Gonzales v. Boas

Citation874 A.2d 491,162 Md. App. 344
Decision Date17 May 2005
Docket NumberNo. 2014,2014
PartiesCorinne GONZALES v. Lawrence BOAS.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Stephen L. Prevas, Baltimore, for appellant.

Jeffrey J. Utermohle (Thomas Minkin, Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, PC, on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Panel EYLER, JAMES R., ADKINS, BARBERA, JJ.

ON REMAND

EYLER, J.

This appeal arises out of a late response by Corinne1 Gonzales, appellant, to a request for admission of facts filed by Lawrence Boas, M.D., appellee. See Maryland Rule 2-424. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted appellee's motion to strike appellant's response as untimely. After holding that appellant was deemed to have admitted the facts contained in the request for admissions, which eliminated any genuine dispute as to material facts, the court entered summary judgment in appellee's favor.

On appeal, appellant claims that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting appellee's motion to strike appellant's response to the request for admissions. Alternatively, appellant claims the court abused its discretion in denying appellant's request to withdraw its admissions. Finally, appellant contends that the circuit court erred, as a matter of law, in ruling that appellant's response to appellee's request for admissions was untimely.

In an opinion filed on December 29, 2004, we held that the circuit court properly found that appellant's responses were untimely. We also held that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting appellee's motion to strike appellant's responses or in not permitting appellant to withdraw her admissions. After granting a writ of certiorari, the Court of Appeals, by order dated April 7, 2005, vacated the judgment of this Court and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185, 867 A.2d 1077 (2005). We have done so and we reaffirm our prior decision. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.

Our holding in this case is very fact dependent and is based on the combination of the following: (1) the response to the request for admissions was filed 8 days late, (2) the late filing was as a result of oversight of appellant's counsel, who prepared the response but inadvertently did not file it, (3) at the time the response was filed, the case had been pending 3 months and was not near trial, (4) there was a substantial dispute as to the subject of the requests in that the requests were directed to the core facts underlying the claim and were denied in the late response, (5) there was no showing of prejudice to appellee in the presentation of his defense, only the time and expense of having to defend the claim, and (6) the sanction imposed by the circuit court for the late filing was, as a practical matter, summary disposition of the claim. Expenses may be sought as a sanction under Rule 2-424(e) or Rule 1-341 if the required showing is made.

RELEVANT FACTS

On December 16, 2002, appellant filed a complaint in circuit court, alleging three counts of civil battery against appellee. On February 10, 2003, appellee responded by serving on appellant a motion to dismiss, a motion for a more definite statement, and discovery requests, including a first request for admission of facts.

Through an oversight of counsel,2 appellant failed to respond to the request for admissions within the thirty-day time period designated by Maryland Rule 2-424.3 Shortly after the expiration of the thirty-day time period, appellee moved for summary judgment, arguing that, as appellant failed to timely respond to his request for admissions, all such facts were deemed admitted, and thus, there were no material facts in dispute. Thereafter, appellant served a response to appellee's request for admissions, eight days late. Appellant also filed a response to appellee's motion for summary judgment, arguing that there were material facts in dispute because her response, although late, still constituted a denial of the requests that could only be stricken upon motion by appellee and in the exercise of the court's discretion. As there had been no motion to strike, appellant asked that her response be considered as a denial, or alternatively, that she be granted permission to withdraw any of the "deemed admissions," should the court find that her late response resulted in such.4

In response, appellee filed a motion to strike appellant's response to his request for admissions as being untimely. Appellant filed a response to the motion to strike.

On May 8, 2003, the circuit court granted appellee's motion to dismiss, without prejudice, allowing appellant twenty days leave to amend. The court denied appellee's motion for a more definite statement and his motion for summary judgment, finding them both moot. The court did not rule on appellee's motion to strike appellant's response to his request for admissions.

Thereafter, on May 28, 2003, appellant filed an amended complaint.5 Appellee responded by filing a second motion for summary judgment and a second motion for a more definite statement. In his motion for summary judgment, appellee again asserted that, as a result of appellant's failure to timely respond to his request for admissions, appellant had admitted the facts contained in the requests; thus, there were no material facts in dispute.

On July 14, 2003, the court denied appellee's motion. Appellee filed a motion for reconsideration. On September 23, 2003, the court held a hearing, and on October 21, 2003, the court granted appellee's motion to strike appellant's response to appellee's request for admissions and entered summary judgment in appellee's favor based on matters deemed admitted.

Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court on November 20, 2003.

DISCUSSION
Appellee's Second Motion to Dismiss Appeal

Before reaching the issues raised in appellant's brief, we address preliminarily appellee's Second Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. Appellee contends that appellant has committed seventeen violations of the Maryland Rules, eight during trial and nine during the appellate phase, which have caused appellee "considerable inconvenience, delay, and expense." Appellee argues that the alleged procedural violations justify dismissal of this appeal. We shall exercise our discretion and deny the motion.

Substantively, the allegations in the Second Motion to Dismiss Appeal have been previously considered by this Court.6 In this motion, appellee lists nine violations of the rules that he alleges have occurred during the pendency of the appeal. The majority of the alleged rules violations are minor, clerical, and organizational errors.7 Two of the alleged violations involve questions of rule interpretation.8 Appellant disputes the facts recited by appellee in support of one of the alleged violations.9 The final violation was a late response to the initial Motion to Dismiss Appeal filed by appellee, which was argued in appellee's Motion to Strike Appellant's Response, and earlier ruled on by this court. All of the alleged violations were contained in earlier motions filed by appellee. This Court has carefully considered the arguments of the opposing parties, both when they were initially made, and again in this motion, has exercised its discretion, and denies the motions.

This is not to say that we condone deficiencies in procedure. We urge all persons handling appeals to review the Rules regarding the preparation of the record extract and briefs, paying particular attention to Rules 8-411, 8-412, 8-413, 8-414, 8-501, 8-502, 8-503, and 8-504. Parties who fail to adhere to the prescribed procedures risk dismissal pursuant to 8-602, and also impair the effectiveness of their advocacy by demonstrating a disregard for the Rules. On balance, however, we decline to dismiss this appeal.

Request for Admissions and Summary Judgment

Appellant contends that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to grant appellee's motion to strike her response to appellee's request for admissions and to grant summary judgment in appellee's favor. Alternatively, appellant contends that the court abused its discretion in failing to allow her to withdraw her "deemed admissions." Finally, appellant argues that the circuit court erred, as a matter of law, in finding that appellant's response was untimely.

We shall briefly address appellant's final argument first, which we dispose of quickly as having no merit. We do hold, however, that the court abused its discretion in granting appellee's motion to strike and/or alternatively, in failing to permit appellant to withdraw the deemed admissions.

Timeliness of Appellant's Response

Appellant contends that the lower court erred, as a matter of law, in finding that her response to appellee's request for admissions was untimely. Rule 2-424(b) provides that a response to a request for admission must be served either within thirty days after service of the request or within fifteen days after the date on which the served party's initial pleading or motion is required, whichever is later. Appellant argues that the effect of the circuit court's dismissal of her initial complaint with leave to amend was to render her amended complaint the initial pleading in this case. Thus, as she had fifteen days from the date her amended complaint was filed to serve her response upon appellee, and as her response was served within that time, the court erred in finding that her response was untimely.

This argument is without merit. It is true that the filing of an amended complaint supercedes the initial complaint, rendering the amended complaint the operative complaint. See Pharmaceia Eni Diagnostics, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Com'n, 85 Md.App. 555, 563, 584 A.2d 714 (1991)

("once an amended complaint is accepted by the trial court it supersedes the original complaint and becomes the operative pleading in the case")....

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    • 27 Marzo 2014
    ...an amended complaint supercedes theinitial complaint, rendering the amended complaint the operative complaint," Gonzales v. Boas, 162 Md. App. 344, 355, 874 A.2d 491, 497 (2005), we conclude that the State Agencies' argument, relying on the type of "pass-through" business entities listed as......
  • Asphalt & Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Perry
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    ...agree. An amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint, rendering the amended complaint the operative pleading. Gonzales v. Boas, 162 Md.App. 344, 355, 874 A.2d 491, cert. denied, 388 Md. 405, 879 A.2d 1086 (2005). The amended complaint replaces the initial complaint in its entirety, ......
  • Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. White
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    • 12 Agosto 2022
    ...Rule 2-424(e) because the propounding party's request exceeds the rule's intended scope.Respondent also cites to Gonzales v. Boas , 162 Md. App. 344, 874 A.2d 491, cert. denied , 388 Md. 405, 879 A.2d 1086 (2005), but that case factually is distinguishable from Respondent's. Gonzales filed ......
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    ...of an amended complaint supercedes the initial complaint, rendering the amended complaint the operative complaint,” Gonzales v. Boas, 162 Md.App. 344, 355, 874 A.2d 491, 497 (2005), we conclude that the State Agencies' argument, relying on the type of “pass-through” business entities listed......
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