Allen v. Debello

Decision Date27 June 2017
Docket NumberNo. 16-2644,16-2644
Citation861 F.3d 433
Parties Anthony ALLEN, for himself and as parent of A.A.; Todd Bennett, for himself and as a parent of E.B.; Scott Edelglass; Sharir Feldman, for himself and as parent of A.F. and J.F.; Werner Graf, for himself and as parent of A.G. and A.G.; Karl Hagberg, for himself and as parent of E.H., A.H. and C.H.; Clifton Hill, for himself and as parent of A.H.; Samir Joshi, for himself and as parent of J.J., J.J. and J.J.; Yehuda B. Litton; Surender Malhan, for himself and as parent of E.M. and V.M.; Carly Olivier, for himself and as parent of M.O.; Antonio Quinlan, for himself and as parent of K.Q.; Zia Shaikh, for himself and as parent of M.S., S.S., and H.S. for themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Lawrence DEBELLO; Timothy Chell; Kathleen Delaney ; James M. DeMarzo; Madelin Einbinder; Marlene Lynch Ford ; Christopher Garenger; Lawrence Jones; Severiano Lisboa; Anthony Massi; John Tomasello; Sherri Schweitzer; Nancy Sivilli ; Maureen Sogluizzo; State of New Jersey; Michelle M. Smith, in her official capacity as Clerk, Superior Court of New Jersey; John L. Call, Jr., in his official capacity as Presiding Judge Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County; Catherine L. Fitzpatrick; Lisa Thorton; Patricia B. Roe, in her official capacity as Presiding Judge, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County Anthony Allen for himself and as parent of A.A.; Todd Bennett, for himself and as parent of E.B.; Sharir Feldman, for himself and as parent of A.F. and J.F.; Karl Hagberg, for himself and as parent of E.H., A.H. and C.H.; Clifton Hill, for himself and as parent of A.H.; Carly Olivier, for himself and as parent of M.O.; Zia Shaikh, for himself and as parent of M.S., S.S. and H.S. for themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated v. Timothy Chell; Kathleen Delaney ; James DeMarzo; Madelin Einbinder, Lawrence Jones, Severiano Lisboa; John Tomasello; Sherri Schweitzer, Nancy Sivilli and Maureen Sogluizzo Anthony Allen; Todd Bennett; Scott Edelglass; Sharir Feldman; Werner Grag; Karl Hagberg; Clifton Hill; Samir Joshi; Yehuda B. Litton; Surender Malhan; Carly Olivier; Antonio Quinlan; Zia Shaikh, Appellants
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Paul A. Clark, Esq. [ARGUED], Suite 1N, 10 Huron Avenue, Jersey City, NJ, 07306, Attorney for Appellants

Daniel J. Kelly, Esq., Eric S. Pasternack, Esq., Akeel A. Qureshi, Esq., Benjamin H. Zieman, Esq. [ARGUED], Office of Attorney General of New Jersey, P.O. Box 112, 25 Market Street, Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex, Trenton, NJ 08625, Attorneys for Appellees

Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

In this case, Plaintiffs, fathers of minor children in New Jersey, challenge the state law governing child custody proceedings between New Jersey parents. Seeking dramatic changes in the way New Jersey conducts these proceedings, Plaintiffs contend, among other things, that the "best interests of the child" standard that New Jersey courts use to determine custody in a dispute between two fit parents is unconstitutional. To bring about their desired changes, Plaintiffs bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act against state court judges who presided over their custody disputes, and seek declaratory and injunctive relief: a declaration that the challenged standards and practices are unconstitutional and unlawful, and an enforceable injunction against their use. But before reaching the merits of Plaintiffs' arguments, we first answer a threshold question: whether these state court judges are proper defendants in this Section 1983 suit.

I. Factual Background
A. Plaintiffs' Allegations

Plaintiffs allege that New Jersey's family courts have unconstitutionally deprived them of custody of their children and have unconstitutionally interfered with their fundamental rights to the care, custody and control of their children without a full hearing, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In addition to raising the "best interests of the child" point identified above,1 Plaintiffs allege that their parental rights were restricted, or that they were permanently or temporarily separated from their children, by order of the New Jersey family courts without adequate notice, the right to counsel, or a plenary hearing, i.e. without an opportunity to present evidence or cross-examine. They allege that New Jersey state court policy, authorized by the New Jersey Supreme Court and Appellate Division, denies parents a plenary hearing when one parent loses custody to the other parent. Plaintiffs further assert that although mothers and fathers are, in theory, treated equally in custody disputes under New Jersey law, in practice courts favor mothers. Additionally, they assert that New Jersey discriminates against indigent parents by failing to provide them with counsel in a divorce proceeding or other inter-parent dispute that results in a loss of custody. In short, as the District Court explained,

Plaintiffs interpret the United States Constitution as requiring that when parents divorce or separate, each parent has a fundamental right to automatically receive 50-50 custody of his or her children, and that courts are limited to ordering a different custody arrangement only upon a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, in a plenary hearing (and with a right to counsel for both parents), that one of the parents abuses or neglects the child or is otherwise an unfit parent.2

This interpretation would, in the words of the District Court, "dramatically change the legal landscape of New Jersey and the laws governing child custody proceedings between parents."3

Plaintiffs bring suit under Section 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act4 against New Jersey state court judges.5 They seek declaratory and injunctive relief requiring Defendants to, among other things, provide a plenary hearing within ten days to any parent who has his right to the care, custody, and control of his children reduced through state action.

B. New Jersey's Custody Regime

Plaintiffs challenge the New Jersey state statute instituting the best interests of the child standard6 and the New Jersey courts' policy on plenary hearings in custody disputes, which has not been codified by statute but instead developed in the state case law.7 Under this case law, a plenary hearing is not required in every contested motion in New Jersey state court; a trial judge has discretion to decide such a motion without a hearing.8 "It is only where the affidavits show that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact, and that the trial judge determines that a plenary hearing would be helpful in deciding such factual issues, that a plenary hearing is required."9

II. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. "Because this case comes to us upon a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations contained in the Complaint as true, but we disregard rote recitals of the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and mere conclusory statements."10 Our review of the grant of a motion to dismiss is plenary.11 However, to the extent the denial of declaratory relief was discretionary, we review for abuse of discretion.12

Before the District Court, the state defendants asserted that Plaintiffs' suit improperly attempts to appeal concluded and pending state court proceedings—their final and ongoing divorce and custody proceedings—and that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case under the Rooker - Feldman doctrine.13 The District Court found that Rooker - Fel dm an did not apply, because Plaintiffs do not challenge the state court custody decisions themselves, but instead the policies underlying those decisions. Defendants do not raise this doctrine on appeal, but because we have a continuing obligation to determine for ourselves whether subject matter jurisdiction is or was in question,14 we consider the doctrine's application to this suit.

Rooker - Feld man prohibits a federal court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction in "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments."15 As both we and the Supreme Court have explained, the doctrine has narrow applicability. Rooker - Feldman does not bar suits that challenge actions or injuries underlying state court decisions—and especially those that predate entry of a state court decision—rather than the decisions themselves.16 Four requirements must be met in order for Rooker - Feldman to bar suit: "(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgments; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments."17

In line with these decisions, our Circuit previously found that Rooker - Feldman did not bar suit in B.S. v. Somerset County , whose facts were similar to those in the present case.18 In B.S. , a mother sued after Somerset County Children and Youth Services obtained an order from a Pennsylvania state court judge transferring custody of her daughter to her father. We held that "[b]ecause the injury Mother claims is likewise traceable to [the defendants'] actions, as opposed to the state court orders those actions allegedly caused, we reject [the defendants'] contention that the Rooker - Feldman doctrine precludes federal subject matter jurisdiction."19

Like in B.S. , Plaintiffs here are not challenging the state court judgments, but the underlying policy that governed those judgments: the alleged policy of the New Jersey state courts of stripping parents of custody, in favor of the other parents, without a plenary hearing and...

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