Buxton v. City of Plant City, Fla.
| Citation | 871 F.2d 1037 |
| Decision Date | 01 May 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-3298,88-3298 |
| Parties | Donald F. BUXTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF PLANT CITY, FLORIDA, Troy E. Surrency, Individually, Troy E. Surrency, in his official capacity, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
Alice K. Nelson, Gainesville, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.
John W. Robinson, IV, Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, Lynn M. Gilleland, Tampa, Fla., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before RONEY, Chief Judge, HATCHETT, Circuit Judge, and HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge.
In reversing this public employee termination case, we distinguish Thomason v. McDaniel, 793 F.2d 1247 (11th Cir.1986) and hold that the placing of stigmatizing information in a public employee's personnel file or in an internal affairs report (public records of Florida pursuant to state law) constitutes publication sufficient to implicate liberty interests requiring protection through procedural due process of law proceedings.
On February 14, 1981, Plant City, Florida, hired Donald F. Buxton as a police officer. In June, 1982, the Plant City Police Department investigated Buxton for allegedly assaulting Olin English during the course of an arrest. Plant City's Police Chief, Troy W. Surrency, assigned Officer William Hysell to conduct an internal affairs investigation. Officer Hysell interviewed Buxton. Officer Hysell also interviewed the witnesses to the arrest. Officer Hysell concluded that Buxton had physically abused English prior to placing him under arrest.
On June 22, 1982, Buxton met with Chief Surrency, Lieutenant Ruffin Cain, and Officer Hysell in Chief Surrency's office. Chief Surrency advised Buxton that he was being suspended with pay because of the Olin English incident and that he would be contacted again at the end of the week. On June 25, 1982, Buxton again met with Chief Surrency, Lt. Cain, and Officer Hysell. Chief Surrency terminated Buxton for violation of departmental policies which he listed in detail, effective June 26, 1982. The meeting lasted between five and ten minutes.
Section 4.03 of Plant City's Personnel Rules sets forth a grievance procedure available to all city employees. Buxton did not request a hearing on his termination; he contends that he was not aware that he was entitled to such a hearing or that the grievance procedure existed.
Chief Surrency sent a Notice of Termination to the Florida Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (FCJSTC), in compliance with Fla.Stat. Sec. 943.23 (1982), indicating that Buxton had been terminated on June 25, 1982. 1 On March 1, 1983, the Division of Standards and Training filed an administrative complaint with the FCJSTC seeking to suspend or revoke Buxton's certification as a law enforcement officer. On October 9, 1984, the FCJSTC entered a final order dismissing the case due to unavailability of witnesses.
On June 13, 1986, Buxton filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida seeking injunctive relief and damages. The complaint contained three counts and named as defendants the City of Plant City, Florida, Chief Surrency, and Netty Draughton, the city manager. Count I, a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action, asserted violations of Buxton's property and liberty interests as guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Count II alleged a pendent state claim based on violations of Florida's Policeman's Bill of Rights, Fla.Stat. Sec. 112.532 (1982). Count III alleged a pendent state claim of defamation.
On August 4, 1986, Plant City, Chief Surrency, and Draughton filed a motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion on Counts I and II and granted it on Count III of the complaint. Later, the district court dismissed Netty Draughton as a defendant. On May 19, 1987, the district court dismissed Buxton's property interest claim under Count I.
On June 2, 1987, Plant City and Chief Surrency filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment as to Count I of the complaint, Buxton's liberty interest claim, dismissed the remaining count, violation of the Florida policeman's bill of rights, Fla.Stat. Sec. 112.532 (1982), and entered judgment. On January 12, 1988, the district court entered an order reopening the case to consider Buxton's claims under the Florida Policeman's Bill of Rights. On March 22, 1988, the district court dismissed the claim.
Buxton contends that the presence of stigmatizing information in a public employee's personnel file in Florida is sufficient publication to implicate the liberty interest under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Buxton argues that a Florida public employee's liberty interest is violated Plant City and Chief Surrency contend that they have not deprived Buxton of his liberty interest without procedural due process because they did not publish any false and stigmatizing information. They argue that allowing access to public records in accordance with state law, allowing access to records upon receipt of a release, and providing a termination notice to the FCJSTC, do not satisfy the publication requirement for a liberty interest deprivation. They also contend that the alleged publication, if any, did not attend Buxton's termination, but occurred three and one-half years after his termination. Chief Surrency contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
when his employer places false and stigmatizing material in the public records without procedural due process. He asserts that the signing of a release does not relieve the public employer of its duty to provide due process of law. Buxton also argues that Florida's requirement that terminations be reported to the FCJSTC does not relieve Plant City and Chief Surrency of liability. Buxton further contends that Chief Surrency is not entitled to qualified immunity.
The parties present the following issues:
(1) whether the presence of stigmatizing information in a public employee's personnel file is sufficient publication to implicate the liberty interest under the due process clause;
(2) whether allowing access to public records under state law and pursuant to a release signed by the subject of the records satisfies the publication requirement for a liberty interest deprivation;
(3) whether allowing access to public records of an employee more than three years after his termination satisfies the requirement that publication of false, stigmatizing charges must attend an employee's termination for a liberty interest deprivation;
(4) whether providing a terminated employee with an opportunity to present a statement of the facts leading to his termination and including that statement in the report on his termination satisfies the due process requirement after a liberty interest deprivation;
(5) whether providing a grievance procedure, which a terminated employee chooses not to utilize, satisfies the due process requirement after a liberty interest deprivation; and
(6) whether releasing an employee's public records, pursuant to a signed release, constitutes an action for which a public official is entitled to qualified immunity.
The district court granted Plant City's and Chief Surrency's motion for summary judgment on Count I of Buxton's complaint, which alleged a liberty interest violation. We review the district court's decision to determine whether the district court erred as a matter of law in granting Plant City and Chief Surrency summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Republic Health Corp. v. Lifemark Hospitals of Florida, Inc., 755 F.2d 1453 (11th Cir.1985). Summary judgment should be entered only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Clemons v. Dougherty County, Georgia, 684 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir.1982). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply the same legal standards as those that control the district court in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate. Mays v. United States, 763 F.2d 1295, 1296 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 998, 106 S.Ct. 416, 88 L.Ed.2d 365 (1985). The party seeking summary judgment bears the exacting burden of demonstrating that no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact in the case. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Clemons v. Dougherty County, Georgia, at 1368.
In assessing whether the movant has met this burden, we review the evidence and all factual inferences arising from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. at 157, 90 S.Ct. at 1608; Clemons v. Dougherty County, Georgia, at 1368. We must accept Buxton's version of the facts because the district court granted summary judgment against him. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 347, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2078, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976).
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution restrains the federal government, and the fourteenth amendment, section 1, restrains the states, from depriving...
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