Greenberg v. Hilton Intern. Co.
| Decision Date | 01 June 1989 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 117,264,D,s. 117 |
| Citation | 870 F.2d 926 |
| Parties | 52 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 627, 49 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 38,861, 13 Fed.R.Serv.3d 262 Alice Lisa GREENBERG, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, Phyllis Gelman, Susan R. Meredith, Respondents-Appellees, v. HILTON INTERNATIONAL CO., Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee. ockets 88-7400, 88-7438. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Phyllis Gelman, New York City (Susan R. Meredith, New Haven, Conn., of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee, cross-appellant.
Jeffrey L. Liddle, New York City (Paul J. Shoemaker, Liddle, O'Connor, Finkelstein, & Robinson, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellant, cross-appellee.
Before MESKILL, PIERCE and WINTER, Circuit Judges.
This appeal and cross-appeal raise several issues concerning when and under what authority it is proper for a district court to award attorney's fees or to sanction attorneys for their pursuit of frivolous claims or abuse of discovery in Title VII actions. Defendant Hilton International ("Hilton") appeals from the denial of its motion for sanctions, fees and costs. Plaintiff, whose complaint alleging employment discrimination was dismissed with prejudice on her own motion, cross-appeals the denial of her motion for sanctions against defendant. We conclude that no sanctions are warranted with regard to the filing of the claims but reverse and award sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 for plaintiff's counsel's conduct during a second round of discovery. That round involved the production of data, at great expense to Hilton, that would be relevant only after it had been subjected to analysis by professional statisticians. Although the motions to compel production indicated that an expert would be needed and would be hired to analyze the data, plaintiff's counsel knew or should have known that no expert would be hired. Otherwise we affirm.
This litigation began in early 1984, when plaintiff Alice Lisa Greenberg filed suit against Hilton, her former employer, alleging gender-discrimination. The case was ultimately dismissed with prejudice on the plaintiff's own motion, but only after Hilton had expended some $100,000 in legal fees and other costs in its defense. Given the nature of the issues before us, it is necessary to describe this litigation in considerable detail.
In 1965, plaintiff was hired by Hilton to work in its marketing division. Prior to the events giving rise to this action, she had a satisfactory record and had received a promotion to the position of Manager of Marketing Research. In late 1980, Hilton reorganized its marketing department and changed plaintiff's title to Manager of Rate Administration and Product Support (Europe, West Asia, Africa, Asia and Pacific). Plaintiff alleged that the restructuring demoted her by forcing her to report to a superior below her previous reporting level and by otherwise altering her duties. On May 1, 1981, plaintiff resigned because of what she regarded as discourteous and degrading treatment.
After leaving Hilton, plaintiff sought unemployment insurance benefits and was denied them because she had voluntarily resigned. She also filed employment discrimination complaints against Hilton with the New York City Commission on Human Rights, which took no action, and with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), which issued plaintiff a right to sue notice on November 15, 1983.
In February 1984, plaintiff began this action, asserting claims under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. Her complaint alleged that she was paid less than similarly situated males, was denied a promotion and subsquently demoted because of her sex, and was thereafter subjected to such intolerable working conditions as to render her resignation a constructive discharge.
On April 9, 1984, Hilton moved for summary judgment. In support of that motion, it argued that plaintiff's Equal Pay Act claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and that plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute a prima facie case of either a Title VII violation or constructive discharge. By stipulation, plaintiff She also submitted two affidavits in response to the motion for summary judgment. Her first affidavit stated that she "failed to receive a promotion" that she "should have received" and that the "management of Hilton International treated [her] badly in order to force [her] to leave the company." Plaintiff also stated, "[t]he treatment I received was so painful that I could not continue to work at Hilton International." Plaintiff recounted that a male, no more qualified than she, was given a promotion for which she had applied, that her duties were curtailed so as to humiliate her, and that her new superior harassed her "openly," gave her "constant, petty orders," spoke to her "discourteously" and "often screamed" at her. The "final straw" was an order that she not leave work until 5:00 p.m., thereby causing her to miss her usual bus.
conceded that her Equal Pay Act action was time-barred as to the period prior to February 15, 1981. This reduced the maximum of potential damages on the equal pay claim to somewhere between $600 and $1200.
In reply, Hilton submitted an affidavit from its director of personnel, John Negroni, stating that the male who received the promotion was more qualified than Greenberg and that the changes in plaintiff's duties resulted solely from business judgments made during Hilton's reorganization. Plaintiff next submitted a Supplemental Affidavit containing information alleging that she was paid less than comparable males. On July 25, 1984, Judge Owen denied Hilton's motion for summary judgment.
Discovery by the plaintiff followed. In the early phase, plaintiff's counsel deposed three Hilton representatives and made numerous document requests. Their First Request for Production of Documents included, inter alia, the personnel files of thirty-one employees holding positions comparable to that of plaintiff, information concerning other allegations of discrimination against Hilton, and many other documents, letters, and memoranda covering an almost twenty-year period. Defendant objected to several requests but produced 1,000 pages of documents in response. Plaintiff's counsel moved to compel discovery of the material objected to on March 13, 1985. In her supporting memorandum, plaintiff announced that she sought information relevant to proof of a pattern and practice of gender-discrimination. Defendant objected, and after discussions between counsel and applications to the magistrate, plaintiff's requests were "trimmed down" and discovery proceeded.
Defendant thereafter produced complete personnel files of the thirty-one former or current employees whom plaintiff had identified as comparable to her. These included women managers, male managers alleged to have received promotions denied to similarly situated female employees, females supervised by one Peter Schulze (plaintiff's final superior and the cause of her alleged constructive discharge), persons supervised by plaintiff, and persons who supervised plaintiff.
In late July 1985, after receiving the data concerning the thirty-one employees comparable to her, plaintiff's counsel initiated a second round of discovery. In this round they sought, inter alia, forms reporting employment patterns and changes by race, sex and other protected categories, salary records, "key personnel" lists, and documents reflecting the policy and practice of Hilton from 1965 to date with regard to severance pay, profit sharing, bonuses, and incentive compensation. Plaintiff's counsel also served on defendant a first set of interrogatories. These asked: (i) what computer-readable personnel information defendant kept; (ii) what files containing what sort of information were kept on "key personnel"; (iii) for each non-clerical employee in the central office of Hilton since January 1965, their name, sex, salary and By late October 1985, the defendant had formulated "Answers and Objections" to plaintiff's first set of interrogatories. Defendant's response stated that: (i) its personnel information was not computerized; (ii) files on "key personnel" were irrelevant and defendant had already produced the files of thirty-one comparable employees; and (iii) plaintiff's request for basic and expanded data on non-clerical employees covering a twenty-year period was overbroad, irrelevant, and unduly burdensome. In addition, defendant agreed to produce certain documents but objected on the grounds that others had already been produced, were irrelevant and burdensome to compile, or did not exist.
other compensation for each year from 1965 to the present, title, education and employment history; (iv) for promotion, transfer and termination information from 1965 on for all non-clerical employees; (v) for organizational charts; and (vi) for information on other, more narrowly-focused matters.
Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to compel discovery before the magistrate on February 3, 1986. Defendant made a cross-motion for sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, 26(g) and 37. This was accompanied by an affidavit stating that plaintiff's requests for fifty-six categories of documents for persons employed over a twenty-one-year period concerned information about employees in positions not comparable to plaintiff and not relevant to her claims of gender-discrimination. The supporting affidavit claimed that collection of the requested information on terminated employees would entail a manual review of approximately 3,000 personnel files.
On February 28, 1986, plaintiff's counsel filed a third request for production of documents and a third set of interrogatories, requesting yet more detailed information. The claimed purpose of the...
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