Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 21 April 1990 |
| Docket Number | WIL-RICH,No. 68665,68665 |
| Citation | 253 Kan. 741,861 P.2d 1299 |
| Parties | , 62 USLW 2301, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,731 Ryan M. PATTON and Kathy Patton Strunk, Plaintiffs, v. HUTCHINSONMANUFACTURING COMPANY, et al., Defendants. . Syllabus by the Court 1. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas certified the following four questions under the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, K.S.A. 60-3201 et seq.: (a) Whether Kansas products liability law recognizes a continuing duty to warn theory of liability requiring manufacturers who learn of a danger incident to the use of their products after the sale of those products to warn ultimate consumers who purchased the products prior to the time the manufacturers learned of the potential danger through warnings disseminated to the manufacturers' retailers who have continuing contact with the consumers. (b) Whether Kansas products liability law recognizes a continuing duty to warn theory of liability requiring manufacturers who learn of a danger incident to the use of their products after the sale of those products to directly warn ultimate consumers who purchased the products prior to the time the manufacturers learned of the potential danger. (c) Whether Kansas products liability law places a duty to retrofit upon manufacturers who learn of a potential danger incident to the use of their products after the products have been sold. (d) Whether Kansas products liability law places a duty to recall upon manufacturers who learn of a potential danger incident to the use of their products after the products have been sold. We hold, under the facts as submitted by the certifying court and supplemented by the record, that the answers as amplified in the opinion are: (a) A qualified yes. (b) A qualified yes. (c) No. (d) No. 2. A manufacturer has a post-sale duty to warn ultimate consumers who purchased the product who can be readily identified or traced when a defect, which originated at the time the product was manufactured and was unforeseeable at the point of sale, is discove |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas certified the following four questions under the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, K.S.A. 60-3201 et seq.:
(a) Whether Kansas products liability law recognizes a continuing duty to warn theory of liability requiring manufacturers who learn of a danger incident to the use of their products after the sale of those products to warn ultimate consumers who purchased the products prior to the time the manufacturers learned of the potential danger through warnings disseminated to the manufacturers' retailers who have continuing contact with the consumers.
(b) Whether Kansas products liability law recognizes a continuing duty to warn theory of liability requiring manufacturers who learn of a danger incident to the use of their products after the sale of those products to directly warn ultimate consumers who purchased the products prior to the time the manufacturers learned of the potential danger.
(c) Whether Kansas products liability law places a duty to retrofit upon manufacturers who learn of a potential danger incident to the use of their products after the products have been sold.
(d) Whether Kansas products liability law places a duty to recall upon manufacturers who learn of a potential danger incident to the use of their products after the products have been sold.
We hold, under the facts as submitted by the certifying court and supplemented by the record, that the answers as amplified in the opinion are:
(a) A qualified yes.
(b) A qualified yes.
(c) No.
(d) No.
2. A manufacturer has a post-sale duty to warn ultimate consumers who purchased the product who can be readily identified or traced when a defect, which originated at the time the product was manufactured and was unforeseeable at the point of sale, is discovered to present a life threatening hazard.
3. A manufacturer who was unaware of a life-threatening hazard at time the manufacturer's product was sold and has since acquired knowledge of the hazard should not be absolved of all duty to take reasonable steps to warn ultimate consumers who purchased the product. A manufacturer is to be given a reasonable period of time after discovery of the life-threatening hazard in which to issue any post sale warning that might reasonably be required.
4. A manufacturer is not required at the time of sale to warn of unforeseeable dangers involving the use of the manufacturer's product.
5. The imposition of liability upon a manufacturer for inadequately warning an ultimate consumer who purchased the product prior to the time the manufacturer learned of the potential danger regarding the dangers of the product is dependent upon a reasonableness test and the manufacturer's actual or constructive knowledge of the risk.
6. K.S.A. 60-3305 of the Kansas Products Liability Act, K.S.A. 60-3301 et seq., refers to "any duty on the part of the manufacturer ... to warn or protect against a danger or hazard which could or did arise in the use or misuse of such product" in "any product liability claim". No statutory limitation or precedential authority limits to the point of sale a manufacturer's duty to warn the ultimate consumer who purchased the product prior to the time the manufacturer learned of the potential danger.
7. A manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn does not exist until either actual or constructive knowledge is acquired by the manufacturer concerning a later life-threatening hazard posed by the manufacturer's product when the product is used for its normally intended purpose.
8. A strict liability theory is not applied to a manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn. The cardinal inquiry is, was the manufacturer's post-sale conduct reasonable? The reasonableness standard is flexible. A negligence analysis is more appropriate than an application of strict liability in the post-sale context.
9. Generally, resolution of the issue of reasonableness of a post-sale duty to warn will be one of fact for the jury.
10. The nature of a manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn and where and to whom the warning should be given involves a case-by-case analysis.
11. K.S.A.1992 Supp. 60-3307 encourages manufacturers to make their products as safe as possible, free from the fear that remedial measures will be used adversely in later litigation. K.S.A.1992 Supp. 60-3307 prohibits the introduction of post-manufacture remedial measures, except as provided by 60-3307(b) (). The operative language of the statute, in the context of the case at bar, is the phrase "if such advancements or changes have been made, learned or placed into common use subsequent to the time the product in issue was ... sold by the manufacturer." K.S.A.1992 Supp. 60-3307(a)(1).
12. The decision to expand a manufacturer's post-sale duty beyond implementing reasonable efforts to warn of newly discovered latent life-threatening hazards unforeseeable at the point of sale should be left to administrative agencies and the legislature.
Gary D. McCallister, of Davis, Wright, Unrein, Hummer & McCallister, Topeka, argued the cause, and Anne L. Baker, of the same firm, and James A. Patton, Hiawatha, were with him on the briefs, for plaintiffs.
Daniel M. Dibble, of Lathrop & Norquist, Kansas City, MO, argued the cause, and Brian J. Madden of the same firm, and William G. Howard, of the same firm, Overland Park, were with him on the briefs, for defendants.
Donald Patterson, of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, Topeka, was on the brief, for amicus curiae Kansas Product Liability Advisory Council.
Lynn R. Johnson and Bobbie R. Bailey, of Shamberg, Johnson, Bergman & Morris, P.C., Overland Park, were on the brief, for amicus curiae Kansas Trial Lawyers Ass'n.
Kevin M. Reynolds, of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, IA, and Donald C. Bollard, III, of Sherman, Taft, and Bangert, Leawood, were on the brief, for amicus curiae Defense Research Institute, Inc.
Lawton M. Nuss and Donald G. Reinsch, of Clark, Mize & Linville, Chartered, Salina, were on the brief, for amicus curiae Kansas Ass'n of Defense Counsel.
This is a first impression products liability case. Four questions concerning a manufacturer's post-sale duties to warn of danger incident to use of its product have been certified by the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. Our jurisdiction is under K.S.A. 60-3201 ().
The four certified questions are:
I. Whether Kansas products liability law recognizes a continuing duty to warn theory of liability requiring manufacturers who learn of a danger incident to the use of their products after the sale of those products to warn ultimate consumers who purchased the products prior to the time the manufacturers learned of the potential danger through warnings disseminated to the manufacturers' retailers who have continuing contact with the consumers.
II. Whether Kansas products liability law recognizes a continuing duty to warn theory of liability requiring manufacturers who learn of a danger incident to the use of their products after the sale of those products to directly warn ultimate consumers who purchased the products prior to the time the manufacturers learned of the potential danger.
III. Whether Kansas products liability law places a duty to retrofit upon manufacturers who learn of a potential danger incident to the use of their products after the products have been sold.
IV. Whether Kansas products liability law places a duty to recall upon manufacturers who learn of a potential danger incident to the use of their products after the products have been sold.
Because of the infinite variety of products marketed in this state, the following answers are inexorably linked to and amplified by the corresponding portions of the opinion.
We answer the four certified questions as follows:
A qualified yes.
A qualified yes.
The federal court memorandum and order certifying the four questions contains the following statement of facts:
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