Mich. Flyer LLC v. Wayne Cnty. Airport Auth.

• Decision Date: 22 June 2017
• Docket Number: Nos. 16-1205/1255,s. 16-1205/1255
• Parties: MICHIGAN FLYER LLC ; Indian Trails, Incorporated, Plaintiffs–Appellants/Cross–Appellees, v. WAYNE COUNTY AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Defendant–Appellee/Cross–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

860 F.3d 425

MICHIGAN FLYER LLC ; Indian Trails, Incorporated, Plaintiffs–Appellants/Cross–Appellees,

v.WAYNE COUNTY AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Defendant–Appellee/Cross–Appellant.

Nos. 16-1205/1255

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: January 26, 2017

Decided and Filed: June 22, 2017

ARGUED: Jason M. Turkish, NYMAN TURKISH PC, Southfield, Michigan, for Appellants/Cross–Appellees. Gary K. August, ZAUSMER, AUGUST & CALDWELL, P.C., Farmington Hills, Michigan, for Appellee/Cross–Appellant. ON BRIEF: Jason M. Turkish, Ryan T. Kaiser, Melissa M. Nyman, NYMAN TURKISH PC, Southfield, Michigan, for Appellants/Cross–Appellees. Gary K. August, ZAUSMER, AUGUST & CALDWELL, P.C., Farmington Hills, Michigan, for Appellee/Cross–Appellant.

Before: BOGGS, SILER, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

SILER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs Michigan Flyer and Indian Trails provide public transportation services. Plaintiffs supported two disabled individuals' lawsuits against Defendant Wayne County Airport Authority ("Airport") because some of Plaintiffs' customers are disabled. Airport allegedly began retaliating against Plaintiffs for this support. Plaintiffs sued under the provisions of Title V of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). The district court dismissed the lawsuit, denied reopening, and denied Airport's claim for attorney's fees. We affirm the district court because it did not err in dismissing the action and did not abuse its discretion in denying reopening or attorney's fees.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Michigan Flyer provides public transportation services to the Detroit Metro area. It also provides services on behalf of the Ann Arbor Area Transportation Authority. Indian Trails is the parent company of Michigan Flyer. In 2014, two disabled individuals sued Airport to prevent Airport from moving the public transportation bus stop from the curbside at the terminal. Michigan Flyer and Indian Trails ("Plaintiffs") provided support to the disabled individuals in the lawsuit. After the lawsuit settled, Plaintiffs allege that Airport retaliated against them for their role in the lawsuit. Among the list of alleged conduct, Plaintiffs allege that Airport extended preferential access to all other transportation providers.

Plaintiffs sued Airport for violation of the ADA Title V provisions. The district court dismissed the lawsuit. Subsequently, the district court denied Plaintiffs' motion to reopen the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and Airport's motion for attorney's fees.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs brought suit for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). The district court dismissed the lawsuit holding that "individual," as used in the statute, did not protect corporate entities. Plaintiffs argue that the term "individual" should be interpreted broadly to protect it from retaliatory actions because the ADA's remedial scheme is broad, Supreme Court precedent supports the finding that "individuals" can include corporations, and agency regulation supports its broad interpretation of the term "individual." Therefore, the question for our review is whether the word "individuals" as found in 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) includes corporate entities.

a. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court's order granting a motion to dismiss de novo. Lambert v. Hartman , 517 F.3d 433, 438–39 (6th Cir. 2008).

b. TEXT/CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

Our review must begin with the plain language of the statute because the "language of the statute is the starting point for interpretation, and it should also be the ending point if the plain meaning of that language is clear." United States v. Choice , 201 F.3d 837, 840 (6th Cir. 2000) ; see also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) ("Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose." (citation omitted)). 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) provides:

No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.

(emphasis added). As the ADA does not define "individual," it should be interpreted by the common usage of the word. See Perrin v. United States , 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979) ("A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.").

The Supreme Court recently provided guidance on the ordinary meaning of the word "individual" in Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth. , 566 U.S. 449, 132 S.Ct. 1702, 182 L.Ed.2d 720 (2012). The Court held that "[t]he ordinary meaning of the word, fortified by its statutory context, persuades us that the [Torture Victim Protection] Act authorizes suit against natural persons alone." Id. at 1706. The Court first noted that " ‘individual’ ordinarily means ‘[a] human being, a person.’ " Id. at 1707 (quoting 7 The Oxford English Dictionary 880 (2d ed. 1989)). It also noted that the term "individual" is used in everyday parlance as denoting a human being, and the Court, itself, "routinely uses ‘individual’ to denote a natural person, and in particular to distinguish between a natural person and a corporation." Id . Other courts faced with a similar task have also held that "individual" does not include corporate entities. See Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 393 (4th Cir. 2011) ("In our view, then, when Congress uses the noun ‘individual’—rather than the broader term ‘person’—it should ordinarily be construed to mean a human being or natural person.''); Jonson v. C.I.R. , 353 F.3d 1181, 1184 (10th Cir. 2003) ("When the word ‘individual’ is used elsewhere in the Internal Revenue Code, the context almost always compels it to be construed to mean a human being."); In re North, 12 F.3d 252, 254–55 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (holding that the term individual in the Ethics in Government Act's fee provisions is limited to human beings); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 184–85 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that "individual" under the Bankruptcy Code means "human beings" rather than "corporations and other legal entities").

In response, Plaintiffs point to Mohamad 's recognition that "Congress remains free, as always, to give the word a broader or different meaning." 132 S.Ct. at 1707. Plaintiffs also argue that Clinton v. City of New York , 524 U.S. 417, 118 S.Ct. 2091, 141 L.Ed.2d 393 (1998), provides support that "individual" can mean a non-human person.

In Clinton, the Court held that "Congress undoubtedly intended the word ‘individual’ to be construed as synonymous with the word ‘person.’ " Id. at 428, 118 S.Ct. 2091. The same cannot be said for the intent of Congress with the ADA. First, and most damaging to reliance on Clinton , is the fact that the terms "person" and "individual" are both used in 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) : "No person shall discriminate against any individual ...." (emphasis added). If Congress had "undoubtedly intended" the word "individual" to mean "person," it would have used the term "person" again five words later. Instead, Congress knowingly used two distinct terms, understanding the difference that each term provides to the statute. Second, the "language and design" of the ADA would not make sense if "individual" was to mean corporate entities. See Choice , 201 F.3d at 840. For example, the ADA uses "individuals" in the following manner: "individuals with hearing impairments," 42 U.S.C. § 12103(1)(A) ; an "individual's uncorrected vision," 42 U.S.C. § 12113(c) ; and "an individual [who] has an infectious or communicable disease

," 42 U.S.C. § 12113(e)(2). In each scenario, replacing "individual" with "corporate entity" would make the statute incoherent and thus must be avoided. Brown v. Gardner , 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) ("observing the interpretive presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute"). This fact is compounded with the understanding that Congress appreciates the difference between the terms "person" and "individual." "[F]ederal statutes routinely distinguish between an ‘individual’ and an organizational entity." Mohamad , 132 S.Ct. at 1707. Title I of the ADA even instructs that the "term[ ] ‘person’ ... shall have the same meaning given ... in section 2000e of this title." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(7). Section 2000e(a) states: "The term ‘person’ includes one or more individuals, governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under title 11, or receivers." Therefore, the term "individual" is distinct from the term "corporation."

c. ADA'S REMEDIAL SCHEME AND AGENCY INTERPRETATION

As a rebuttal to the unambiguous text,¹ Plaintiffs argue that the remedial scheme of the ADA requires the term "individual" to be interpreted as broadly as possible. See Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2014) ("Congress also mandated that the ADA, as amended, be interpreted as broadly as its text permits."); Alexander v. Kujok , 158 F.Supp.3d 1012, 1019 (E.D. Cal. 2016) ("[T]he ADA should be interpreted as broadly as permissible under the Constitution."). According to Plaintiffs, interpreting "individual" narrowly would result in unfair treatment of corporations that defend the rights of disabled individuals.

This is unpersuasive. The fact that a statute has a broad remedial structure does not allow us to interpret its text in a way that conflicts with its plain language. See Sandusky Wellness...