United States v. Laurent
| Citation | 861 F.Supp.2d 71 |
| Decision Date | 02 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 11–CR–322.,11–CR–322. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Jamal LAURENT, Defendant. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of New York) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Recognized as Unconstitutional
18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(c)(1)(B)
Donna R. Newman, Esq., Buttermore Newman Delanney & Foltz LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant.
Tiana A. Demas, United States Attorney's Office, Brooklyn, NY, Zainab Ahmad, United States Attorney's Office, for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Government.
I. Introduction
Defendant Jamal Laurent is charged with receipt of a firearm and ammunition while under indictment for a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. See18 U.S.C. § 922(n). On October 18, 2011, the parties were ordered to show cause why the indictment should not be dismissed on the grounds that § 922(n) is unconstitutional. Ct.'s Order to Show Cause, Doc. Entry 34, Oct. 18, 2011. Concerns raised included that the statute may violate equal protection, the Fifth Amendment's notice requirement, and the presumption of innocence. Defendant subsequently argued that the statute violates his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, Def.'s Mem. of L. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. Entry 46, Nov. 17, 2011, Def.'s Letter, Doc. Entry 51, Nov. 20, 2011. A hearing on these issues was held on November 21, 2011. See Tr. of Hr'g on Order to Show Cause, Nov. 21, 2011.
Challenges to the statute are multifarious. Under § 922(n), the fact of an indictment in any jurisdiction for any felony converts what can be assumed to be an otherwise lawful activity—the shipping, transportation, or receipt of a firearm—into a crime. At the time the defendant commits this act, he has not been convicted of any offense. He has not seen the evidence against him, or had the other protections of due process, including an opportunity to present his own version of events. While the grand jury which originally indicted him determined that there was probable cause of a crime, there has not necessarily been an independent judicial determination that the defendant poses a danger to the community. Despite the absence of these procedural protections, the statute permits the government to both deprive someone of what is arguably a constitutional right to receive a gun, and to punish the exercise of that right with criminal sanctions.
Defendant questions whether the broad prohibition of the statute is necessary to achieve the congressional goals. Arguably, public safety could be adequately protected if the judge in the initial felony case made an individual determination regarding whether the defendant is sufficiently dangerous to be deprived of his right to obtain a gun as a condition of bail. Def.'s Mem. of L. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. Entry 46, Nov. 17, 2011. See, e.g.,18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv) (); N.Y.Crim. Proc. § 530.14 (). Even if the statute does not violate the presumption of innocence, equal protection, the Commerce Clause, or the Second Amendment, does it run afoul of the Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process?
The issues raised pose the question: is it necessary to impinge on a fundamental right to receive guns with a strict rule when the same interest in public safety might be adequately served while providing appropriate procedural protections to defendants? The answer is that Congress could reasonably respond, “Yes.”
For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss on constitutional grounds is denied. The facts of this case demonstrate that the statute is constitutional both on its face and as applied to this particular defendant.
Defendant also moved for a bill of particulars specifying when and where the defendant received the firearm in question. Def.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pre–Trial Mot., Doc. Entry 49, Nov. 18, 2011. The motion was granted. Ct.'s Mem. & Order, Doc. Entry 53, Nov. 23, 2011. In accordance with the terms of § 922(n), the government is required to demonstrate that the defendant received the weapon after indictment. If it fails to do so, the indictment will be dismissed without prejudice.
II. Facts
On June 21, 2010, an individual (“Victim 1”) residing at 1445 Schenectady Avenue, Brooklyn, New York reported to the New York City Police Department (NYPD) that someone shot a bullet through the wall of his apartment from the adjoining room. Compl. ¶ 2, Doc. Entry 1, Apr. 11, 2011. Shortly thereafter, the defendant entered Victim 1's room. Id. He apologized...
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