Patterson v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Office

• Decision Date: 16 September 1993
• Docket Number: CA-CV,No. 1,1
• Citation: 865 P.2d 814,177 Ariz. 153
• Parties: Michael L. PATTERSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Maricopa County Sheriff, Thomas J. Agnos, and Maricopa County Employee Merit System Commission, Defendants-Appellants. 91-0136.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 814

865 P.2d 814

177 Ariz. 153

Michael L. PATTERSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Maricopa County Sheriff, Thomas J. Agnos, and Maricopa County Employee Merit System Commission, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 91-0136.

Court of Appeals of Arizona,

Division 1, Department D.

Sept. 16, 1993.

[177 Ariz. 154] Bryan, Cave, McPheeters & McRoberts by Marshall W. Anstandig, Diane M. Dear, Teresa D. Forst, Phoenix, for defendants-appellants.

Brown & Bain, P.A. by Paul F. Eckstein, Joel W. Nomkin, Hugh L. Hallman, Phoenix, for plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

LANKFORD, Judge.

This appeal presents the following issues:

1. Did the Maricopa County Employee Merit System Rules bar Appellee Michael L. Patterson, an employee of Appellant Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, from a candidacy for municipal office?

2. Is Maricopa County Employee Merit System Rule 20 unconstitutional?

We hold that because the office was unpaid and nonpartisan, the County rules did not prevent Patterson from both being a candidate for the position and continuing in his county job. As a result, we need not reach the constitutional question.

Patterson was employed by the Sheriff's Office as a detention officer. In January 1989, Patterson filed nominating petitions for the position of Cave Creek Town Council representative, an unpaid and nonpartisan position.

Patterson's employment was governed by the Maricopa County Employee Merit System Rules ("the Rules"). Section 20 of the Rules ¹ provides in part:

B. No employee shall be a member of any national, state or local committee of a political party, or an officer or chairman of a committee of a partisan political club, or a candidate for nomination or election to any paid public office, or shall take any part in the management or affairs of any political party or in any political campaign, except that any employee may express opinions, attend meetings for the purpose of becoming informed concerning the candidate for public office and the political issues and cast a vote.

C. The provisions of this section shall not apply to school board elections or junior college district governing board elections, and an employee or commissioner may serve as a member of the board of trustees of a common or high school district or as a member of the junior college district governing board.

D. Any person in the county service who violates any of the provisions of this section shall be subject to suspension of not less than thirty days or dismissal.

Prior to the Cave Creek general election, the Sheriff's Office learned of Patterson's candidacy and conducted an investigation to determine whether it violated the Rules proscribing political activity. The investigators concluded that Patterson was not violating Rule 20B because the position he sought was unpaid and nonpartisan. However, the Director of Detention and a Deputy Chief disagreed with this conclusion, as did Appellant Sheriff Agnos and the Maricopa County Attorney's Office.

Patterson was elected in May 1989 to the Cave Creek Town Council. Shortly thereafter, Agnos informed Patterson by letter of Agnos' intent to terminate Patterson's employment for engaging in improper political activity in violation of the Rules. The letter asserted that Patterson not only violated the Rules by serving as a town council representative but created a potential conflict of interest because the Sheriff's Office had contracted with the Town of Cave Creek to provide law enforcement service.

At Patterson's request, a pre-termination meeting was held. Agnos advised Patterson that if he would resign his elected position on the town council, the Sheriff's Office would not terminate his employment.

Patterson did not resign, and by letter dated June 23, 1989, Agnos terminated Patterson's employment with the Sheriff's Office. Agnos cited the legal causes for dismissal as violation of Rule 17(c)(13) ("improper political activity") and Rule 20B ("participation in political campaign"). Rule 17C provides: "An appointing authority may remove any employee with permanent status only for cause. Each of the following constitutes cause for discipline or dismissal of an employee in the county service: ... 13. Improper political activity." Rule 20 defines political activity.

Patterson appealed his dismissal to the Maricopa County Employee Merit System Commission, which denied his appeal. He subsequently filed a superior court action challenging the Commission's order. He sought reinstatement to his former job, back wages and other benefits, damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and a declaratory judgment that Rule 20B was unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, section 6 of the Arizona Constitution. ²

Patterson filed a motion for partial summary judgment on liability and appellants ("the County") filed a response and cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted Patterson's motion and denied the County's cross-motion. The court resolved the motions by referring to Rule 20B without resolving the underlying constitutional issues. The court stated:

In this case, the word "paid" in line 3 of Section 20B would have no meaning if the defendants' theory of the case prevailed. We must assume that the legislature intended the word to have some meaning or else it would not have been used. In addition, where a statute is plain on its face, it would be inappropriate to refer to legislative history to alter the plain and literal meaning of its words.

The County filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment in favor of Patterson. ³

The facts in this matter are not in dispute. The only issue is the proper interpretation of Rule 20B. The interpretation of a statute or rule involves legal rather than factual questions; thus, we are not bound by the trial court's construction of the rule, and we consider de novo the rule and its application to the facts before us. See Hampton v. Glendale Union High Sch. Dist., 172 Ariz. 431, 433, 837 P.2d 1166, 1168 (App.1992) (interpreting statute); Libra Group, Inc. v. State, 167 Ariz. 176, 179, 805 P.2d 409, 412 (App.1991) (interpreting statutes and regulations).

We look first to the language of the rule. Rule 20B provides in relevant part that "[n]o employee shall be ... a candidate for nomination or election to any paid public office, or shall take part in the management or affairs of any political party or in any political campaign ..." (Emphasis added).

This rule can be read in three ways: (1) Because an employee may not take part in any campaign, he may not be a candidate for any office involving a campaign; (2) An employee may be a candidate for an unpaid position, but he may not participate in his own campaign; or (3) An employee may be a candidate for unpaid office and he may take part in his own campaign. We believe that the third reading of the rule is correct. Thus, the rule allowed Patterson to campaign as a candidate for the town council.

The first interpretation of the rule would make the prohibition against running for a paid public office meaningless. If a county employee cannot campaign as a candidate for any office, paid or unpaid, then the ban on candidacy for a paid office would be superfluous. In construing a statute or rule, we presume that the promulgating body did not intend to do a futile act by including a provision that is not operative or that is inert and trivial. See Campbell v. Superior Ct., 105 Ariz. 252, 255, 462 P.2d 801, 804 (1969) (construing statute). We must give each word, phrase, clause and sentence meaning so that no part of the rule is rendered superfluous, void, insignificant, redundant or contradictory. See State v. Superior Ct., 113 Ariz. 248, 249, 550 P.2d 626, 627 (1976); Maricopa County v. Arizona Tax Ct., 162 Ariz. 64, 68, 781 P.2d 41, 45 (App.1989) (construing statutes). We therefore reject an interpretation of the rule which prohibits employees from participating in their own campaigns because that construction would render an important clause of the rule nugatory. The second alternative would allow an employee to be a candidate for unpaid office, but prohibit participation in the employee's own campaign. We reject an interpretation that limits employees to such "passive" candidacies. An integral part of candidacy for public office is the waging of a campaign to be elected. It is through campaigns--speeches, brochures, voter canvassing--that the electorate is informed of the qualifications and views of a candidate. Disallowing campaign activity not only places the candidate at an acute disadvantage, but disserves the public as well. Moreover, the County has never offered any persuasive policy reason for distinguishing passive and active candidacies. It would not be a sensible construction of the rule to allow an employee to be a candidate, but disallow his participation in the attendant campaign for election. "Statutes must be given a sensible construction which will avoid absurd results." Lake Havasu City v. Mohave County, 138 Ariz. 552, 557, 675 P.2d 1371, 1376 (App.1983) (citing School Dist. No. 3 of Maricopa County v. Dailey, 106 Ariz. 124, 471 P.2d 736 (1970) and St. Joseph's Hosp. and Medical Ctr. v. Maricopa County, 130 Ariz. 239, 635 P.2d 527 (App.1981)).

We embrace the third interpretation as the most reasonable reading of Rule 20. That interpretation allows an employee to both stand for an unpaid office and campaign for that office. Other jurisdictions have considered similar provisions and have concluded, as we do, that limits on employee participation in campaigns do not control provisions regarding candidacies of the employees themselves.

In Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d 22 (1st Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063, 98 S.Ct. 1236, 55 L.Ed.2d 763 (1978), one provision of a city charter banned both partisan and nonpartisan candidacies while another prohibited employees from taking part in political...