Swift v. Speedway Superamerica, LLC
| Citation | 861 N.E.2d 1212 |
| Decision Date | 26 February 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02-0607-CV-577.,49A02-0607-CV-577. |
| Parties | Mary SWIFT, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. SPEEDWAY SUPERAMERICA LLC., Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Ronald E. Weldy, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
William R. Groth, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
Plaintiff-Appellant Mary Swift ("Swift") appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Speedway Superamerica, LLC., ("Speedway") and denying Swift's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
Swift was an at-will employee of Speedway from May of 1998 until March 10, 2004. Swift was a store manager at the time of her resignation earning a weekly salary of $716.00. Speedway pays its store managers weekly salaries, and they also are eligible for bonuses under Speedway's Store Manager Bonus Program.
After her resignation, Swift filed a complaint against Speedway under Indiana's Wage Claim Statute, Ind.Code § 22-2-9-1 et seq., and Indiana's Wage Payment Statute, Ind.Code § 22-2-5-1 et seq. In her complaint, filed on August 29, 2004, Swift sought reimbursement and damages for sick pay and store manager bonuses she alleged were owed to her by Speedway. Speedway denied Swift's allegations, and filed a motion for summary judgment on March 8, 2005. On May 19, 2005, Swift filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. After all of the briefs in support and opposition of the motions were filed, the trial court held oral argument on those motions on December 16, 2005. The trial court granted Speedway's motion for summary judgment and denied Swift's cross-motion for summary judgment on February 27, 2006. Swift filed a motion to correct error on March 29, 2006. The trial court held oral argument on the motion on June 8, 2006. On June 12, 2006, the trial court denied the motion to correct error.
The purpose of summary judgment is to terminate litigation about which there can be no factual dispute and which may be determined as a matter of law. Williams v. Riverside Community Corrections Corp., 846 N.E.2d 738, 743 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006). Our standard of review is the same as that of the trial court. Summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party. Id. The trial court's order granting and/or denying summary judgment is cloaked with a presumption of validity. Id. A party appealing from an order granting summary judgment has the burden of persuading the court on appeal that the decision was erroneous. Id.
At issue in this appeal is Swift's entitlement to payment for store manager bonuses for January and February 2004. Swift does not pursue her claim for sick pay. Swift claims that her store manager bonuses were wages. She contends that the bonuses are present compensation that can not be forfeited absent a valid contract between her and Speedway.
The Indiana Wage Payment Statute provides as follows:
(a) Every person, firm, corporation, limited liability company, or association, their trustees, lessees, or receivers appointed by any court, doing business in Indiana, shall pay each employee at least semimonthly or biweekly, if requested, the amount due the employee. The payment shall be made in lawful money of the United States, by negotiable check, draft, or money order, or by electronic transfer to the financial institution designated by the employee. Any contract in violation of this subsection is void.
(b) Payment shall be made for all wages earned to a date not more than ten (10) days prior to the date of payment. However, this subsection does not prevent payments being made at shorter intervals than specified in this subsection, nor repeal any law providing for payments at shorter intervals. However, if an employee voluntarily leaves employment, either permanently or temporarily, the employer shall not be required to pay the employee an amount due the employee until the next usual and regular day for payment of wages, as established by the employer. If an employee leaves employment voluntarily, and without the employee's whereabouts or address being known to the employer, the employer is not subject to section 2 of this chapter until:
(1) ten (10) days have elapsed after the employee has made a demand for the wages due the employee; or
(2) the employee has furnished the employer with the employee's address where the wages may be sent or forwarded.
The Wage Payment Statute does not provide a definition of "wages" as that term is used in the statute. However, case law provides guidance in determining the substance of compensation which has been the subject of controversy.
Present compensation refers generally to the hourly or salaried wages of an employee, and it commonly constitutes the consideration underlying the employment contract. Williams, 846 N.E.2d at 743-744. The defining characteristic of present compensation, with regard to an employee's hourly or salaried wage, is that it vests upon the performance of labor without any additional requirements. Id. at 744. An employee is immediately entitled to a share of his present compensation when labor is performed. Id.
Deferred compensation, vests upon some requirement in addition to, or apart from, the performance of labor. Id. That additional requirement might be the passage of time, the attainment of a certain age by an employee, or some other variable spelled out in a policy or by agreement of the parties. Id.
Present compensation indefeasibly vests upon the performance of labor, and can never be forfeited by an employee absent a contractual agreement to the contrary. Id. Deferred compensation, however, is subject to forfeiture, unless it arises via contract as opposed to an employer's policy, and the contract lacks any express terms providing for forfeiture. Id.
Deferred payment of compensation that accrued during an employee's tenure is a wage. Wank, 740 N.E.2d at 912. Common forms of deferred compensation include various forms of PTO, pension benefits, retirement savings plans, stock options, healthcare plans, annuities, etc. Williams, 846 N.E.2d at 747. Unlike present compensation, which is generally provided for by contract, deferred...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Harney v. Speedway Superamerica, LLC
...and benefits of bonus are not conferred upon employee unless all conditions of the bonuses are met); Swift v. Speedway Superamerica LLC, 861 N.E.2d 1212, 1215-16 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), reh'g and trans. denied (concluding that these same bonuses were at best deferred compensation but were forfei......
-
Bray v. Wecare TLC, LLC
.... . . [and] is immediately entitled to a share of his present compensation when labor is performed." Swift v. Speedway Superamerica, LLC, 861 N.E.2d 1212, 1214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (internal citations omitted). Employee compensation and payment arrangements vary widely, and no Indiana case ......
-
Hendricks Cnty. v. Green
...manual. [15] "Deferred payment of compensation that accrued during an employee's tenure is a wage." Swift v. Speedway Superamerica, LLC , 861 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). "Common forms of deferred compensation include various forms of PTO, pension benefits, retirement savings pla......
-
Harradon v. Schlamadinger
...terminate litigation about which there can be no dispute and which may be determined as a matter of law. Swift v. Speedway Superamerica, LLC, 861 N.E.2d 1212, 1213 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied. Our standard of review is the same as that of the trial court. Id. Summary judgment is approp......