United States v. Chapman, 16-1810

• Citation: 866 F.3d 129
• Decision Date: 04 August 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16-1810,16-1810
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Shaun CHAPMAN, Appellant
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

866 F.3d 129

UNITED STATES of America

v.Shaun CHAPMAN, Appellant

No. 16-1810

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued November 4, 2016

Filed: August 4, 2017

James V. Wade, Esq., Ronald A. Krauss, Esq. [ARGUED], Office of the Federal Public Defender, 100 Chestnut Street, Suite 306, Harrisburg, PA 17101, Attorneys for Appellant

David J. Hickton, Esq., Rebecca Ross Haywood, Esq. [ARGUED], Office of the United States Attorney, 700 Grant Street, Suite 4000, Pittsburgh, PA 15219, Attorneys for Appellee

Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

Shaun Chapman appeals the District Court's application of the career offender enhancement to his sentence calculation under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines"). Chapman contends that his convictions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) do not qualify as crimes of violence. This appeal requires us to determine whether § 876(c) —which proscribes mailing a communication containing a threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another —is a crime of violence, as defined by the Guidelines. Because we agree with the District Court that Chapman's convictions are crimes of violence within the meaning of the Guidelines, we will affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Factual Background

While serving a sentence in state prison in 2006, Chapman wrote a letter—eventually intercepted by prison staff—threatening to kill President George W. Bush. Shortly after, in an interview with Secret Service agents, Chapman admitted that he wanted to kill the President and went on to make additional threats. A few months later, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Chapman with threatening the President, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871(a). Chapman pled guilty and was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment.

In 2007, shortly after his sentencing, Chapman mailed a letter to a federal district court judge, which contained threats against the judge and other court staff. This time, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Chapman with mailing a threatening communication, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). Chapman was sentenced to an additional 48 months' imprisonment.

Chapman was released from federal custody in April 2014. Soon after, he violated the terms of his supervised release and received a sentence of 11 months' imprisonment. While serving this sentence, Chapman mailed a letter to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The letter contained threats against the federal prosecutor who handled Chapman's revocation proceedings, as well as the probation officer involved with Chapman's case. These actions put Chapman in his current predicament.

B. Procedural History

In May 2015, a federal grand jury returned an indictment on one count of mailing a threatening communication, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). Chapman pled guilty to the one count, without a plea agreement.

At the March 2016 sentencing hearing, the District Court considered Chapman's presentence investigation report ("PSR"). Based on the PSR, the government recommended that Chapman receive the career offender enhancement because his "instant offense of conviction [was] a felony that is ... a crime of violence" and he "ha[d] at least two prior felony convictions of ... a crime of violence." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a) (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2017) [hereinafter Guidelines Manual]. The government also noted that other circuits had adopted the same position as to § 876(c). Meanwhile, Chapman argued that § 876(c) is not a crime of violence because it does not require "violent physical force," and therefore it does not "have as an element the use, attempted use, or threaten[ed] use of force." App. 49–52.

The District Court rejected Chapman's argument and concluded that a conviction under § 876(c) is a crime of violence. The District Court noted that the "express language and the semantic structure of [§] 876(c) refute[d]" Chapman's argument. App. 53. Applying the career offender enhancement, the District Court sentenced Chapman to 70 months' imprisonment, which is at the bottom of the Guidelines range. This timely appeal followed.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. "Whether a ... conviction constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of the career offender Guideline is a question of law over which we exercise plenary review." United States v. Brown , 765 F.3d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Chapman argues that his conviction here and a previous conviction do not qualify as crimes of violence under the Guidelines. We disagree.¹

Under the Guidelines, one is designated a career offender if:

(1) [he] was at least eighteen years old at the time [he] committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) [he] has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.

Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a). Both the instant conviction and the previous conviction at issue here were for violating 18 U.S.C. § 876(c), which prohibits mailing "any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another."

To determine whether Chapman's convictions under § 876(c) could serve as career offender predicate offenses, we will first examine the definition of "crime of violence," as defined by Guidelines § 4B1.2(a)(1). Then, we will compare this definition to the elements of the statute forming the basis of Chapman's convictions.

A. Definition of "Crime of Violence," Pursuant to the Career Offender Enhancement

The Guidelines define "crime of violence" as "any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that ... has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(1).² It bears discussing the meaning of "use" and "physical force."

The word "use" means "the intentional employment of ... force, generally to obtain some end." Tran v. Gonzales , 414 F.3d 464, 470 (3d Cir. 2005). "[T]he word ‘use’ conveys the idea that the thing used ... has been made the user's instrument." United States v. Castleman , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1415, 188 L.Ed.2d 426 (2014) (some internal quotation marks omitted).

Turning to "physical force," the Supreme Court has defined this phrase to mean "violent force," in other words, "force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person." Johnson v. United States , 559 U.S. 133, 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010).³ It is important to note that the use of physical force does not require that the person employing force directly apply harm to—i.e. , strike—the victim. We derive this principle from United States v. Castleman , where the Supreme Court rejected the contention that knowingly or intentionally poisoning another person does not constitute a use of force:

The "use of force" in [Respondent's] example is not the act of "sprinkl[ing]" the poison; it is the act of employing poison knowingly as a device to cause physical harm. That the harm occurs indirectly, rather than directly (as with a kick or punch), does not matter. Under [Respondent's] logic, after all, one could say that pulling the trigger on a gun is not a "use of force" because it is the bullet, not the trigger, that actually strikes the victim.

134 S.Ct. at 1415.

We understand that the Court in Castleman applied the common-law definition of "force"—which is satisfied by offensive touching—to the meaning of "physical force," as used in "misdemeanor crime of violence," and the sentencing enhancement in this case requires us to analyze the meaning of "physical force," as used in felony "crime of violence." Chapman argues that Castleman lacks persuasive value for this reason.

But Chapman fails to sufficiently explain why Castleman 's analysis should not apply here. If employing a device to cause harm indirectly (e.g. , pulling the trigger on a gun) meets the definition of "physical force," as used in misdemeanor crime of violence, then it stands to reason that the same action meets the definition of "physical force," as used in felony crime of violence. Otherwise, § 4B1.1(a)(1) would only apply to offenses that explicitly require a punch, kick, or some other form of touching that is more than offensive. We therefore find that the "use" of "physical force," as used in § 4B1.2(a)(1), involves the intentional employment of something capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person, regardless of whether the perpetrator struck the victim's body.⁴

B. The Framework for Comparing Chapman's Convictions to the Definition of "Crime of Violence"

To determine whether a conviction qualifies as a crime of violence, courts use the categorical approach, which calls for a comparison of "the elements of the statute forming the basis of the defendant's conviction" with the definition of crime of violence.

Descamps v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 2281, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013). Under this approach, we " ‘look only to the statutory definitions'—i.e. , the elements—of a defendant's prior offense[ ], and not ‘to the particular facts underlying th [e] conviction[ ].’ " Id. at 2283 (emphasis in original) (quoting Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) ).

In the context of determining whether a conviction is a crime of violence, as defined by § 4B1.2(a)(1), we ask whether "the use or threat of physical force [against the person of another]" is an element of the offense. Brown , 765 F.3d at 189 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks...