United States v. Collins

• Decision Date: 12 December 2017
• Docket Number: No. 15-1998,15-1998
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Maurice COLLINS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

877 F.3d 362

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Maurice COLLINS, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 15-1998

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued November 17, 2015

Decided December 12, 2017

Jason M. Bohm, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Urbana Division, Urbana, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Elisabeth R. Pollock, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Urbana, IL, for Defendant–Appellant.

Before Flaum, Easterbrook, and Hamilton, Circuit Judges.

Hamilton, Circuit Judge.

Maurice Collins pled guilty to distributing cocaine and at least 28 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to 120 months in prison—the statutory minimum in light of a prior felony drug conviction. See § 841(b)(1)(B). On appeal Collins challenges the district court’s decision at sentencing to add to his Sentencing Guidelines calculation two offense levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) for his supervisory role in the offenses. While the guidelines have been advisory since United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), this guideline decision had significant consequences under the terms of a statute that is mandatory, not advisory. The supervisory role enhancement disqualified Collins from safety-valve relief from the statutory minimum sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4). We generally review a district court’s determinations on the guidelines for aggravating and mitigating roles for clear error, e.g., United States v. Robertson , 662 F.3d 871, 876 (7th Cir. 2011) ; United States v. Herrera , 878 F.2d 997, 1000 (7th Cir. 1989), but if the court acted on the basis of a misunderstanding of the legal standard, we may need to remand for reconsideration under the proper legal standard. See Robertson , 662 F.3d at 876.

This is an atypical drug case in which the judge based the role enhancement for defendant Collins on a legal error. Without any criminal organization or hierarchy, Collins’s isolated, one-time request to another independent dealer to cover for him on a sale did not make him a supervisor or manager within the meaning of the guideline. See United States v. Figueroa , 682 F.3d 694, 697–98 (7th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. McGregor , 11 F.3d 1133, 1138–39 (2d Cir. 1993). We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Over several months in 2013 and 2014, law enforcement used a confidential source to carry out three controlled buys of powder cocaine and one of crack cocaine after contacting Collins. He was charged with distributing cocaine and crack cocaine. Two of the controlled buys were very simple: the confidential source, monitored at all times by law enforcement agents, called Collins to buy cocaine, arranged to meet him, and bought the requested cocaine from him. There was no indication that anyone else was involved in those buys, and they do not affect the supervisory role issue.

Our focus is on the other two controlled buys, which each involved one other person. At the time of the first, in November 2013, Collins was out of town. He wanted to accommodate the confidential source’s request for one ounce of cocaine. He turned to a friend, Robert Palmer, apparently another street-level drug dealer. Palmer owed Collins an unspecified favor but operated independently on all other occasions. On this one occasion, Collins asked Palmer to do him a favor by picking up the cocaine, delivering it to the confidential source, and accepting payment for him. In his recorded proffer interview, Collins said that Palmer helped him "just that one time"—"It was a favor for a favor." The government did not offer evidence to contradict Collins’s account.

The last controlled buy occurred in April 2014. On that occasion, the source asked Collins for crack cocaine. Collins did not sell crack, but he knew someone who did. He sent the source to another dealer, T.G., in Danville, Illinois. Collins gave the confidential source the address and driving directions to T.G.’s house, and the source bought crack from T.G. There is no evidence that Collins profited from the sale or referral.

Collins pled guilty to all counts without a plea agreement. The probation officer calculated a guideline sentence of 120 months—the statutory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). Without the statutory minimum, Collins’s guideline range would have been well below the statutory minimum.

The court’s calculation of Collins’s guideline offense level included a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) because the court found that "the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity...." Under the statutory "safety valve," a guideline adjustment for a supervisory role bars relief from a statutory mandatory minimum sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4). The statutory provision means that this supervisory role issue presents one of the few remaining situations after Booker where a guideline determination produces consequences that the sentencing court does not have discretion to reject or modify.

The probation officer recommended a two-level upward adjustment under § 3B1.1(c) because Collins "directed" both Palmer and T.G. to sell drugs to the confidential source. The probation officer also noted that Collins had given a safety-valve proffer interview, but that the case agents concluded that Collins had provided false information and minimized his actions. Because of his supervisory role and dishonesty, the probation officer recommended that Collins was not eligible for safety-valve relief. If that is correct, the statutory mandatory minimum applies and is also the guideline sentence for Collins.

Collins objected to the role adjustment and denial of the safety valve. He argued that he did not "direct" either Palmer when he called upon him for a single favor or T.G. when he referred the confidential source to her on one occasion. These two incidents, he argued, were isolated and did not show that he exercised the necessary control or authority over either Palmer or T.G. needed for the role adjustment. Collins said that he lacked an ongoing relationship with either of the two; that neither worked for him; that he did not manage any larger "scheme"; and that, with regard to the referral to T.G., no evidence indicated that he profited in any way. Collins described himself as merely a "one-man show" and argued that § 3B1.1(c) was not meant to cover acts like asking for an isolated favor or making a referral.

Regarding the sale with Palmer’s help, the government relied on language from cases involving the supervision of hired drug couriers, such as United States v. Bennett , 708 F.3d 879, 892 (7th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Figueroa , 682 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2012). Under these cases, the government argued, someone who tells another person to pick up drugs, to exchange the drugs for money, and to return the cash supervises that other person. In the government’s view, Collins essentially admitted at his proffer interview that he supervised Palmer when he acknowledged: (1) asking Palmer to "go over there and serve the CI for me"; (2) telling Palmer where to pick up the drugs; and (3) having Palmer agree to turn over the money later. As to the transaction with T.G., the government argued that Collins’s guilty plea to distributing crack cocaine "through T.G." also justified the role adjustment.

The district court agreed with the government and found that Collins’s one-time help from Palmer supported the supervisory role adjustment. The court explained that it was wrestling with two passages from this court’s decisions—one from Figueroa saying that "cases distinguish between ongoing supervision and merely asking a coconspirator on one occasion to do something," 682 F.3d at 698, and one from Bennett assigning a supervisory role to someone who "told his drug courier ... where to get the drugs and where to meet him to deliver the drugs and get paid," 708 F.3d at 892 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Following the language in Bennett as more recent and "more instructive," the district court found that because Collins on this occasion "told [Palmer] where to go, do the deal, and ... then bring the money back," he was a manager or supervisor. The court also agreed with the government that Collins’s guilty plea to distributing crack cocaine in the T.G. transaction provided an independent reason to apply the role adjustment. The district court sentenced Collins to the 120–month statutory minimum. But the court added that if the role adjustment did not apply and if Collins were eligible for the safety valve, it "would not hesitate" to sentence Collins to fewer than 120 months.

II. Analysis

As noted, we treat application of aggravating role enhancements as findings of fact that we review for clear error, e.g., United States v. May , 748 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Robertson , 662 F.3d 871, 876 (7th Cir. 2011), but review de novo a district judge’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. The sentencing transcript shows there was no real disagreement about the actual facts here and that the district judge viewed the issue as a legal issue that required him to navigate between our opinions in Bennett and Figueroa . Sent. Tr. 23–24.

We consider first the sale involving Palmer. The judge acknowledged there was no "ongoing relationship" and that Collins "directed" Palmer on only this one occasion. Id . at 24. In cases involving couriers for ongoing drug-trafficking operations, we have routinely affirmed § 3B1.1 enhancements for those who supervise couriers and others. E.g., United States v. Figueroa , 682 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2012) (enhancement applies to "low-level supervisors"); United States v. Fox , 548 F.3d 523, 530–31 (7th Cir. 2008) (enhancement applied where defendant directed acquaintances to deliver his drugs on multiple occasions); United States v. Howell , 527 F.3d 646,...