Waldrop v. Evans, 88-8228
Citation | 871 F.2d 1030 |
Decision Date | 28 April 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 88-8228,88-8228 |
Parties | Don WALDROP, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. David C. EVANS, et al., Defendants, Frank Fodor, M.D., T.G. Smith, M.D., Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
Michael E. Hobbs, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cathy A. Cox, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., and Joseph H. Chambless, Harris, Watkins, Davis & Chambless, Emmitte H. Griggs, Macon, Ga., for defendants-appellants.
Charles A. Gower, Columbus, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Robert B. Remar, Remar & Graettinger, Atlanta, Ga., for amicus curiae, Marilyn Greeson, et al.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.
Before JOHNSON and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and VINSON, * District Judge.
This case arises on appeal from the district court's denial of defendants' motions for partial summary judgment based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. 681 F.Supp. 840. The parents of a state prison inmate brought suit against prison medical personnel under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983, alleging that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's psychiatric needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs also alleged two pendent state tort claims. The district court granted motions for summary judgment on the section 1983 claims as to all defendants except two. Those defendants, Drs. Fodor and Smith, appealed. We affirm the denial of their motions for summary judgment.
In 1984, Timmy Waldrop pleaded guilty but mentally ill to armed robbery charges and was sentenced to a prison term of five to twenty years. On October 15, 1984, Waldrop was sent to the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center ("GDCC") in Jackson, Georgia, for evaluation and treatment of his mental problems. At the time of his arrival at the GDCC, Waldrop had been diagnosed as manic depressive. His mental illness was being controlled with, among other medication, Lithium and Haldol, two drugs commonly used to control this type of disorder. Shortly after arrival, Waldrop was taken off all medication including Lithium.
Waldrop's mental condition deteriorated rapidly. He complained of nightmares, insomnia, and a generally poor mental condition. On November 1, 1984, Waldrop slashed his own forearm, requiring three stitches. On November 4, 1984, Waldrop enucleated or gouged out his left eye. GDCC personnel discovered the injury on November 5, and took Waldrop to the county hospital for emergency surgery. Once his physical injuries were treated, Waldrop was transferred to a new facility. On December 6, 1984, while at the Augusta Correctional and Medical Institution in Augusta, Georgia, Waldrop used a prison-issued razor blade to cut his scrotum, losing both testicles. On December 10, 1984, while under restraint in Augusta, Waldrop reached his right eye and damaged it so badly that he lost sight in that eye.
Plaintiffs, Waldrop's parents acting as his guardians, sued a variety of prison officials under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983, alleging that the doctors and staff who treated Waldrop were deliberately indifferent to his psychiatric needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs also asserted pendent state tort claims. The defendants were members of the medical and administrative staffs at both the GDCC and at the facility in Augusta. All defendants filed motions for summary judgment on the section 1983 claims based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. The district court granted the motions of all defendants except Drs. Fodor and Smith. Appellant Fodor is a psychiatrist under contract with the GDCC to treat patients one day a week and to be on call for emergencies. Fodor treated Waldrop for his psychiatric problems while Waldrop was incarcerated at the GDCC. Appellant Smith is a staff physician at the GDCC who is not a psychiatrist. Smith treated Waldrop for his physical problems while Waldrop was at the GDCC. Fodor and Smith's appeals are limited to the issue of qualified immunity. 1
Qualified immunity insulates government officials from personal liability for actions taken pursuant to their discretionary authority. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the Court established the test for courts to use in determining whether an official can claim qualified immunity: "[G]overnment officials ... generally are shielded [by the doctrine of qualified immunity] from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." The right must be sufficiently clear that "in light of preexisting law the unlawfulness [of the official's conduct] must be apparent." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Plaintiffs have the burden of showing that the officials violated such clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. See Zeigler v. Jackson, 716 F.2d 847, 849 (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam).
Courts evaluate an official's conduct under an objective, reasonable person standard. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1098, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) ( ); Clark v. Evans, 840 F.2d 876, 881 (11th Cir.1988) ( ). Qualified immunity is available to government officials "as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3038. The purpose of these requirements is to ensure that the official is or should be aware of the rights he or she may be violating. Id. at 3039 (). The doctrine is intended to balance society's interest in providing a remedy for injured victims and discouraging unlawful conduct against the interest in enabling public officials to act independently and without fear of consequences. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819, 102 S.Ct. at 2739-40.
Plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated Waldrop's Eighth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has held that deliberate indifference by prison personnel to an inmate's serious medical needs violates the inmate's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). This deliberate indifference standard applies to psychiatric needs as well. Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir.1986). Thus, a prison inmate has the right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from deliberate indifference to serious physical or psychiatric needs.
Grossly incompetent or inadequate care can constitute deliberate indifference, Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058 ( ), as can a doctor's decision to take an easier and less efficacious course of treatment. Id. Failure to respond to a known medical problem can also constitute deliberate indifference. Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (pre-trial detainee); accord Carswell v. Bay County, 854 F.2d 454, 457 (11th Cir.1988) (pre-trial detainee); Aldridge v. Montgomery, 753 F.2d 970, 972-73 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam). Mere medical malpractice, however, does not constitute deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292 (). Nor does a simple difference in medical opinion. See Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir.1977) () (citation omitted).
The district court posed the question in this case as "[w]hether it was clearly established in November of 1984, that providing an inmate with inadequate psychiatric care could lead to a violation of that inmate's Eighth Amendment rights." 681 F.Supp. at 846. The court then concluded that because a prisoner's right to psychiatric care was clearly established under the Eighth Amendment, appellants could not rely on the defense of qualified immunity. Id. at 846-47. The district court applied the wrong standard in evaluating appellants' qualified immunity claim, however. The question is not whether deliberate indifference to an inmate's psychiatric needs would violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. The inquiry is more particularized and fact-specific. Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3039-40. The question is whether a reasonable doctor in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as appellants could have concluded that his actions were lawful, i.e., not deliberately indifferent to Waldrop's psychiatric needs. See Clark v. Evans, 840 F.2d at 880; cf. Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3040.
This Court will consider the entire record, not just the plaintiffs' allegations, in evaluating this summary judgment motion. See Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1060 & n. 6 ( ); see also Green v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 647, 651 (7th Cir.1987) ( )(citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815, and Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816, 102 S.Ct. at 2737); Trapnell v. Ralston, 819 F.2d 182, 184 n. 1 (8th Cir.1987) ( ); but...
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