Young v. Davis

• Decision Date: 20 June 2017
• Docket Number: No. 15-70023,15-70023
• Citation: 860 F.3d 318
• Parties: Christopher YOUNG, Petitioner-Appellant v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

860 F.3d 318

Christopher YOUNG, Petitioner-Appellant

v.Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee

No. 15-70023

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 20, 2017

David R. Dow, University of Houston, Law Center, Houston, TX, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Ari Cuenin, Office of the Attorney General, Office of the Solicitor General, Stephen M. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Texas, Ellen Stewart-Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Postconviction Litigation Division, Austin, TX, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

After a Texas jury sentenced Christopher Young to death for the murder of Hasmukh Patel, he unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of his sentence in the Texas state courts and in the federal district court. We granted a certificate of appealability on two issues: (1) a Mills¹ claim that the omission of a jury instruction—required under Texas law—that jurors need not agree on what particular evidence they found mitigating created a substantial risk that the jurors may have mistakenly believed mitigating evidence needed to be accepted unanimously and (2) that Young's trial counsel's failure to object to the missing instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland .² We hold that the state courts' rejection of these claims was not "an unreasonable application of[ ] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."³

I.

On the morning of November 21, 2004, Young forced his way into the apartment of Daphne Edwards, where she lived with her three young daughters.⁴ Pressing a revolver to her head, he demanded money.⁵ She gave him $28—all she had.⁶ Young demanded Edwards undress.⁷ When she did not do so fast enough, Young fired a shot into the ground at her feet.⁸ He then sexually assaulted Edwards, with her girls nearby where he could keep an eye on them.⁹ On leaving, he "walked over to the children and kissed each of them on the cheek and told them that their mommy would be back."¹⁰

Young then forced Edwards, still at gunpoint, into her red Mazda Protégé and had her drive to the front of the apartment complex.¹¹ At that point, Young decided he wanted to drive.¹² He exited the passenger side of the car, telling Edwards not to drive off or he would go back to the apartment and kill her daughters.¹³ Circling around to the driver's side, Young ordered Edwards to scoot over to the passenger seat.¹⁴ Edwards seized her opportunity to escape through the still-open passenger-side door.¹⁵ Young drove off in Edwards' car.¹⁶

Minutes later, Young entered the mini-mart/dry cleaners owned by Patel.¹⁷ Young moved behind Patel, threatening him: "Alright, give up the money. I'm not playing. I'm not f[* * * * * *] playing."¹⁸ Patel moved behind the counter toward the cash register.¹⁹ While continuing to demand that he "give up the money," Young shot Patel twice.²⁰ Patel tripped the alarm between shots as he attempted to flee.²¹ Young pursued him momentarily, yelling once more for money, before concealing the revolver under his shirt and exiting the store.²² All of the interactions between Young and Patel were captured by a surveillance camera.

As Young fled, a customer in the parking lot was able to make out the letter "W" on the license plate of Edwards' car.²³ Another customer provided a description of Young and the red Mazda, leading to his arrest later that morning.²⁴ Patel died as a result of his wounds.²⁵

Convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, Young, on direct appeal, alleged fifteen points of error, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected.²⁶ The Supreme Court denied certiorari.²⁷ Young then sought state habeas relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the Texas trial court recommended rejection of each of his twenty claims for relief.²⁸ The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted that recommendation.²⁹

In 2014, Young filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Western District of Texas. The petition, as amended, alleged in relevant part that the trial court's jury instructions were constitutionally deficient and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to those deficiencies. After rejecting his request for an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Young's claims and a certificate of appealability.³⁰ We in turn granted a certificate of appealability on claims of flawed jury instructions and ineffective assistance of counsel.³¹ The Supreme Court denied certiorari on Young's other claims.³²

II.

As all claims before us were adjudicated on the merits in the Texas courts, our review is constrained by the deferential standard of review mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.³³ The Supreme Court has instructed that " ‘clearly established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision"³⁴ ; "that ‘ "clearly established Federal law" for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions.’ "³⁵

The "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of § 2254(d)(1) provide two separate avenues for federal habeas relief.³⁶ A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law of the Supreme Court if it either (1) "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth" in the Supreme Court's opinions or (2) "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent."³⁷ "The ‘unreasonable application’ clause of § 2254(d)(1) applies when the ‘state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.’ "³⁸

Our question is whether the Texas courts unreasonably applied the principles of Mills and Strickland to Young's claims.³⁹ In reviewing state court decisions, we are mindful that "[s]ection 2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in which a state court unreasonably applies [the Supreme] Court's precedent; it does not require state courts to extend that precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error."⁴⁰ "[A]n ‘unreasonable application of’ those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice."⁴¹ "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court's decision."⁴² We are also limited to claims for which the factual basis was developed in state court unless:

(A) the claim relies on—(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.⁴³

III.

We turn first to whether the Texas trial court's failure to give a jury instruction required by Article 37.071, Section 2(f)(3) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure subjected Young to a substantial risk that the individual jurors would believe they had to unanimously agree on what evidence was mitigating in violation of Mills .

A.

In Lockett , the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that, in imposing a death sentence, the sentencer be able to consider all relevant mitigating evidence.⁴⁴ Ohio's then-applicable capital punishment statute required a death sentence unless the trial judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "(1) the victim had induced or facilitated the offense, (2) it was unlikely that [the defendant] would have committed the offense but for the fact that she ‘was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation,’ or (3) the offense was ‘primarily the product of [the defendant's] psychosis or mental deficiency.’ "⁴⁵ In striking down the Ohio law, the Court held that:

[A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.⁴⁶

Four years later, the Court extended Lockett , holding "[j]ust as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence."⁴⁷ Another four years later, Skipper extended Lockett to evidentiary rulings.⁴⁸ The following year, the Court ruled that a Florida judge's instructions to the jury that Florida's death penalty law limited mitigation evidence to the types specifically enumerated in the statute violated the constitutional rights of the defendant.⁴⁹

In Mills , the Court applied Lockett to Maryland's capital murder jury instructions.⁵⁰ The verdict form there provided the instruction: "Based upon the evidence we unanimously find that each of the following mitigating circumstances which is marked ‘yes' has been proven to exist by A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE and each mitigating circumstance marked ‘no’ has not been proven by A PREPONDERANCE OF THE...