872 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1989), 88-2084, Chambers v. Lockhart
|Citation:||872 F.2d 274|
|Party Name:||Billy J. CHAMBERS, Appellant, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellee.|
|Case Date:||April 21, 1989|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit|
Submitted Jan. 12, 1989.
Rehearing Denied May 19, 1989.
Robert J. Brown, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.
William F. Knight, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.
Before WOLLMAN and BEAM, Circuit Judges, and BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge.
BEAM, Circuit Judge.
Billy J. Chambers appeals the denial of his application for a writ of habeas corpus by the district court. 1 We affirm.
In April of 1981, Billy Chambers was convicted in Arkansas state court of the rape, by deviate sexual activity, of a six-year-old girl. His conviction was affirmed by the Arkansas Supreme Court, Chambers v. State, 275 Ark. 177, 628 S.W.2d 306 (1982), and his application for post-conviction relief was denied. Chambers then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the district court. The court dismissed the petition.
A. Adequacy of Miranda warnings
Following his arrest, Chambers was taken to the Pulaski County Sheriff's office where he gave a statement to a Pulaski County Deputy Prosecutor. Prior to giving the statement, Chambers was advised of his Miranda rights. In addition, he signed a form which provided as follows:
I have been advised that I am a suspect in a rape, and that I have the right to use the telephone, that I have the right to remain silent, that I have the right to talk with an attorney, either retained by me or appointed by the court, before giving a statement, and to have my attorney present when answering any questions. I have also been advised if I waive these rights I have the right to stop the interrogation at any time. Also, that any statement I give will be used in a court of law against me. I have read the above statement of my rights and I understand them. No promises or threats have been made to induce me into making this statement.
Chambers contends that this statement did not meet the standards set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), because it did not advise him that a court-appointed attorney would be provided free of charge if he could not afford one. As a result, Chambers claims that the...
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