Smith v. City of Santa Clara

Citation876 F.3d 987
Decision Date30 November 2017
Docket NumberNo. 14-15103,14-15103
Parties Josephine SMITH, an individual; A.S., a minor child, by and through her guardian ad litem, Josephine Smith, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. CITY OF SANTA CLARA, a public entity, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Lauren R. Coatney (argued), Christine Peek, Matthew Schechter, and James McManis, McManis Faulkner, San Jose, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Sujata T. Reuter (argued) and Jon A. Heaberlin, Rankin Stock Heaberlin, San Jose, California, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges, and Lynn S. Adelman,* District Judge.

ADELMAN, District Judge:

Justine Smith was involved in the theft of a vehicle and the stabbing of its owner. During the course of their investigation of these crimes, the police learned that Smith was on probation and that the terms of her probation allowed warrantless searches of her person and residence. The police went to the house that she had reported as her residence. Josephine Smith, Justine's mother, answered the door.1 The officers, who did not have a warrant, told Josephine that they were there to conduct a probation search for Justine. Josephine refused to admit the officers to the home without a warrant. Despite her objection, the officers entered the home to search for Justine but did not find her.

Josephine and her minor granddaughter, A.S., sued several police officers and the City of Santa Clara, alleging that the search for Justine violated their constitutional rights under state and federal law. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that under the Supreme Court's decision in Georgia v. Randolph , 547 U.S. 103, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006), the search of Josephine's home was unreasonable as a matter of law because the undisputed facts showed that Josephine was physically present at the time of the search and refused permission to search.

I.
A.

On October 4, 2010, Vahid Zarei reported to the San Jose Police Department that his car had been stolen. Zarei told police that he had just given Justine Smith a ride in the car and discovered that his spare key to the vehicle was missing. On October 7, 2010, Zarei's friend found the car in Santa Clara, California. Zarei and his friend then drove to Santa Clara to retrieve the car. When they arrived, but before they could get to the car, Justine and an unknown male entered the car and drove away. Justine was the driver. Zarei and his friend followed the car in the friend's car. At some point the cars stopped and the unknown male exited Zarei's vehicle and stabbed Zarei in the stomach. The male got back into Zarei's car, and Justine drove away. Zarei was taken to the hospital with life-threatening injuries.

Santa Clara police officers investigated both the car theft and the stabbing. While at the hospital, they showed Zarei's friend a picture of Justine, and he identified her as the driver of the stolen car. The police then learned that in December 2009, a California court had placed Justine on probation for three years in connection with felony convictions for grand theft and forgery. As a condition of her probation, Justine agreed to warrantless searches of her residence.

The police contacted the probation department to determine Justine's whereabouts. On December 22, 2009, Justine reported her address to probation as 940 Gale Drive. This was the address of her mother's unit in a small, two-unit duplex. On January 6, 2010, Justine reported to the California Department of Motor Vehicles that her address was 942 Gale Drive, which was the address for the other unit in the duplex. In addition, two entries in a county database, one dated January 27, 2010, and the other dated May 14, 2010, listed Justine's address as 940 Gale Drive. Finally, on June 2, 2010, Justine once again reported to probation that her residence was 940 Gale Drive, but this time she added that she was in the process of moving out of her mother's house.

On October 10, 2010, officers began surveilling the Gale Drive duplex but did not see Justine. After waiting awhile, they knocked on the door to 940 Gale Drive and announced, "Probation Search. Open the door." Josephine opened the door, stated that Justine did not live at the residence, and demanded that the officers produce a search warrant. When the officers explained that they needed to conduct a probation search for Justine, Josephine became angry and refused to allow them to enter.

The officers entered the home despite Josephine's objections. They did not find Justine, but they found in the garage a sofa with sheets lying on it, female clothing, and an unopened envelope addressed to Justine at the 940 Gale Drive address. Officers then told Josephine that they needed to search the 942 unit of the duplex, which was locked and, according to Josephine, rented to another tenant. When officers indicated that they might need to force entry, Josephine directed them to the key. Officers then searched the 942 unit but did not find Justine.

B.

After the search, Josephine and A.S. sued the City of Santa Clara and the individual police officers involved in the search, alleging violations of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California's Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1,2 along with several other state-law claims.3 One of Josephine's claims was that the search of the duplex violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Josephine argued that the search was unreasonable because the officers had searched her home without a warrant or her consent. (She also challenged the manner in which the officers carried out the search, but we will not discuss that aspect of her claim, as it is not at issue in this appeal.)

The defendants moved for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim. They argued that the warrantless search of the residence was permitted because Justine was on probation and the Supreme Court has held that officers may search a probationer's residence without a warrant if they have reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity. See United States v. Knights , 534 U.S. 112, 121, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). In opposition to the motion, Josephine argued that the Supreme Court's more recent decision in Randolph created an exception to the probation-search rule. In Randolph , the Court held that a warrantless search of a residence, when justified only by an occupant's consent to the search, is unreasonable as to a co-occupant when that co-occupant is physically present and objects to the search. 547 U.S. at 106, 126 S.Ct. 1515. Josephine argued that, under Randolph , because she was present and objected to the search of her home, the search was unreasonable as to her.

The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on Josephine's § 1983 claim on the ground of qualified immunity, reasoning that it was not clearly established that Randolph created an exception to the probation-search rule. However, the court denied the motion for summary judgment on the Bane Act claim because qualified immunity of the kind applied to § 1983 claims does not apply to actions brought under the Bane Act. See Cousins v. Lockyer , 568 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, the court essentially allowed the federal Fourth Amendment claim to proceed to trial through the vehicle of the California Bane Act.

The Bane Act claim was tried along with some related claims arising out of the search. Over Josephine's objection, the district court did not instruct the jury that Justine's consent was insufficient to make the search reasonable if Josephine was present and objected to the search. Josephine also sought judgment as a matter of law on the ground that it was undisputed that she was present and objected to the search and that therefore the search was unreasonable under Randolph . The district court denied the motion. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on all claims, and the district court entered judgment in their favor.

Josephine now appeals the judgment only as it relates to the Bane Act claim. She contends that the district court should have granted her motion for judgment as a matter of law because, under Randolph , her objection to the search required the officers to obtain a warrant before conducting a probation search for Justine. For the same reason, she argues that the district court should have instructed the jury to find the search unreasonable if it found that Josephine was present and objected to the search.

II.

Josephine's challenges to both the jury instructions and the district court's denial of her motion for judgment as a matter of law turn on the same question of Fourth Amendment law: Is a warrantless search of a residence that the police have probable cause to believe is the residence of a probationer, and that is otherwise reasonable as to the probationer, unreasonable as to a non-probationer occupant of the residence who is present at the time of the search and refuses to consent to the search? We review the district court's resolution of this question of law de novo. See Quiksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp. , 466 F.3d 749, 755 (9th Cir. 2006) (review of denial of judgment as a matter of law de novo); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't , 447 F.3d 769, 784 (9th Cir. 2006) (review of whether the district court's jury instructions misstate the law is de novo).4

A.

"It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). One exception to this principle is that the police generally may search a home without a warrant if they have obtained...

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8 cases
  • Reed v. Sheppard
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of New York
    • 17 Agosto 2018
    ...that warrantless searches of a home are unreasonable relates to persons who are on probation or parole." Smith v. City of Santa Clara, 876 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) ; United States v. Knights, 534 U.S......
  • Gullatt v. Dirkse, CASE NO. 1:20-cv-00473-EPG
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • 21 Julio 2020
    ...a non-probationer occupant of the residence who is present at the time of the search and refuses to consent to the search[.]" 876 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 2017). The court adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances test:[T]he question is whether a warrantless probation search that affects the r......
  • Stein v. Depke
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Arizona
    • 14 Septiembre 2023
    ...on Arizona law). The Court notes that federal law only creates a cause of action for that occupant whose consent is withheld. See Smith, 876 F.3d at 990. But a jury could infer Jackie was speaking for both Steins throughout her encounter with Depke, such that Justin's consent was withheld t......
  • Porter v. Sergeant Munoz in His Individual Capacity
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • 1 Febrero 2019
    ...third-party was reasonable, a court within the Ninth Circuit must consider "the totality of the circumstances." Smith v. City of Santa Clara, 876 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19, 122 S. Ct. 587 (2001)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1563 (2018......
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2 books & journal articles
  • Sentencing
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • 1 Agosto 2022
    ...conditions limiting a probationer’s ability to participate in a given occupation 2371 or to run for political off‌ice. 2372 Santa Clara, 876 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2017) (4th Amendment not violated by warrantless search of probationer’s residence despite nonconsent of other occupant becaus......
  • IS JUVENILE PROBATION OBSOLETE? REEXAMINING AND REIMAGINING YOUTH PROBATION LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE.
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 112 No. 3, June 2022
    • 22 Junio 2022
    ...Carter, 566 F.3d 970, 974-76 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. King, 672 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012); Smith v. City of Santa Clara, 876 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2017). (192) Keith, 375 F.3d at 350; Carter, 566 F.3d at 974-76; King, 672 F.3d at 1139; Smith, 876 F.3d at 995; see also Roth......

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