Brooks v. Cook, 87-6449
| Decision Date | 03 May 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-6449,87-6449 |
| Citation | 874 F.2d 815 |
| Parties | Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. Andre BROOKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charlotte COOK, et al, Defendant-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Before CANBY, WIGGINS, O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.
Andre Brooks appeals from an adverse directed verdict in his civil rights action against Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriffs Charlotte Cook and Mark Machanic (the "Deputies"). The Deputies stopped a car in which Brooks was a passenger and conducted a brief search of the car and its occupants. Brooks contends that the Deputies lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car and that their conduct violated his fourth amendment rights. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Brooks, we conclude that the directed verdict was improperly granted. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
In the late evening of January 14, 1985, the Deputies stopped a car driven by Brooks's brother. Brooks was the only passenger in the car. The Deputies claim that they observed the car speeding and weaving in traffic. Brooks, however, contends that his brother was neither speeding nor weaving. After stopping the car, the Deputies ordered Brooks and his brother to exit the car. The Deputies frisked Brooks and his brother and searched the car's passenger compartment. After a detention of approximately ten to fifteen minutes, Brooks and his brother were released without citation or arrest.
Brooks brought suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against the Deputies and Los Angeles County. He alleged that the Deputies illegally stopped the car, conducted an unlawful search and seizure, and used excessive force against him, thereby violating his fourth amendment rights. The case proceeded to trial in September 1987. At the close of Brooks's case in chief, the district court dismissed Los Angeles County as a defendant and granted the Deputies' motion for a directed verdict. The court entered judgment on that verdict. Brooks timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291.
In determining the propriety of a directed verdict, this court has the same role as the court below. Donoghue v. County of Orange, 848 F.2d 926, 932 (9th Cir.1987). "Thus the decision is reviewed de novo." Id. The court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Id.; Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 795 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir.1986); Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1256 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986).
A directed verdict is proper when the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict, but "improper when there is conflicting testimony raising a question of witness credibility because '[i]t is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the credibility of the witnesses.' " Donoghue, 848 F.2d at 932 (quoting Twin City Fire Ins., 795 F.2d at 1423)).
"To establish the liability of individual defendants under section 1983, a plaintiff must show, first, that he was deprived of an interest protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the defendants caused the deprivation while acting under color of state law." Heller v. Bushey, 759 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir.1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986). The Deputies admittedly acted under color of state law when they detained Brooks. Thus section 1983 provides a remedy if the Deputies' conduct deprived Brooks of a constitutional right. 1 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a fourth amendment seizure, "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-37 (1984). In Berkemer, the Court analogized the usual traffic stop to a "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and noted that the fourth amendment allows a police officer who lacks probable cause, but whose observations lead him to reasonably suspect criminal activity is afoot, to briefly detain the suspected individual for investigation. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439; see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 (1983) ().
Recognizing the risk confronting a police officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile, the Supreme Court has held that officers may routinely require persons lawfully stopped for a traffic violation to exit their vehicles. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-11 (1977) (per curiam). Furthermore, a carefully limited search of a person's outer clothing is proper if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is armed and dangerous. Id. at 111-12; Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31. Finally, the police may conduct an area search of the vehicle's passenger compartment to uncover weapons, as long as they reasonably believe that the suspect is potentially dangerous. Long, 463 U.S. at 1051.
Whether the Deputies could lawfully order Brooks from the car and search him and the vehicle hinges on whether the initial detention was lawful. Since a traffic stop is...
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