State v. Claborn, S-92-164

• Decision Date: 08 February 1994
• Docket Number: No. S-92-164,S-92-164
• Citation: 870 P.2d 169
• Parties: The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellant, v. Sharon Ann CLABORN, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 169

870 P.2d 169

The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellant, v. Sharon Ann CLABORN, Appellee.

No. S-92-164.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Feb. 8, 1994.

An Appeal on a Reserved Question of Law from the District Court of Johnston County the Honorable John H. Scaggs, District Judge.

Joseph O. Minter, V (at trial), Madill, for defendant.

John Lawson, Asst. Dist. Atty. (at trial), Tishomingo, for State.

Joseph O. Minter, V (on appeal), Madill, for appellee.

Fred Collins, Dist. Atty., John Lawson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Tishomingo, Susan Brimer Loving, Atty. Gen. of Oklahoma, Robert Whittaker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City (on appeal), for appellant.

OPINION

CHAPEL, Judge.

Sharon Ann Claborn was charged with two counts of Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance with Intent to Distribute, After Former Conviction of One Felony (63 O.S.Supp.1990, § 2-401(A)(1) and 21 O.S.Supp.1989, § 51, respectively) in Johnston County District Court, Case Nos. CRF-89-65 and CRF-89-68. She entered a negotiated plea of guilty in both cases. The Honorable John H. Scaggs, District Judge, sentenced Claborn to twenty years imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently.

The judge also imposed the following monetary assessments against Claborn: $4.00 C.L.E.E.T. fee required by 20 O.S.Supp.1988, § 1313.2(B); $3.00 fingerprinting fee required by 20 O.S.Supp.1990, § 1313.3(A); and, $100.00 Victim's Compensation Assessment required by 21 O.S.Supp.1990, § 142.18. The trial judge suspended the $500.00 Drug Assessment Fee required by 63 O.S.Supp.1990, § 2-503.2. Claborn objected on state and federal constitutional grounds to the imposition of these assessments, and requested leave of court to file a Motion to Dismiss and supporting brief.

The trial court granted Claborn's request and also granted amicus curiae status to both the Oklahoma Criminal Defense Lawyers Association and the State Attorney General. After considering the arguments presented by all interested parties, the trial judge declared unconstitutional the statutory sections at issue. The State of Oklahoma appeals the trial judge's finding upon a reserved question of law pursuant to 22 O.S.Supp.1990, § 1053 and 22 O.S.1981, § 1053.1. ¹

The State initially raises the presumption of constitutionality to which all statutes are entitled. See State v. Hunter, 787 P.2d 864, 865 (Okl.Cr.1990). Because of the presumption of constitutionality, the burden of proving unconstitutionality is on the one challenging the statute. See S.A.H. v. State, 753 P.2d 381, 383 (Okl.Cr.1988). The State contends Claborn did not meet this burden of proof. We agree and reverse the trial court's order declaring the statutory assessments unconstitutional.

I. EX PARTE COFFELT: SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FREE ACCESS TO COURTS

The trial judge presented four basic grounds to support his conclusion that the three assessments in question are unconstitutional. Relying exclusively on Ex parte Coffelt, 93 Okl.Cr. 343, 228 P.2d 199 (1951), he initially concluded that the assessments violate Okla. Const. art. IV, § 1 (separation of powers doctrine), and Okla. Const. art. II, § 6 (right to free access to courts). In Coffelt, this Court declared unconstitutional certain statutes which required a defendant's payment upon conviction of a one dollar fee into a parole fund. The Coffelt Court found that because the one dollar fee did not "bear a true relation to the expenses of [that particular] prosecution," it constituted a tax. Id., 228 P.2d at 201. By requiring the courts to impose this "tax," the Legislature had--in violation of the separation of powers doctrine--reduced the courts to a tax gathering agency of the executive branch.

When Coffelt was decided, neither Oklahoma caselaw nor statutes supported this Court's conclusion that a mandatory statutory assessment, the amount of which is not directly related to the particular prosecution at hand, is a tax and not a cost. See id., 228 P.2d at 201. In fact, since Coffelt, other jurisdictions faced with similar issues have cited the case, only to adopt a more relaxed standard. See Broyles v. State, 285 Ark. 457, 688 S.W.2d 290 (1985) (An assessment against drunk drivers was not invalid even though there was not a precise relationship to the particular prosecution); State v. Young, 238 So.2d 589 (Fla.1970) (A $1.00 assessment for the law enforcement bureau, though not directly related to the particular prosecution, was not unreasonable; a convicted person should be forced to share the cost of protection of society).

Today we reject the rigid standard adopted in Coffelt. It is, of course, incumbent upon this Court and the judicial branch in general to carefully preserve and protect the separate powers assigned to each of the three branches of government by our constitution. With this in mind, we hold that as long as a criminal statutory assessment is reasonably related to the costs of administering the criminal justice system, its imposition will not render the courts "tax gatherers" in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.

We further note that the separation of powers doctrine does not demand crystal clear distinctions between branches of government. A certain amount of "blending" is inevitable. See State v. Juvenile Division, Tulsa County District Court, 560 P.2d 974, 975 (Okl.Cr.1977). However, a branch of government might violate the separation of powers clause if it were to involve itself in matters within the exclusive domain of another branch. See Spitznas v. State, 648 P.2d 1271, 1274 (Okl.Cr.1982).

By enacting the statutes at issue, the Legislature was merely exercising its rather broad power--defined by article V, section 36 of the Oklahoma Constitution--to make laws. See also Salyers v. State, 755 P.2d 97, 100 (Okl.Cr.1988) (Legislature has power to define crimes and fix degrees of punishment); State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Daxon, 607 P.2d 683, 687 (Okla.1980) (Legislature is constitutionally vested with authority to pass legislation on any subject not specifically prohibited by state or federal constitutions). The Legislature does not infringe upon matters within the exclusive province of the judiciary simply by performing its legislative duties. See Spitznas at 1274.

Accordingly, the statutes at issue are not violative of the separation of powers doctrine. The various assessments are reasonably related to the costs of administering the criminal justice system and are not simply an executive branch "tax." Further, the statutory assessments were properly enacted by the Legislature in its role as lawmaker. Their enactment does not infringe upon matters within the exclusive province of the judiciary.

The trial judge's conclusion that the assessments in question violate criminal defendants' rights to free access to the courts was also grounded in the Coffelt decision. There, this Court held that imposing the one dollar parole fund fee might "create insurmountable prejudices against those who could not afford to submit to a trial because they could not afford to pay the costs incident thereto." Id., 228 P.2d at 202. Citing by way of analogy the potentially high cost of being convicted of an offense such as simple possession of marijuana, the trial court in the present case concluded that imposition of the assessments now at issue would also effectively deny a defendant free access to the courts in violation of article II, section 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

This Court explicitly overruled this part of Coffelt in State v. Ballard, supra n. 1. Twenty years after the Coffelt decision, the Legislature remedied the "free access" problem by amending 28 O.S.1951, § 101, to provide for defendants who do not have the means to pay an imposed fine, fee or cost. ² Based upon our decision in Ballard, we hold that the assessments in this case likewise do not violate the free access to courts provision in article II, section 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

II. THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

The trial court's second basis for holding the assessments at issue unconstitutional was that their imposition violates the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude. ³ Based upon its interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, the trial court apparently concluded that involuntary servitude may be constitutionally imposed as a punishment for a crime of which a defendant has been "duly convicted." The trial court then referred to Belle v. State, 516 P.2d 551, 552 (Okl.Cr.1973), which held that "a deferred sentence is not a conviction until such time as the trial court pronounces judgment and sentence." Considering these "factors," the trial court concluded that a defendant may properly be subjected to involuntary servitude (in the form of the imposition of the instant assessments), but not unless he or she has been "convicted" (which Belle says they could not be if they had received a deferred sentence).

The trial court's analysis is based upon the dubious premise that the imposition of the assessments at issue in this case would constitute involuntary servitude. Other than the words of the Thirteenth Amendment, the trial court never offered a definition or meaningful construction of the term "involuntary servitude." We have discovered no support for and must reject the trial court's theory that imposing the instant assessments violates the Thirteenth Amendment. Based upon this theory, the trial court concluded that the assessments at issue cannot be imposed upon defendants who have received deferred sentences. ⁴ Because this conclusion was based on a false premise, it must also be rejected. In addressing the trial court's statement that imprisonment for failure to pay costs constitutes involuntary servitude, we would refer to our previous "free access" analysis.

III. EQUAL PROTECTION

Equal protection principles formed the basis of the trial court's third ground for declaring the...