State v. Hensel, A15–0005.
| Decision Date | 25 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. A15–0005.,A15–0005. |
| Citation | 874 N.W.2d 245 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Robin Lyne HENSEL, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Paul D. Reuvers, Nathan C. Midolo, Iverson Reuvers Condon, Bloomington, MN, for respondent.
Kevin C. Riach, David D. Coyle, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
Considered and decided by LARKIIN, Presiding Judge; WORKE, Judge; and BJORKMAN, Judge.
On appeal from her conviction of disorderly conduct for disturbing a city council meeting, appellant argues that (1) Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(2), violates the First Amendment, (2) the district court erred by denying her requested jury instructions, and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm.
Appellant Robin Lyne Hensel is a retired resident of the City of Little Falls. Hensel regularly attends Little Falls City Council meetings. Council meetings take place at the Little Falls City Hall in a room that has a raised dais where the council sits. Members of the public sit in chairs that are set out by the public works director. On some occasions, tables and chairs have been set up in the area between the dais and public-seating area to accommodate work sessions before the council meeting. Typically the extra chairs are removed before the council meeting begins.
The events underlying this appeal took place at the council's meetings on June 3 and 7, 2013. At the June 3 meeting, the work-session tables were set up between the public-seating area and dais. Hensel brought signs to the meeting, which she placed beside the council dais and around her chair in the front row of the public-seating area. She also wore a sign on her head. The mayor's husband was at the meeting, and he asked to sit at the work-session tables. The council president allowed him and other members of the public to come forward and sit in front of Hensel at the work-session tables. Then, immediately after the meeting was called to order, the mayor moved to close the meeting and reconvene at another time. The meeting was rescheduled for June 7 at 9:30 a.m.
On June 7, Hensel arrived at the meeting and seated herself in the front row of the public-seating area. There were no tables and chairs between the dais and the public-seating area that morning. Before the meeting was called to order, Hensel twice moved her chair forward into the area in between the public-seating area and dais where council members were seated. Hensel asserted that she moved her seat forward because of what she believed to be unequal treatment based on events at the June 3 city council meeting.
The first time Hensel moved her seat forward, the public works director moved the chair back and told Hensel, "We set the council chambers up and the chair stays here, please." The second time, the police chief asked Hensel to move her chair back to the public-seating area. She refused, and an exchange of comments ensued among Hensel, the police chief, the city attorney, and city council members. Hensel said that she would compromise, and moved her chair partway back to the public-seating area. When she refused to move her chair any further, the police chief removed her from the meeting. As a result of Hensel's conduct before the June 7 meeting, the council was unable to start the meeting on time.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Hensel with disorderly conduct for disturbing a public meeting. Hensel pleaded not guilty and moved to dismiss the charge for lack of probable cause and on First Amendment grounds. The district court denied the motion. The district court reasoned that the statute was overbroad in that it reached speech and expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, but that it could be narrowly construed to reach only conduct.
The case was tried to a jury. Hensel requested a jury instruction regarding expressive conduct to advise the jury that, if it found that Hensel's conduct consisted only of expressive conduct, it must find that the expressive conduct constituted fighting words to find her guilty. She also requested a jury instruction regarding the First Amendment that would have precluded the jury from finding her guilty if her disturbing conduct was inseparable from protected expression. The district court denied the requests, reasoning that the First Amendment issues were legal issues for the court to decide.
The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the district court denied Hensel's request for a judgment of acquittal. The district court sentenced Hensel to 15 days of stayed jail time and placed her on unsupervised probation to the court for one year. Hensel appeals.
I. Did the district court err by denying Hensel's motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Hensel's requested jury instructions?
III. Is the evidence sufficient to support the conviction?
Hensel was convicted under Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(2), which provides that:
Hensel argues that the statute is unconstitutional, that the district court erred in instructing the jury, and that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. We address each argument in turn.
Hensel first asserts a First Amendment1 facial challenge to Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(2), arguing that it is both vague and overly broad.2 "To be a constitutional exercise of the police power of the state, a statute that punishes speech must be neither overly broad nor unduly vague." In re Welfare of S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn.1978). This court reviews the constitutionality of a statute de novo. State v. Crawley, 819 N.W.2d 94, 101 (Minn.2012).
In a case involving a First Amendment challenge, whether First Amendment concerns are actually implicated is a threshold inquiry. State v. Stockwell, 770 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Minn.App.2009), review denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2009). The party asserting First Amendment protection bears the burden in this regard. Id. (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non–Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069 n. 5, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984) ). The state asserts that Hensel has not met this burden because "[n]o spoken word or expressive conduct comes under the control of Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(2)'s reach." We disagree; the language of the statute is clearly broad enough to encompass both speech and expressive conduct. See Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(2) (). Hensel has met the threshold burden of demonstrating that First Amendment concerns are implicated in this case.3
To succeed on her facial First Amendment challenge, Hensel "must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which [the statute] would be valid, that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep, or that a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Rew, 845 N.W.2d at 778 (quotations and citations omitted). "We do not evaluate the facial constitutionality of a statute in a vacuum." Id.
Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(2), is not unconstitutionally vague.
" ‘As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ " State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn.1985) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) ).4
The [vagueness] doctrine is based on fairness and is not designed to "convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited."
State v. Enyeart, 676 N.W.2d 311, 319 (Minn.App.2004) (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 1957, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972) ), review denied . "[A] higher standard of certainty of meaning is required" for statutes that impose criminal penalties. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d at 528. But even a criminal statute "need not be drafted with absolute certainty or mathematical precision." Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 568 (), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006); see also Enyeart, 676 N.W.2d at 319 (). "Instead, uncertainty invalidates a statute only when those subject to it cannot determine with reasonable certainty whether a particular act is forbidden or permitted." Enyeart, 676 N.W.2d at 319 (citing State v. Kuluvar, 266 Minn. 408, 417, 123 N.W.2d 699, 706 (1963) ).
Applying these principles here, we conclude that Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(2), is not void for vagueness. The statute must be construed in context and in light of its intent. See State v. Hipp, 298 Minn. 81, 87–88, 213...
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State v. Hensel, A15-0005.
...statute was a time, place, or manner restriction that was not subject to standard overbreadth analysis. State v. Hensel , 874 N.W.2d 245, 253 (Minn. App. 2016). Applying the relaxed test for time, place, or manner restrictions, the court concluded that the statute was constitutional and did......
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State v. Hall, A15–1645.
...not frequently intrude upon First Amendment activity in light of the statute's legitimate public-safety goals. See State v. Hensel, 874 N.W.2d 245, 250 (Minn.App.2016) (stating that to succeed in facial First Amendment challenge, a challenger must, among other items, establish that “the sta......
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State v. Benjamin
...construction of S.L.J. does not apply to the conduct-based proscriptions in the disorderly conduct statute." State v. Hensel, 874 N.W.2d 245, 256 (Minn. App. 2016), review granted (Minn. Apr. 19, 2016). But we have also stated that "[l]oud and even boisterous conduct is protected under Minn......
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State v. Thomas
...lies within the discretion of the district court and no error results if no abuse of discretion is shown." State v. Hensel, 874 N.W.2d 245, 255 (Minn. App. 2016) (quotation omitted). A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on his or her theory of the case if there is evidence to suppo......