Regan v. Edward Lowe Industries, Inc., 88-1062
| Decision Date | 08 May 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-1062,88-1062 |
| Citation | 875 F.2d 867 |
| Parties | Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. Lucille M. REGAN, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EDWARD LOWE INDUSTRIES, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Before NATHANIEL R. JONES, WELLFORD and RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff brought this diversity action against her former employer, Edward Lowe Industries, Inc. (Lowe Industries), alleging that she was wrongfully terminated. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff appeals, asserting that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's claims of wrongful termination, age discrimination, and promissory estoppel. Upon review, we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted, and therefore, the decision of the district court is affirmed.
Lowe Industries is an Indiana corporation that manufacturers products for cats, including "Kitty Litter." The president of Lowe Industries is Edward Lowe. Lowe lives on a farm in Cassopolis, Michigan. Lowe Industries' research and development center is also located on this farm.
Plaintiff was hired by Lowe Industries in September of 1984. Prior to this date, plaintiff was living in Florida. She was working at a full-time secretarial job, but also was breeding and raising cats in her home. Her household "cattery" consisted of about twenty-eight Persian cats. During the summer of 1984, plaintiff was introduced to Edward Lowe through Chris Petty, an employee of Lowe Industries. Edward Lowe was interested in starting a new venture, a cat breeding business. Lowe met with plaintiff in Florida, and he toured her cattery. Lowe informed plaintiff of his plans for a cat breeding business. Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she was skeptical of Lowe and did not take him seriously because there are no corporate cat breeders in the world, very few people breed cats for a living, and cat breeding is mainly a hobby or cottage industry. Plaintiff also believed that Lowe's plans for a pentagon shaped cattery on his farm would not work. Plaintiff stated that she pursued discussions with Lowe because she wanted to sell him some of her cats. She testified that there were no promises or offers made to her during this meeting.
Plaintiff was later invited to meet with Lowe on his farm in Michigan. Lowe again discussed cat breeding, and plaintiff took Lowe's ideas more seriously than she had previously. However, plaintiff, in her deposition, could not state any promises or offers of employment which were made to her at this time. She stated that she could not remember on what terms the meeting was concluded.
Subsequently, in early August, plaintiff received a written offer of employment from Lowe Industries, asking her to be the director of cat breeding. The position paid $21,000 annually plus benefits and housing in a cottage on the farm. Plaintiff signed the offer and returned it. She then dismantled the cattery in her house and moved her cats and herself to Michigan, all at Lowe Industries' expense. Plaintiff commenced work at Lowe Industries on September 3, 1984. Her cats were housed either with her or in a converted garage next to her house.
Shortly after plaintiff began working for Lowe Industries, she was asked to complete a formal employment application. She testified in her deposition that she filled out the form and dated it to correspond with the date she started working rather than the actual date which she signed it. The paragraph preceding her signature states in relevant part:
I understand that if I am hired by the company, my employment relationship, unless otherwise specified in writing, will be at will. This means that I may leave my employment at my will and without prior notice, or the company may, without cause and without prior notice, terminate my employment.
(App. 286).
Subsequently, in June of 1986, Edward Lowe informed plaintiff that the cat breeding program was not financially sound and he wanted it discontinued. Plaintiff and Lowe Industries then held discussions concerning plaintiff becoming an independent contractor. These discussions were later discontinued, and plaintiff was told in September that her position was being eliminated. Plaintiff was officially terminated November 7, 1986. Defendant states that after plaintiff was terminated, the cat breeding position was eliminated, and cat breeding and all related activities ceased.
Plaintiff filed this action against defendant in May 1987. Interrogatories were subsequently exchanged between the parties, and depositions were taken. Defendants then filed for summary judgment, which was granted by the district judge in December 1987, in a memorandum bench opinion. Plaintiff had five claims, all of which were dismissed on summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals three of her dismissed claims. 1
Plaintiff's first claim on appeal is that the district court erred in granting Lowe Industries' motion for summary judgment on the wrongful termination claim. Plaintiffs assert that there is a question of material fact as to whether Lowe Industries employed plaintiff under a contract providing that she could be terminated only for cause.
The Supreme Court explained in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the standard for a grant of summary judgment:
Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.
Id. at 322-23 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)).
Lowe Industries argues in this case that summary judgment was properly granted because plaintiff's employment was at-will, as evidenced in the employment application that she signed. Lowe Industries asserts that plaintiff has offered no more than her subjective beliefs that she could only be discharged for cause. Furthermore, Lowe Industries asserts that even if plaintiff did have a just-cause contract, plaintiff's position was eliminated, thus constituting just cause for discharge as a matter of law, citing Nora v. Carrier Corp., 861 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.1988).
The district court found Lowe Industries' arguments persuasive. Plaintiff argues that Lowe represented to her that she would have long term employment (Brief at 4, 8, 14), but yet plaintiff does not specifically identify what was represented. In her deposition, she was unable to state even one representation made to her which formed her belief that she could only be fired for just cause. (App. 165-75). The cases upon which plaintiff relies are cases which state that an employer can transform an at-will employment relationship into one where the...
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