Vera v. Richards

• Decision Date: 02 September 1994
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. H-94-0277.
• Parties: Al VERA, Bill Calhoun, Edward Chen, Pauline Orcutt, Edward Blum, Kenneth Powers and Barbara L. Thomas, Plaintiffs, v. Ann RICHARDS, Governor, Bob Bullock, Lt. Governor, Dan Morales, Attorney General, Pete Laney, Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives, Ronald Kirk, Texas Secretary of State, Defendants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Intervenor, v. Rev. William LAWSON, Zollie Scales, Jr., Rev. Jew Don Boney, Deloyd T. Parker, Dewan Perry, and Rev. Ceasar Clark, Defendants-Intervenors, v. LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS (LULAC) Defendant-Intervenors, v. Robert REYES, Angie Garcia, Robert Anguiano, Dalia Robles, Nicolas Dominguez, Oscar T. Garcia, and Ramiro Gamboa, Defendants-Intervenors.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

861 F. Supp. 1304

Al VERA, Bill Calhoun, Edward Chen, Pauline Orcutt, Edward Blum, Kenneth Powers and Barbara L. Thomas, Plaintiffs, v. Ann RICHARDS, Governor, Bob Bullock, Lt. Governor, Dan Morales, Attorney General, Pete Laney, Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives, Ronald Kirk, Texas Secretary of State, Defendants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Intervenor, v. Rev. William LAWSON, Zollie Scales, Jr., Rev. Jew Don Boney, Deloyd T. Parker, Dewan Perry, and Rev. Ceasar Clark, Defendants-Intervenors, v. LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS (LULAC) Defendant-Intervenors, v. Robert REYES, Angie Garcia, Robert Anguiano, Dalia Robles, Nicolas Dominguez, Oscar T. Garcia, and Ramiro Gamboa, Defendants-Intervenors.

Civ. A. No. H-94-0277.

United States District Court, S.D. of Texas, Houston Division.

August 17, 1994.

Order Issued September 2, 1994.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Paul Loy Hurd, Monroe, LA, Ted Hirtz, Houston, TX, for plaintiffs.

Renea Hicks, State Sol., Austin, TX, for defendants Ann Richards, Bob Bullock, Dan Morales, Pete Laney and Ronald Kirk.

Gaye L. Hume, Robert A. Kengle, Steven H. Rosenbaum, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Voting Section, Washington, DC, Nancy Herrera, U.S. Attorney's Office, Houston, TX, for defendant-intervenor, U.S.

Penda D. Hair, Allison M. Zieve, NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., Washington, DC, Alice A. Brown, Union Pacific Law Dept., Lawrence Boze, Houston, TX, for defendants-intervenors Rev. William Lawson, Zollie Scales, Jr., Rev. Jew Don Boney, Deloyd T. Parker, Dewan Perry, and Rev. Ceasar Clark.

Judith A. Sanders-Castro, Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund, San Antonio, TX, Frumencio Reyes, Reyes & Reyes-Castillo, P.C., Houston, TX, for defendants-intervenors, League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and, Individually, Robert Reyes, Angie Garcia, Robert Anguiano, Dalia Robles, Nicolas Dominguez, Oscar T. Garcia, and Ramiro Gamboa.

Before JONES, Circuit Judge, HITTNER and HARMON, District Judges.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
                  I. Introduction ........................................................ 1308
                 II. Procedural History .................................................. 1310
                III. Evidentiary Background .............................................. 1311
                     A.  Texas Demography Related to Redistricting ....................... 1311
                     B.  Pertinent History Related to Redistricting in Texas ............. 1312
                     C.  The 1991 Congressional Redistricting Process .................... 1313
                         1. General Background ........................................... 1313
                         2. Voting Rights Act Considerations ............................. 1314
                            a.  Racial Polarization ...................................... 1316
                            b.  History of Discrimination ................................ 1317
                         3. Incumbents' Interests ........................................ 1317
                         4. Use of Racial Data ........................................... 1318
                         5. Congressional District 30 .................................... 1319
                         6. Congressional Districts 18 and 29 ............................ 1323
                         7. Congressional District 28 .................................... 1325
                         8. Other Congressional Districts ................................ 1326
                     D.  Expert Testimony ................................................ 1328
                     E.  Other Districting Plans ......................................... 1330
                 IV. Factual Findings and Legal Conclusions .............................. 1331
                     A.  The Voting Rights Districts ..................................... 1337
                         1. Congressional District 30 .................................... 1337
                         2. Congressional Districts 18 and 29 ............................ 1339
                         3. Narrow Tailoring to Achieve a Compelling State Interest? ..... 1341
                         4. Congressional District 28 .................................... 1344
                     B.  Other Congressional Districts ................................... 1344
                  V. Conclusion .......................................................... 1345
                     Special Concurrence ................................................. 1345
                     Appendix (Maps of Districts 18, 29, 30) ............................. 1348
                     Order ............................................................... 1351
                

OPINION

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 at one blow demolished the obvious devices that southern states had used to disenfranchise African-American voters for decades. The Act marked the full maturity in American political life of the Founders' idea that "all men are created equal" and the Rev. Martin Luther King's hope that his children would be judged by the content of their character, not the color of their skin. The meaning of equality — as also enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "equal protection of the laws" — is the subject of this lawsuit.

It is no longer disputed that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody a right to ballot box equality among American citizens of different races or ethnic backgrounds. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960). The Fourteenth Amendment also prohibits government from invidiously classifying persons because of their race. Repeatedly and in the strongest terms, the Supreme Court has condemned intentional racial discrimination by state agents or bodies. Where official discrimination is found to exist, the burden is on the governmental body to justify it by no less than a compelling governmental interest.

One year ago, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that intentional racial discrimination is offensive to the Equal Protection Clause when it occurs as part of legislative redistricting. See Shaw v. Reno, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993). In Shaw, the Court held that "redistricting legislation is unconstitutional if it is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification." Id. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2824.

In 1991, the State of Texas deliberately redrew its Congressional boundary lines following the 1990 census with nearly exact knowledge of the racial makeup of every inhabited block of land in the state. This insight, worthy of Orwell's Big Brother, was attainable because computer technology, made available since the last decennial census, superimposed at a touch of the keyboard block-by-block racial census statistics upon the detailed local maps vital to the redistricting process. Not only did the state know the precise location of African-American, Hispanic, and Anglo populations, but it repeatedly segregated those populations by race to further the prospects of incumbent officeholders or to create "majority-minority" Congressional districts. The result of the Legislature's efforts is House Bill 1 ("HB1"), a crazy-quilt of districts that more closely resembles a Modigliani painting than the work of public-spirited representatives.¹

The challenged plan (HB1) was passed in the second called session of the 72nd Texas Legislature and signed into law by the Governor on August 29, 1991. See Plaintiff Exh. 1. On November 18, 1991, the Texas Congressional Redistricting Plan received § 5 preclearance from the Attorney General.² See United States Exh. 1007; Stip. 37. Notwithstanding the preclearance, the Attorney General expressed fundamental reservations about the redistricting plan:

While we are preclearing this plan under Section 5, the extraordinarily convoluted nature of some districts compels me to disclaim any implication that the proposed plan is otherwise lawful or constitutional.

United States Exh. 1007 at 2.

The plaintiffs in this case are six Texas voters who reside in Congressional Districts 18, 25, 29, and 30. In a pretrial stipulation, they alleged that 24 of the state's 30 Congressional Districts are the product of racial gerrymandering or intentional racial discrimination.³

The question before this court is whether any of the 24 challenged Congressional Districts, many of whose boundaries were clearly affected by racial considerations, can be sufficiently explained by legitimate redistricting criteria other than race. See Shaw, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2824. For reasons that follow, we conclude that Congressional Districts 18, 29, and 30 as presently drawn are not so explainable. They were conceived for the purpose of providing "safe" seats in Congress for two African-American and an Hispanic representatives. They were scientifically designed to muster a minimum percentage of the favored minority or ethnic group; minority numbers are virtually all that mattered in the shape of those districts. Those districts consequently bear the odious imprint of racial apartheid, and districts that intermesh with them are necessarily racially tainted.

Other challenged Texas Congressional Districts are disfigured⁴ less to favor or disadvantage one race or ethnic group than to promote the reelection of incumbents; they are not unconstitutionally segregated.

We do not hold that the state may only draw Congressional boundaries with a blind eye toward race, a goal which would be impossible, nor that it is altogether prohibited from creating majority-minority districts. But when the State redraws the boundaries of Districts 18, 29, and 30 and contiguous districts, it can and must exhibit respect for neighborhoods, communities, and political subdivision lines. As the Supreme Court put it, appearances do matter. Id. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2827. In appearance and in reality, these three districts were racially gerrymandered.

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