U.S. v. Mejia-Orosco

Decision Date17 February 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88-5584,D,MEJIA-OROSC,88-5584
Citation867 F.2d 216
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juventinoefendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Alfredo Villarreal, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Lucien B. Campbell, Federal Public Defender, San Antonio, Tex., for defendant-appellant.

LeRoy Morgan Jahn, Asst. U.S. Atty., Helen M. Everberg, U.S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before CLARK, Chief Judge, HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge, and LITTLE, * District Judge.

CLARK, Chief Judge:

Juventino Mejia-Orosco was convicted of illegally transporting aliens into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1324(a)(1)(B). He does not contest the underlying conviction, but argues that the district court imposed an improper sentence. Because the district court correctly applied the guidelines to its factual findings, and because those findings were not clearly erroneous, we affirm.

I

Mejia-Orosco is a citizen of Guatemala. He earns his living trucking curios from Guatemala, through Mexico, to the United States. In April of 1988, on one of his many trips to this country, he brought along Hector Galvencio Paz-Ortega and Carlos Enrique Cruz-Morales, both citizens of Guatemala and purportedly related to Mejia-Orosco. After Mejia-Orosco and his two passengers had travelled through Mexico and arrived in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, Mexico, Paz-Ortega and Cruz-Morales disembarked.

Mejia-Orosco drove his van across the bridge into Laredo, Texas. Paz-Ortega and Cruz-Morales waded the Rio Grande. They did not pass through customs and had no legal right to enter this country. Mejia-Orosco and the aliens then regrouped and spent two days in Laredo. During this time, the group contacted relatives of the aliens living in the United States. The family members were instructed to wire Mejia-Orosco funds. He received $1,000 from Paz-Ortega's family in Los Angeles and $1,700 from relatives of Cruz-Morales living in New York City. Two days after arriving, the three drove to the Laredo International Airport. Mejia-Orosco supplied the aliens with airline tickets to San Antonio and the key to a motel room there. Later, Mejia-Orosco met the aliens at the motel and drove them to the San Antonio International Airport. At the airport, Paz-Ortega was detained and questioned by immigration officials. He admitted that he and Cruz-Morales had illegally entered the United States with the aid of Mejia-Orosco. With this information, law enforcement officials were able to locate and detain Cruz-Morales, who was aboard an airplane awaiting departure to New York, and Mejia-Orosco. A search of Mejia-Orosco's van uncovered 4,102 United States dollars and 574,000 Mexican pesos.

Mejia-Orosco pled guilty to one count of illegally transporting aliens into the United States. He admits that he received $850 from each of the transported aliens in exchange for his illegal services. He was sentenced to 10 months in prison and fined $4,000. His van, used to transport the aliens from Guatemala, has been seized pending forfeiture proceedings.

The district court calculated the sentence imposed on Mejia-Orosco according to the guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a). On appeal, Mejia-Orosco argues that the district court erroneously imposed a sentence of 10 months imprisonment. The guidelines, in the defendant's view, would permit a maximum sentence of no more than 7 months. His appeal is specifically authorized by statute. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(a)(2).

II

Our review of the sentence imposed by the district court is governed by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(d) and (e):

(d) Consideration.--Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall determine whether the sentence--

(1) was imposed in violation of law;

(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines;

(3) is outside the range of the applicable sentencing guideline, and is unreasonable, having regard for--

(A) the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in chapter 227 of this title; and (B) the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by the district court pursuant to the provisions of section 3553(c); or

(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable.

The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous.

(e) Decision and disposition

If the court of appeals determines that the sentence--

(1) was imposed in violation of law or imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines, the court shall remand the case for further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the court considers appropriate;

(2) is outside the range of the applicable sentencing guideline and is unreasonable or was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable, it shall state specific reasons for the conclusions and ...

it shall set aside the sentence and remand the case for further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the court considers appropriate.

(3) is not described in paragraph (1) or (2), it shall affirm the sentence.

Under these provisions, the characterization of the alleged sentencing error is critical. A sentence imposed "outside the range of the applicable sentencing guideline" will be reversed only if it is unreasonable. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e)(2). On the other hand, a sentence "imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines" must be reversed even if reasonable. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e)(1). Findings of fact that underlie the district court's sentence are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(d).

The sentencing guidelines do not merely change the procedures used to impose sentences, they initiate an historic shift in modern penology. The guidelines are designed to create uniform, determinate sentences based upon the crime committed, not the offender. Congress abandoned the rehabilitation model that shaped penology in the Twentieth Century. Under the rehabilitation model, sentences were individualized. Prisoners were sentenced according to predictions of "their potential for, or actual rehabilitation." United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2613, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978). From this premise, the maxim developed that "the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1083, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949). Congress concluded after decades of empirical evidence that this commendable and ambitious approach had proven unworkable and unjust. Predictions of an offender's propensity for, or actual, rehabilitation were found to be unsubstantiated and, in fact, incapable of any scientific determination. The result was that an unjustifiably wide range of punishment was meted out to similar offenders convicted of committing similar crimes under like circumstances. In most cases, the district court would impose a term of imprisonment that was almost never fully implemented. Instead, prisoners were released based upon the determination of parole officials that the prisoner was rehabilitated.

By enacting the sentencing guidelines Congress returned federal sentencing to an earlier philosophy that the punishment should fit the crime and that the main purpose of imprisonment is punishment. Senator Edward M. Kennedy described the guidelines as "a comprehensive and far reaching new approach ... [designed to] reduce the unacceptable disparity of punishment that plagues the federal system, and ... to assure sentences that are fair--and are perceived to be fair--to offenders, victims, and society." 32 Fed.B. News & J. 60, 65 (1985). Similar crimes should be punished similarly. To accomplish this goal, Congress limited the discretion of district judges through the guidelines and made the sentence imposed determinate by abolishing parole. The guidelines provide the analytic framework needed to create uniform sentences. The accompanying abolishment of parole ensures that the imposed sentence will be served.

Sentencing under the guidelines is not, however, an exact science. Justice cannot be meted out according to mathematical formulas. The universe of potential factors that might affect the seriousness of a given offense is too broad to be refined to a mechanistic approach. The sentencing guidelines are not intended to cover all contingencies or rigidly bind district judges. The guidelines do not impose the sentence, they provide a framework for a district court to impose a sentence. "The sentencing judge has an obligation to consider all the relevant factors in a case and to impose a sentence outside the guidelines in an appropriate case. The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual offender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences." S.Rep. No. 225, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3182, 3235.

The district court's fact-finding power is an important guarantor of the practical judgment essential to any just sentencing procedure. As we have already mentioned, the guidelines statute expressly insulates such fact-finding against appellate attack. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(d) (endorsing the "clearly erroneous" standard). Once the district court has made factual findings, the court's sentence will be affirmed if it results from a proper application of the sentencing guidelines to those facts. On the other hand, if the court...

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