Spiegler v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 27 January 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-7092,88-7092
• Citation: 866 F.2d 461
• Parties: , 275 U.S.App.D.C. 260, 57 USLW 2447, 51 Ed. Law Rep. 754 Joseph SPIEGLER, et al., Appellants v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 461

866 F.2d 461

107 A.L.R.Fed. 743, 275 U.S.App.D.C. 260,

57 USLW 2447,

51 Ed. Law Rep. 754

Joseph SPIEGLER, et al., Appellants v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.

No. 88-7092.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Nov. 17, 1988.

Decided Jan. 27, 1989.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No. 87-3132).

Matthew B. Bogin, with whom Michael J. Eig, Washington, D.C., and Margaret A. Kohn were on the brief, for appellants.

Mary L. Wilson, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom Frederick D. Cooke, Jr., Corp. Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellees.

Before MIKVA, BUCKLEY, and D.H. GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MIKVA.

MIKVA, Circuit Judge:

The issue in this case is whether appellants' claims under the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1400-1485 ("EHA" or "Act"), are time-barred.

The Act provides that parties to state administrative proceedings may bring a civil action in federal court to challenge the findings and decision of such proceedings. See Sec. 1415(e)(2). Because the Act is silent as to a limitations period for such actions, we elect to borrow a measure from a suitable local law. We hold that the 30-day local time limit for petitions for review of agency orders would be appropriate, but that the Act requires the District of Columbia ("District") to give clear notice to parties of the availability of judicial review and of the relatively short statute of limitations.

Because the District failed to give adequate notice to appellants in this case, we conclude that the 30-day limitations period cannot be applied to them and accordingly reverse the district court's dismissal of appellants' claims under the Act.

I.

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant Joseph Spiegler is a learning-disabled child (now 15) who had completed the fourth grade in a non-special education private school in June 1984 when his parents filed a request with the District of Columbia Public Schools ("DCPS") for special education and related services for Joseph. In August 1984, the DCPS prepared an "individualized education program" ("IEP") for Joseph, proposing that he attend the Janney Learning Center, a public school special education program in which handicapped students are placed with nonhandicapped students for a quarter of their curriculum.

Joseph's parents disagreed with the IEP and, pursuant to the EHA, requested a due process hearing to review the determination. The Spieglers asserted that the Lab School of Washington, a private special education school, where they had enrolled Joseph in September 1984, was a more appropriate educational environment for him because it would not involve contact with non-handicapped students.

The hearing was held on November 13, 1984, and the hearing officer issued his decision on January 2, 1985. The hearing officer concluded that the Janney program prescribed by the IEP would, with certain modifications, suffice for Joseph's needs. The Spieglers, however, continued to disagree with the decision and elected to keep Joseph at the Lab School, at their own expense, for the next three years. During this time, the Spieglers neither sought reconsideration of the DCPS placement decision nor asked the DCPS to re-evaluate Joseph's needs.

On November 19, 1987, almost three years after the hearing decision was issued, the Spieglers filed a complaint in district court under 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(2) requesting a declaration that Janney was an inappropriate placement for Joseph and that the Lab School was and is the preferable educational environment for Joseph. They sought recovery of tuition and expenses incurred since September 1984 for Joseph's education at the Lab School and an order that the District continue to reimburse them for Joseph's educational expenses.

The district court applied the 30-day local limitations period governing petitions for review of agency orders and dismissed the suit as time-barred. Spiegler v. District of Columbia, No. 87-3132, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 1988) ("Mem. Op."), Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 9. This appeal followed.

B. Statutory Framework

The EHA provides federal funds to assist state and local agencies in educating handicapped children, but only on the condition that the state complies with certain goals and procedures. See 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412; Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179-84, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3037-40, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (describing evolution and major provisions of the EHA). The Act's primary purpose is "to assure that all handicapped children have available to them * * * a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs." 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1400(c).

Among the procedural safeguards enacted by Congress are requirements that parents or guardians of handicapped children be notified of any proposed change in "the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate education to such child," and that they be permitted to bring a complaint about "any matter relating to" such evaluation and education. Sec. 1415(b)(1)(C)-(E). Complaints brought by parents or guardians must be resolved at "an impartial due process hearing," and appeal to the state educational agency must be provided if the initial hearing is held at the local or regional level. Sec. 1415(b)(2), (c). Parties to such hearings must be accorded the right to counsel, the right to present evidence and cross-examine and compel witnesses, and the right to a written record of the hearing, findings of fact, and decisions. Sec. 1415(d).

Thereafter, "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision" of the state administrative hearing:

shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint * * * in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy. In any action brought under this paragraph the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.

Sec. 1415(e)(2) (emphasis added). The Act does not, however, specify a limitations period for section 1415(e)(2) actions.

II.

When Congress has not established a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, it is well-settled that federal courts may "borrow" one from an analogous state cause of action, provided that the state limitations period is not inconsistent with underlying federal policies. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1941-42, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 240, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 1254, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). But cf. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-72, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2294, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (federal court may apply an analogous federal statute of limitations in the absence of a closely analogous state statute of limitations).

The District urges us to borrow the 30-day limitations period of D.C. Court of Appeals Rule 15(a) for petitions for review of agency orders. Appellants, on the other hand, advocate adoption of the 3-year statute of limitations under D.C.Code Sec. 12-301(8) (Michie 1981) for actions "for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed."

This is a question of first impression in this circuit. Our sister circuits that have been faced with similar though less extreme choices have disagreed as to whether the generally shorter period for administrative appeals should apply or whether a longer limitations period is more appropriate. Compare Adler v. Education Department, 760 F.2d 454, 457-59 (2d Cir.1985) (four months) and Department of Education v. Carl D., 695 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir.1983) (30 days) with Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 482-83 (4th Cir.1987) (one year) and Janzen v. Knox County Board of Education, 790 F.2d 484, 487 (6th Cir.1986) (three years) and Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir.1984) (two years) and Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District, 665 F.2d 443, 450 (3d Cir.1981) (two or six years), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121, 102 S.Ct. 3508, 73 L.Ed.2d 1383 (1982).

We accordingly note at the outset that neither 30 days nor three years appears to be a clearly accepted limitations period for actions under the EHA. Absent congressional action, local legislation, and other suitable alternatives, we appear to be confined to the choice presented to us by the parties. We note in passing that we must decline to apply an analogous federal statute of limitations, because we find no federal statute that "clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes." DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2294, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983).

A. Analogous State Cause of Action

Our first task is therefore to decide whether a suit under section 1415(e)(2) of the Act is sufficiently analogous either to an administrative appeal or to a de novo civil action for statute-of-limitations purposes.

Section 1415(e)(2) permits "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision" of the state administrative hearings "to bring a civil action * * * in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy." The complaint may concern "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child." Sec. 1415(b)(1)(...