People v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 28 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 149798. |
| Citation | 498 Mich. 246,869 N.W.2d 253 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Timothy Ward JACKSON, a/k/a Timothy Ward–Jackson, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
498 Mich. 246
869 N.W.2d 253
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellee
v.
Timothy Ward JACKSON, a/k/a Timothy Ward–Jackson, Defendant–Appellant.
Docket No. 149798.
Supreme Court of Michigan.
Argued May 5, 2015.
Decided July 28, 2015.
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Kym Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and David A. McCreedy, Lead Appellate Attorney, for the people.
Lisa B. Kirsch Satawa LLC and Clark Hill PLC (by Lisa B. Kirsch Satawa, Southfield), for defendant.
Opinion
McCORMACK, J.
The defendant, Timothy Ward Jackson, was convicted by a jury of six counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC–I), for sexually abusing a 12– to 13–year–old member of the church where he served as a pastor.1 Before us is whether certain testimony regarding prior sexual relationships the defendant had with other parishioners constituted evidence of “other acts” under MRE 404(b) and, if so, whether that testimony could be admitted without reference to or compliance with MRE 404(b) by virtue of a “res gestae exception” to that rule. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the testimony was other-acts evidence as contemplated by MRE 404(b), and that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. We disagree with the Court of Appeals majority, however, that the trial court's failure to subject the testimony to scrutiny under MRE 404(b) was nonetheless correct because the testimony fell within a “res gestae exception” to that rule. By its plain language, MRE 404(b) creates no such exception from its coverage. Accordingly, because the testimony at issue constituted evidence of “other acts” as contemplated by MRE 404(b), its admission was governed by that rule and its procedural requirements. We agree, however, with the Court of Appeals'
determination that the defendant's convictions should be affirmed, as the defendant has failed to show entitlement to relief on the basis of this error. We therefore affirm the defendant's convictions, but vacate that portion of the opinion of the Court of Appeals majority reasoning that the testimony at issue could be admitted without reference to or compliance with MRE 404(b) by virtue of a “res gestae exception” to that rule.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The defendant's six CSC–I convictions arose from allegations that he repeatedly engaged in sexual intercourse and fellatio with the complainant, a female parishioner at his church, while she was 12 to 13 years old and serving as one of his “youth nurses.”2 The abuse was alleged to have occurred on a regular basis for approximately a year, until the complainant disclosed it to her aunt, Jacklyn Price, who was also a parishioner in the same church. This disclosure triggered a police investigation, which in turn led to the institution of the charges of which the defendant was ultimately convicted.
At trial, the complainant testified to the alleged abuse; the prosecution also offered testimony from Price and the complainant's mother, as well as other testimony and physical evidence corroborative of the complainant's version of events. The defendant testified in his own defense, denying the allegations in full, questioning the complainant's credibility, and asserting that Price had fabricated the allegations and manipulated
the complainant out of spite toward the defendant for refusing to preside over Price's marriage to a non-
Christian man. The defendant pointed to the year-long delay in the complainant's disclosure of the alleged abuse as supporting his claim that the allegations were false. The defendant also offered testimony from other parishioners, including former youth nurses, to corroborate his version of events.
Price's trial testimony is central to the claim of error before us, and bears elaboration. The prosecutor's direct examination of Price focused on developing the circumstances and events surrounding the complainant's disclosure of the alleged abuse to her. Price testified that she started attending the defendant's church when she was 15, and at one point had served as a nurse for the defendant; she had subsequently left the church for a few years on two occasions, but had since returned and was an active member at the time of the complainant's disclosure. This disclosure came on the heels of a conversation that Price had initiated with the complainant after a morning church service. According to Price, she “had a specific motive” for initiating this conversation: to “see[ ] if [the complainant] had been touched in any sexual way” by the defendant. Price acknowledged that she had not “notice[d] anything out of the ordinary” in the defendant's interactions with the complainant. She explained, however, that roughly a month prior to her conversation with the complainant, she had fallen back in touch with a woman named Latoya Newsome, who had formerly been a parishioner at the church and had been a friend of Price's and a fellow nurse to the defendant. Newsome, however, had left the church for reasons unknown to Price at the time, and according to Price, “every time I would ask somebody about her and where was she, it was almost like quiet and secret as if
I had said something wrong by bringing her name up.” Price had not heard from Newsome for years, which Price believed was because Newsome “didn't want anything to do with me or the church.” Price testified that, when the two fell back in touch, she expressed this belief to Newsome, and Newsome offered a response that “[a]ffected me badly—very, very badly.” This, according to Price, prompted her to approach the complainant.
Price then testified to the substance of her conversation with the complainant. Price started the conversation with small-talk about the complainant entering high school and developing into a young woman. She then told the complainant “that there was some things that I experience[d] when I was a little younger, that I didn't say anything to anybody about because I was embarrassed, and I didn't know what would happen,” and that the complainant should “say something to somebody” if anyone touches her in a way that makes her “feel bad ..., because it's not supposed to be that way.” The complainant then disclosed the alleged abuse to Price, and Price in turn told the complainant's mother. According to Price, her “exact words” to the mother were that “this cannot happen. There was some things that happened to me and I know wasn't right, and I didn't say anything, and I buried it. And I'm not going to let this happen to my niece.... He touched the wrong one.” The court later questioned Price on this topic as well:
The Court: “All right. Because of this conversation that you had with [Newsome], why did you want to talk to your niece?”
Price: “Because [Newsome] said some things to me that kind of—there was some similarities of what she—”
The Court: “What do you mean? Hold on for one second. Did you ever see any familiarity between your niece
and [the defendant] before you sat down an[d] spoke with her in [her] mother's car.”
Price: “No; not that I seen.”
During Price's direct examination, defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial; counsel later renewed this motion. The trial court heard argument on the objection and motion outside the presence of the jury, and ultimately rejected both. Defense counsel argued that Price's testimony regarding her decision to approach the complainant constituted impermissible other-acts evidence under MRE 404(b)(1) because the testimony clearly indicated that the defendant had previously engaged in sexual relations with Price and Newsome, and gave rise to the improper inference that the defendant had a propensity to abuse his position of authority over his parishioners in the manner alleged in the instant case. Defense counsel also stressed that the prosecution had not provided any notice of intent to introduce this testimony, as required under MRE 404(b)(2), and had instead represented to defense counsel at the start of trial that Price had been instructed not to bring the matter up. The prosecutor argued that the testimony was not other-acts evidence governed by MRE 404(b) because it did not identify any specific acts performed by the defendant and did not purport to demonstrate that the defendant had engaged in prior sexual conduct with underage parishioners.3 The prosecutorfurther
argued that Price's testimony was offered for a proper purpose under MRE 404(b) —to counter the defendant's theory of fabrication by...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rojas v. People
...not unique. Many jurisdictions have determined that res gestae is incompatible with the modern Rules. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 498 Mich. 246, 869 N.W.2d 253, 264 (2015) ("[T]he plain language of MRE 404(b) ... sets forth no such ‘res gestae exception’ from its coverage. Nor do we see a......
-
People v. Agar, Docket No. 321243.
...de novo.” People v. Malone, 287 Mich.App. 648, 654, 792 N.W.2d 7 (2010), overruled in part on other grounds People v. Jackson, 498 Mich. 246, 268 n. 9, 869 N.W.2d 253 (2015). “When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this Court reviews the record in a light most favorable to the pro......
-
People v. Sardy
...not bar admission of the evidence, given that the photographs were admitted for purposes other than propensity. People v. Jackson, 498 Mich. 246, 274, 281, 869 N.W.2d 253 (2015) (concluding that no “res gestae exception” to the coverage of MRE 404(b) exists).16 The Court referred to such re......
-
People v. Dixon-Bey
...admitted, its admission was not outcome-determinative and does not entitle defendant to appellate relief. See People v Jackson , 498 Mich. 246, 257; 869 N.W.2d 253 (2015) (explaining that preserved nonconstitutional evidentiary error is not grounds for reversal unless it is more probable th......