877 P.2d 56 (Or. 1994), SC S40649, State ex rel. Hall v. Riggs

Docket Nº:SC S40649.
Citation:877 P.2d 56, 319 Or. 282
Opinion Judge:GILLETTE, J.
Party Name:STATE ex rel. Frank A. HALL, Director of the Oregon Department of Corrections, and Manfred Maass, Superintendent of the Oregon State Penitentiary, Plaintiffs-Relators, v. R. William RIGGS, Judge of the Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon, Defendant, and Donald Harold Graham, Intervenor.
Attorney:Robert B. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for plaintiffs-relators. With him on the brief were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, Salem. Lawrence Matasar of Hoffman & Matasar, Portland, argued the ca...
Case Date:July 21, 1994
Court:Supreme Court of Oregon
 
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877 P.2d 56 (Or. 1994)

319 Or. 282

STATE ex rel. Frank A. HALL, Director of the Oregon

Department of Corrections, and Manfred Maass,

Superintendent of the Oregon State

Penitentiary, Plaintiffs-Relators,

v.

R. William RIGGS, Judge of the Court of Appeals of the State

of Oregon, Defendant,

and

Donald Harold Graham, Intervenor.

SC S40649.

Supreme Court of Oregon, En Banc

July 21, 1994

       Argued and Submitted May 9, 1994.

        Reconsideration Denied Oct. 4, 1994.

       [319 Or. 283] Robert B. Rocklin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for plaintiffs-relators. With him on the brief were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.

       Lawrence Matasar of Hoffman & Matasar, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for defendant.

       Donald H. Graham, intervenor pro se, filed a brief.

       [319 Or. 284] GILLETTE, Justice.

       This is an original mandamus proceeding in which relators, the Director of the Oregon Department of Corrections and the Superintendent of the Oregon State Penitentiary (hereafter collectively called "relators"), challenge the authority of the defendant judge, a

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Judge of the Court of Appeals, 1 to enter an order that denied to the Department of Corrections the power to commit an inmate to a particular form of custody in a particular portion of the Oregon State Penitentiary (OSP) until after a hearing could be held. Because of a concern that the defendant judge may have exceeded either the jurisdiction or the statutory authority of the Court of Appeals, we issued an alternative writ of mandamus directing that the defendant judge either withdraw his order or show cause why he should not be required to do so. The defendant judge declined to withdraw his order. For the reasons that follow, we now conclude that the order of the defendant judge was one that lay within both the jurisdiction and the authority of the Court of Appeals to issue. We therefore dismiss the writ.

       The first issue in this case is the jurisdictional one. Relators argue that the Court of Appeals had no subject matter jurisdiction in this case, which involves a final order of the Department of Corrections that purported to assign the inmate to the Intensive Management Unit (IMU) of OSP for administrative, as opposed to disciplinary, reasons. As we explain in more detail, post, the inmate has attempted to obtain judicial review of that order in the Court of Appeals pursuant to ORS 421.195, which provides:

       "If an order places an inmate in segregation or isolation status for more than seven days, institutionally transfers the inmate for disciplinary reasons or provides for nondeduction from the term of the sentence under ORS 421.120(1)(a) and (b), the order and the proceedings underlying the order are subject to review by the Court of Appeals upon petition to that court filed within 30 days of the order for which review is sought. The department shall transmit to the court the record of the proceeding, or, if the inmate agrees, a shortened [319 Or. 285] record. A copy of the record transmitted shall be delivered to the inmate by the department. The court may affirm, reverse or remand the order on the same basis as provided in ORS 183.482. The filing of the petition shall not stay the department's order, but the department may do so, or the court may order a stay upon application on such terms as it deems proper."

       The jurisdictional issue concerns the scope of the first clause of the first sentence of ORS 421.195, viz, "[i]f an order places an inmate in segregation or isolation status for more than seven days." In Bagby v. OSP, 118 Or.App. 421, 425, 847 P.2d 898, rev. den 317 Or. 396, 857 P.2d 851 (1993), the Court of Appeals held that, when a custody reclassification occurs as the result of a disciplinary violation, a subsequent order transferring an inmate to IMU is subject to judicial review under ORS 421.195, because "[placing an inmate in] IMU is both an institutional transfer for disciplinary reasons and segregation and isolation status." (Emphasis in original.) Relators assert here that Bagby was wrongly decided and that, when correctly construed, ORS 421.195 provides no basis for jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals in cases like the present one. We examine that issue first because, if relators' argument is well taken, the Court of Appeals' order was made in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction.

       The question is one of statutory interpretation. In interpreting a statute, this court's task is to determine the intent of the legislature. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). Thus, our task in this case is to determine whether the legislature intended IMU transfer orders that are not made for disciplinary reasons to be subject to judicial review under ORS 421.195. In pursuing that inquiry, we begin with the text and context of the statute in question. Id. at 610-11, 859 P.2d 1143. Context includes "other provisions of the same statute and other related statutes." Id. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143.

       As noted, by its terms ORS 421.195 provides for judicial review of an order that "places an inmate in segregation or isolation status for more than seven days, institutionally transfers the inmate for disciplinary reasons

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or provides for nondeduction from the term of the sentence under ORS 421.120(1)(a) and (b)." OSP does not deny that [319 Or. 286] the inmate was placed in IMU by an "order," or that confinement in IMU can be characterized as "segregation or isolation status." 2 Thus, if the text is to be taken literally, the inmate is entitled to judicial review under ORS 421.195. Relators argue, however, that ORS 421.195 must be read in the context of the surrounding statutes. According to relators, ORS 421.195, when examined in context, "does not clearly reveal whether it was intended to authorize the Court of Appeals to review any non-disciplinary orders." We turn to that question.

       We begin this exercise by noting that relators face an uphill fight. It is difficult to imagine wording much clearer than that utilized in the statute. That wording purports to authorize judicial review of a complete class--orders "plac[ing] an inmate in segregation * * * for more than seven days." No mention is made of the reason for entering the order as somehow limiting the scope of the right of an inmate to judicial review.

       Moreover, the next clause of the same sentence demonstrates that the legislature knows how to distinguish between...

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