possibility of criminal sanctions and professional discipline operated to check abuses by overzealous prosecutors. Id. at 428-31, 96 S.Ct. at 994-95.

Similarly, in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), the Court found that agency officials who initiate administrative proceedings and agency attorneys who present evidence at such proceedings are absolutely immune from suits challenging their actions. Relying on its reasoning in Imbler v. Pachtman, the Court determined that absolute immunity was necessary to ensure that agency officials make decisions to initiate proceedings and to present evidence without the fear of being subjected to a suit for monetary damages. The Court expressly rejected arguments that agency attorneys in administrative proceedings were entitled to less protection than prosecutors performing similar functions. The Court pointed out that it was the nature of adjudicative proceedings rather than their location that required granting participants in such proceedings absolute immunity. Id. at 512, 98 S.Ct. at 2913.

[C]ontroversies sufficiently intense to erupt in litigation are not easily capped by a judicial decree. The loser in one forum will frequently seek another.... Absolute immunity is thus necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.

Id. Furthermore, the Court determined that safeguards in the judicial process such as judicial review and the ability to challenge an opponent's assertions in open court,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
61 cases
  • Jane Doe 20 v. Bd. Of Educ. Of The Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 5
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. Central District of Illinois
    • January 11, 2010
    ......against supervisors at Attorney General's);. Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273. (7th Cir.1988) (no absolute immunity for. city attorneys for ......
  • Villescas v. Richardson, Civ.A. 97-B-1955.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Colorado
    • November 6, 2000
    ...merely operated "behind the scenes" of the Craig, litigation. Plaintiff's Response, Ex. 2 at 18, ln. 19-23. See Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (extra-judicial investigation by government attorneys defending government officials and entities not entitled to absolute......
  • Pansy v. Preate, Civ. No. 92-778.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • October 6, 1994
    ...decisions (1) to initiate prosecutions or (2) concerning the conduct of the trial and presentation of evidence. Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906, 109 S.Ct. 3215, 106 L.Ed.2d 565 (1989). This immunity covers quasi-judicial functions such as......
  • Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, s. 89-2441
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • January 14, 1991
    ...of detectives must face the music for wrongs committed against suspects to the same extent as detectives do. E.g., Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273 (7th Cir.1988); Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir.1973). Police who use the third degree in interrogation, or break open doors, mus......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT