State ex rel. Hall v. Riggs
Decision Date | 04 October 1994 |
Citation | 319 Or. 282,877 P.2d 56 |
Parties | STATE ex rel. Frank A. HALL, Director of the Oregon Department of Corrections, and Manfred Maass, Superintendent of the Oregon State Penitentiary, Plaintiffs-Relators, v. R. William RIGGS, Judge of the Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon, Defendant, and Donald Harold Graham, Intervenor. SC S40649. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Robert B. Rocklin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for plaintiffs-relators. With him on the brief were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Lawrence Matasar of Hoffman & Matasar, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for defendant.
Donald H. Graham, intervenor pro se, filed a brief.
This is an original mandamus proceeding in which relators, the Director of the Oregon Department of Corrections and the Superintendent of the Oregon State Penitentiary (hereafter collectively called "relators"), challenge the authority of the defendant judge, a Judge of the Court of Appeals, 1 to enter an order that denied to the Department of Corrections the power to commit an inmate to a particular form of custody in a particular portion of the Oregon State Penitentiary (OSP) until after a hearing could be held. Because of a concern that the defendant judge may have exceeded either the jurisdiction or the statutory authority of the Court of Appeals, we issued an alternative writ of mandamus directing that the defendant judge either withdraw his order or show cause why he should not be required to do so. The defendant judge declined to withdraw his order. For the reasons that follow, we now conclude that the order of the defendant judge was one that lay within both the jurisdiction and the authority of the Court of Appeals to issue. We therefore dismiss the writ.
The first issue in this case is the jurisdictional one. Relators argue that the Court of Appeals had no subject matter jurisdiction in this case, which involves a final order of the Department of Corrections that purported to assign the inmate to the Intensive Management Unit (IMU) of OSP for administrative, as opposed to disciplinary, reasons. As we explain in more detail, post, the inmate has attempted to obtain judicial review of that order in the Court of Appeals pursuant to ORS 421.195, which provides:
The jurisdictional issue concerns the scope of the first clause of the first sentence of ORS 421.195, viz, "[i]f an order places an inmate in segregation or isolation status for more than seven days." In Bagby v. OSP, 118 Or.App. 421, 425, 847 P.2d 898, rev. den 317 Or. 396, 857 P.2d 851 (1993), the Court of Appeals held that, when a custody reclassification occurs as the result of a disciplinary violation, a subsequent order transferring an inmate to IMU is subject to judicial review under ORS 421.195, because "[placing an inmate in] IMU is both an institutional transfer for disciplinary reasons and segregation and isolation status." (Emphasis in original.) Relators assert here that Bagby was wrongly decided and that, when correctly construed, ORS 421.195 provides no basis for jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals in cases like the present one. We examine that issue first because, if relators' argument is well taken, the Court of Appeals' order was made in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction.
The question is one of statutory interpretation. In interpreting a statute, this court's task is to determine the intent of the legislature. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). Thus, our task in this case is to determine whether the legislature intended IMU transfer orders that are not made for disciplinary reasons to be subject to judicial review under ORS 421.195. In pursuing that inquiry, we begin with the text and context of the statute in question. Id. at 610-11, 859 P.2d 1143. Context includes "other provisions of the same statute and other related statutes." Id. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143.
As noted, by its terms ORS 421.195 provides for judicial review of an order that "places an inmate in segregation or isolation status for more than seven days, institutionally transfers the inmate for disciplinary reasons or provides for nondeduction from the term of the sentence under ORS 421.120(1)(a) and (b)." OSP does not deny that the inmate was placed in IMU by an "order," or that confinement in IMU can be characterized as "segregation or isolation status." 2 Thus, if the text is to be taken literally, the inmate is entitled to judicial review under ORS 421.195. Relators argue, however, that ORS 421.195 must be read in the context of the surrounding statutes. According to relators, ORS 421.195, when examined in context, "does not clearly reveal whether it was intended to authorize the Court of Appeals to review any non-disciplinary orders." We turn to that question.
We begin this exercise by noting that relators face an uphill fight. It is difficult to imagine wording much clearer than that utilized in the statute. That wording purports to authorize judicial review of a complete class--orders "plac[ing] an inmate in segregation * * * for more than seven days." No mention is made of the reason for entering the order as somehow limiting the scope of the right of an inmate to judicial review.
Moreover, the next clause of the same sentence demonstrates that the legislature knows how to distinguish between reasons for an action when it wishes to do so. That clause subjects to judicial review only orders that "institutionally transfer[ ] the inmate for disciplinary reasons." (Emphasis supplied.) Without question, the legislature by that provision recognized that institutional transfers could occur for different reasons, and it chose to subject to judicial review only one kind of transfer.
Finally, the third circumstance listed in the first sentence of the statute likewise illustrates the same point: Judicial review is to be available for orders "provid[ing] for nondeduction from the term of the sentence under ORS 421.120(1)(a) and (b)," both of which describe computation of various "good time" credits for inmates against their sentences. The statute that is referred to, ORS 421.120, contains several other subsections relating to computation of good time, ORS 421.120(1)(c) through (1)(g), and authorizes the Department of Corrections to develop rules for deduction of each type of good time credit. ORS 421.120(1)(h). In distinguishing among various kinds of deductions of good time, the legislature once again demonstrated its ability to provide for judicial review of certain kinds of decisions within a broader category. The legislative choice to do that with respect to two types of orders listed in the first sentence of ORS 421.195, while making no mention of any subcategory within the third type, strongly suggests that there was no intention to limit judicial review only to some subcategory of the third type of order.
With the foregoing admonition concerning the clarity of the text of ORS 421.195 in mind, we turn to an examination of that statute's context. The context on which relators rely is the act by which ORS 421.195 became law: Oregon Laws 1973, chapter 621 ("the Act"). Four sections of that enactment are pertinent to our inquiry. We shall discuss each individually.
Section 1 of the Act amended ORS 183.310, the definitions section of the Administrative Procedures Act. More specifically, it amended the definition of "rule" in that statute by adding the following underlined portion to what was then subsection (7) of that statute:
That section of the Act does not help relators. Instead, it again exhibits the striking differentiation in treatment between orders placing an inmate in segregation or isolation status for more than seven days--which category is not subdivided according to the reason for the placement--and institutional transfers--which category is subdivided along precisely those lines.
Relators rely specifically on section 4 of the Act, which was added to ORS chapter 421 by Oregon Laws 1973, chapter 621, section 3....
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