Wood v. Conn. Sav. Bank

• Decision Date: 25 July 1913
• Citation: 87 Conn. 341,87 A. 983
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: WOOD v. CONNECTICUT SAVINGS BANK.

87 A. 983

87 Conn. 341

WOOD

v. CONNECTICUT SAVINGS BANK.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 25, 1913.

[Copyrighted material omitted.]

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Isaac Wolfe, Judge.

Action by Walter S. Wood, administrator, against the Connecticut Savings Bank. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Defendant pleaded as a defense that plaintiff had neither presented the passbook to defendant nor the duplicate procured in the manner provided by law, nor complied with the provisions of chapter 130 of the Public Acts of 1907.

Burton Mansfield and Osborne A. Day, both of New Haven, for appellant.

Zacher & Ely, of New Haven, for appellee.

RORABACK, J. The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to prove these facts: The plaintiffs intestate, Christopher G. Wood, was a resident of Branford, Conn., where he had resided for many years, and was employed as a skilled mechanic in the factory of the Malleable Iron Fittings Company. He and his wife had two sons, the older of whom is the plaintiff in the present action. In June of each year it was the custom of his employer to pay Mr. Wood a considerable sum of money as a bonus for his work during the preceding year. Such bonus was generally deposited for him by his wife in one of five savings banks as follows: The Connecticut Savings Bank, the New Haven Savings Bank, the National Savings Bank, the Branford Savings Bank, and the People's Savings Bank of Bridgeport. These deposits had been made in the different banks for a considerable length of time. On April 14, 1910, Mr. Wood had on deposit with the defendant bank the sum of $702.25. Subsequently on April 21, May 9, and June 7, 1910, the defendant paid the sums of $526, $150 and $25, respectively, to Mrs. Wood on orders presented to the defendant by Mrs. Wood, together with the passbook. There was on deposit in the bank after the last withdrawal the sum of $5.66. It is the validity of these three withdrawals which are in question in the present action, and for which the plaintiff seeks to recover.

On March 7, 1911, Mr. Wood went to the secretary to get the passbooks, and found that they were not in their usual place. Acting upon his father's instructions, the son Walter S. Wood called the Branford Savings Bank by telephone. This occurred in the presence of Mrs. Wood, who was asked by Mr. Wood what had become of the books. She stated that she did not know where they were. On the following day Mrs. Wood shot and killed her husband and her younger child, and two days later she committed suicide. Christopher G. Wood left no will. The plaintiff was appointed administrator of his father's estate by the probate court for the district of Branford, and it is as such administrator that he has brought the present action. By the death of his father, his younger brother, and his mother, the plaintiff became entitled to his father's estate. The plaintiff claimed that these payments to Mrs. Wood were unauthorized and made on forged orders of Christopher G. Wood, and therefore the bank was liable to repay the same. The defendant contended that the signatures upon the three orders were made by Christopher G. Wood and were genuine; or that Wood constituted his wife his agent to present the passbook to the defendant and to execute all necessary orders and sign all necessary receipts for the withdrawal of the money.

The court was requested to tell the jury that: "Section 6, article 1, of the bylaws of the bank, printed in the passbook, furnished the plaintiff's intestate, and presented to the bank by Mrs. Wood when she withdrew money on the three orders, April 21, May 9, and June 7, 1910, respectively, exempts the bank from liability from any payment made by the bank, where reasonable discretion has been exercised by the bank." This portion of the by-laws of the bank, among other things, provides that: "Neither the bank nor its officers shall be responsible for losses in any case where a reasonable discretion has been exercised."

The court below did not err in refusing to charge as requested upon this branch of the case. It was immaterial for the purposes of this case whether the defendant bank exercised reasonable discretion in making the payments in question. As we interpret the pleadings no such issue is raised by the defendant in its answer. If the defendant wished to avail itself of the defense that in the payment of this money it used due care, it should have so pleaded. This was not done.

Furthermore it is apparent from the classification of this rule in the by-laws under the title of organization that it was not intended to be applicable to withdrawals dealt with specifically under another title. This regulation appears to relate to the conduct of the officers and agents of the bank in the management of its affairs. If it was intended to safeguard the bank in relieving it from liability from fraud practiced upon it in withdrawing money by means of forged signatures, its language and position in the by-laws were such that it could not be fairly held that the depositors should be presumed to know of its terms. See Dinini v. Mechanics' Savings Bank, 85 Conn. 225, 228, 82 Atl. 580.

It is a further ground of appeal that the court instructed the jury that: "And furthermore that at such time he offered to the bank a good and sufficient bond with surety to protect the bank from any loss which it might thereafter meet with in consequence of the payments to him of such sums." This portion of the charge furnishes no ground of complaint to the appellant it appears that the court in this connection was simply stating a claim of the plaintiff which the record discloses he had offered evidence to prove. As the evidence has not been made a part of the record, we cannot determine whether or not there was any foundation for such a claim. It also appears that the language complained of is in substance an allegation of the plaintiff's reply to the answer of the defendant.

In one passage of the charge the court stated to the jury that: "The relation between the savings bank and the depositors is that of a debtor and creditor." This language quoted was technically incorrect. This court has repeatedly held that the relation between a savings bank and its depositor is not merely one of debtor and creditor. We are not satisfied, however, that this error was of such a substantial character as to require a reversal of the judgment rendered. This court is not inclined to find mere technical errors upon which to reverse judgments. Foote v. Brown, 81 Conn. 218, 227, 70 Atl. 699. The controlling questions for the jury to decide were whether the bank had paid out money of the plaintiff's intestate to the wrong person, and if so was the defendant liable. Under these circumstances it is apparent that the defendant could not have been prejudiced by this statement of the court.

The plaintiff in reply to the defendant's answer averred that: "When he demanded the payment of said $706.25, together with the interest thereon, he...