Bradley v. State
| Decision Date | 13 June 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 10S01-0706-CR-232.,10S01-0706-CR-232. |
| Citation | 867 N.E.2d 1282 |
| Parties | William T. BRADLEY, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Jeffrey D. Stonebraker, Chief Public Defender, Jeffersonville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Kelly A. Miklos, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 10A01-0510-CR-475.
The defendant, William T. Bradley, was charged with attempted murder as a class A felony, criminal confinement as a class B felony, and aggravated battery as a class B felony. After a jury trial, he was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted on the charges of criminal confinement and aggravated battery. His direct appeal raises three claims: insufficient evidence to prove criminal confinement, violation of the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause, and abuse of sentencing discretion. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a 2-1 divided memorandum decision. The defendant's petition to transfer challenges only the rejection of his double jeopardy claim. We grant transfer and modify one of his convictions and his sentence.
In his appeal, the defendant contends that convictions for both criminal confinement and aggravated battery violate the "actual evidence test" for reviewing claims under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Indiana Constitution,1 because there is a reasonable possibility that the facts used by the jury to establish the essential elements of criminal confinement were also used to establish the essential elements of aggravated battery. The Court of Appeals majority decision rejected his claim, concluding "that there is a reasonable possibility that the jury used different evidentiary facts to convict Bradley of aggravated battery and criminal confinement." Bradley v. State, No. 10A01-0510-CR-475, slip op. at 10, 855 N.E.2d 1077 (Ind.Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2006). Judge Vaidik dissented on this point, emphasizing that the "proper inquiry" is not whether there is a reasonable probability that, in convicting the defendant of both charges, the jury used different facts, but whether it is reasonably possible it used the same facts. Id. at 22. She is correct.
The information charging criminal confinement as a class B felony alleged that the defendant knowingly or intentionally confined Vette Porter without her consent and "did so while armed with a deadly weapon, a hammer, or which resulted in serious bodily injury . . ., to-wit: open head wound requiring staples." Appellant's App'x. at 55. The charge of aggravated battery as a class B felony alleged that the defendant knowingly or intentionally inflicted injury on Vette Porter "that created a substantial risk of death or caused serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ, to-wit: open head wound and a knife wound to the back." Id.
The trial evidence showed that on the day of the charged offenses, the defendant and his wife (now Vette Porter) had separated and met that morning with a lawyer to discuss possible divorce proceedings. That afternoon at the marital residence, they got into an argument that culminated in his stabbing her with a knife in the back and following her into a bathroom where he pinned her over the toilet and hit her several times in the back of her head with a hammer.
The trial court instructed the jury that to convict on the charge of criminal confinement, the State must prove that the defendant "(1) knowingly or intentionally; (2) confined Vette Porter without her consent; (3) while armed with a deadly weapon, or resulting in serious bodily injury to Vette Porter." Id. at 112. As to the charge of aggravated battery, the jury was instructed that the State must prove that the defendant "(1) knowingly or intentionally; (2) inflicted injury on Vette Porter that: (a) created a substantial risk of death, or (b) caused serious permanent disfigurement, or (c) caused protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ." Id. at 114.
The defendant contends that it is reasonably possible that the jury used the evidence proving confinement to also prove aggravated battery. He argues that it was impossible to ascertain whether the jury, in finding criminal confinement proved, used the fact that the defendant was armed with the hammer or Porter's open head wound (a serious bodily injury) to establish the element of force required for confinement. Thus in finding the defendant guilty of criminal confinement, the jury reasonably could have used the same evidence of the defendant intentionally inflicting an open head wound to also establish that the defendant had committed aggravated battery.
Focusing on other evidence, showing that the defendant stabbed Porter with a knife, the State argues that "[i]t is reasonable that the jury considered the stabbing with the knife to satisfy the elements of aggravated battery," and that the stabbing occurred before the defendant confined Porter in the restroom and struck her on the head with a hammer. Appellee's Br. at 12. The State urges that "the jury found Porter's confinement in the restroom both during the attack with the hammer and during the struggle over the hammer satisfied the elements of criminal confinement." Id. Focusing on the sequence of events, the State urges that the facts used to establish aggravated battery did not establish all the elements of criminal confinement.
We agree that it is reasonable that the jury may have predicated its finding of guilt regarding aggravated battery, particularly its required element of force, solely on the stabbing evidence. But this does not obviate the defendant's double jeopardy claim. From the evidence and instructions, it is reasonable that the jury may also have found the same element satisfied by the evidence of Porter's open head injury inflicted by the defendant with the hammer. If the latter evidence was the basis for the jury's decision, the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated. Under the actual evidence test, the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause is violated when there is a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged...
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Wadle v. State
...the latter offense would not have established the former offense. 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1222 (Ind. 2015). See also Bradley v. State , 867 N.E.2d 1282, 1284–85 (Ind. 2007) (same). But in Carrico v. State , this Court found no double-jeopardy violation where evidence establishing murder established......
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Keller v. State
...felony Burglary convictions from Class B felonies to Class C felonies and to resentence the defendant accordingly. See Bradley v. State, 867 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (Ind.2007). As to the other appellate issues we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals.7 Ind. App. R. 58(A)(2).As established, the tr......
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Lee v. State, No. 27S04-0805-PC-226.
... ... Since Richardson, this Court has decided several cases where there were separate facts to support two convictions, but the case was presented in a way that left a reasonable possibility that the jury used the same facts to establish both. For example, in Bradley v. State, 867 N.E.2d 1282 (Ind.2007), the defendant was charged with confinement and aggravated battery arising out of a domestic dispute in which he stabbed his wife and also pinned her over a toilet and repeatedly struck her head with a hammer. The jury could have found that the stabbing ... ...
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