87 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir. 1996), 95-16289, U.S. v. Greyshock

Docket Nº:95-16289.
Citation:87 F.3d 1324
Party Name:UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul GREYSHOCK, Defendant-Appellant.
Case Date:May 29, 1996
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Page 1324

87 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir. 1996)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,


Paul GREYSHOCK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-16289.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

May 29, 1996

Submitted May 20, 1996. [*]

Editorial Note:

This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, D.C. Nos. CV-95-00204-DAE, CR-88-01778-SC; David A. Ezra, District Judge, Presiding.



Before: BROWNING, REINHARDT, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.


Paul Greyshock appeals pro se the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his 1989 guilty plea to violating the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). 46 U.S.C. § 1903. 1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and affirm.

Greyshock contends that the district court erred by dismissing his section 2255 motion because given a subsequent change in law, his guilty plea could not have been knowing and voluntary. This contention lacks merit.

A guilty plea is valid if it is both intelligent and voluntary, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Moran v. Godinez, 40 F.3d 1567, 1575 (9th Cir.1994), amended, 57 F.3d 690 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 479 (1995), however, "a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in light of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise," Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1969); cf. United States v. Cortez, 973 F.2d 764, 768 (9th Cir.1992).

Here, in 1989, the district court denied Greyshock's pretrial motion to dismiss his indictment where he argued that the United States lacked consent to prosecute him under the MDLEA. United States v. Greyshock, 719 F.Supp. 927, 934 (D.Haw.1989). The district court found, as a matter of fact, that Cook Island had consented to Greyshock's prosecution under the MDLEA. Id. The district court also noted that the issue of consent was an issue of law to be decided by the court. Id. at 934-35. Greyshock subsequently pleaded guilty to violating 46 U.S.C. § 1903. See United States v. Davidson, No. 89-10349 (consolidated) (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 1990) (unpublished...

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