LaPointe v. BOARD OF ED. OF WINCHESTER

• Citation: 274 Conn. 806,878 A.2d 1154
• Decision Date: 09 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 17379.,17379.
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: David G. LaPOINTE v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWN OF WINCHESTER et al.

878 A.2d 1154

274 Conn. 806

David G. LaPOINTE v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWN OF WINCHESTER et al.

No. 17379.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 19, 2005.

Decided August 9, 2005.

Jon D. Norris, Southbury, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Mark J. Sommaruga, for the appellees (defendants).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and BORDEN, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

BORDEN, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the named defendant, the board of education of the town of Winchester (board), gave the plaintiff, David G. LaPointe, reasonable notice of the cause of his removal as chairperson of the board, as required by the board's bylaws. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his petitions for writs of quo warranto and mandamus.¹ By those petitions, the plaintiff claimed that he had been illegally removed from his position as chairperson of the board and that, accordingly, he was entitled to be reinstated to that position. We agree and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court to the contrary.

The plaintiff brought these actions for quo warranto and mandamus against the defendants, the board and Kathleen O'Brien, his successor as chairperson of the board.² The trial court rendered judgment for the defendants. This appeal followed.

Certain facts and the procedural history are undisputed. The plaintiff was elected to the nine member board on November 6, 2001, for a four year term, expiring in November, 2005. On November 18, 2003, the plaintiff was elected as chairperson of the board, for a two year term as such, expiring in November, 2005. Subsequently, on or about March 24 or 25, 2004,³ the plaintiff received a letter dated March 23, 2004, addressed to him and signed by three members of the board, requesting the plaintiff to call a special meeting of the board.

Specifically, the letter provided: "Re: Request for a Special Meeting. Dear Mr. LaPointe: Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes [§] 10-218,⁴ the following three members of the Board of Education request that you, as Chairman of the Winchester Board of Education, call a Special Meeting of the Board to address the attached agenda. We are also requesting that the Board attorney, either Mr. Sommaruga or Mr. Sullivan be in attendance at such meeting." The attached agenda, which left the date and time of the meeting blank, consisted of: "I. Call to Order II. Roll Call III. Business ACTION: 1) Discussion of performance of Board Chair and possible removal from office of Board Chair (Possible Executive Session) IV. Adjourn."

The plaintiff complied by calling a special session of the board for March 30, 2004. At that meeting, after certain procedural objections raised by the plaintiff and discussed more fully later in this opinion, the board voted, by a vote of five to four, to remove the plaintiff as chairperson of the board, for cause.⁵

The plaintiff then brought this two part complaint, challenging the legality of his removal as chairperson on the following grounds: (1) his removal was in violation of his right to due process of law and of the board's bylaws, for lack of adequate written notice of the cause of his removal; and (2) the cause of his removal was not supported by the evidence adduced at the session of the board. The defendants: (1) moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the plaintiff's claims presented a nonjusticiable political question; and (2) moved to strike the actions on the ground that the plaintiff had no clear legal right to remain as chairperson. The court denied those motions. After reviewing a videotape of the March 30, 2004 session of the board and taking other evidence, however, the court rejected the plaintiff's claims on the merits. The court ruled that the board had given the plaintiff "reasonable notice, a full hearing at which he was represented by counsel, and the right to refute all claims." The court also ruled that the reasons given by the majority of the board for the plaintiff's removal were sufficient to constitute cause, namely, a failure to run the meetings of the board in an effective and impartial manner, giving latitude to members of his own party but "cutting off" others, failing to recognize points of order, acting in an arrogant and abusive manner toward guests, lack of courtesy, and acting without board authority. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment for the defendants on both counts of the complaint.

The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly: (1) placed the burden of proof on him in the quo warranto action; (2) concluded that his removal was not in violation of his right to due process under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution; and (3) concluded that his removal was not in violation of the bylaws of the board. The board renews its claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the "political question" doctrine, defends the trial court's judgment on the merits, and raises as an alternate ground of affirmance of the trial court's judgment that the court improperly denied its motion to strike the complaint. We conclude that: (1) the court had subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) the plaintiff's removal as chairperson was in violation of the board's bylaws.⁶ We also reject the board's alternate ground for affirmance. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and order the court to issue the writs of quo warranto and mandamus.⁷

We first address the board's claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because this action concerns "the internal organization or processes of the [b]oard," and as such "raise[s] a nonjusticiable political question." We disagree.

Specifically, the board relies on that branch of the political question doctrine that requires a court to refrain from adjudication if "the court would be required to express a lack of due respect to a coordinate branch of government ...." Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, 261 Conn. 475, 484, 803 A.2d 318 (2002). We do not regard reviewing the contested aspects of this local board of education's conduct as challenging a "coordinate branch of government" within the meaning of the political question doctrine. Courts routinely review the actions of such boards under claims of illegality of various sorts. See, e.g., Obeda v. Board of Selectmen, 180 Conn. 521, 429 A.2d 956 (1980) (removal of member of local inland wetlands commission by board of selectmen); State ex rel. Raslavsky v. Bonvouloir, 167 Conn. 357, 355 A.2d 275 (1974) (removal of chairperson of board of finance by board of aldermen). There is nothing in the present case that implicates, in any way, the actions of either the legislative or executive branches of the state government. The plaintiff's legal claims are quite straightforward, and simply because they challenge the vote of the board to remove him as chairperson does not transform those legal claims into a political question within the meaning of that jurisdictional doctrine.

We next consider the plaintiff's claim that he was not given adequate notice of the claimed cause of his removal prior to the March 30, 2004 meeting of the board. We agree.

The following additional facts are necessary to the resolution of this claim. Under the board's bylaws, the plaintiff was subject to removal as chairperson without cause by a vote of two thirds of the total membership of the board, or six members. Winchester Board of Education Bylaws, art. II, § 5 (2002).⁸ Under the same bylaws, however, he was subject to removal for cause by a majority of those members of the board present at any special meeting called for that purpose. Id. The letter requesting a special session to consider his possible removal did not specify whether it was without cause or for cause.

In addition, our examination of the videotape of the meeting discloses the following. Apparently, meetings of the board are routinely videotaped. All nine members of the board were present at the March 30, 2004 special meeting. At the outset of the meeting, the plaintiff asked the three members who had asked for the meeting whether his possible removal was to be without cause or for cause. When no specific response was forthcoming, the plaintiff ruled that he therefore interpreted the matter as involving a removal without cause. One of the members then moved that he be removed for cause. At that point, the plaintiff, both by himself and through his attorney, who was attending the meeting, requested that the meeting be terminated because he had not been given a specific statement of the reasons for removal for cause. Relying specifically on article II, § 5, of the board's bylaws, the plaintiff claimed that "reasonable notice" embodied the notion that he be given prior notice of the specific grounds for a removal for cause. The plaintiff made this point repeatedly. When no such specificity was forthcoming, either in writing or orally, the plaintiff as chairperson of the meeting ruled the meeting illegal for lack of reasonable notice. The board then, by a vote of five to four, overruled the plaintiff's ruling, and the meeting continued.

There then ensued a discussion of the plaintiff's shortcomings as chairperson, and the plaintiff's responses thereto, denying the claims. At the end of this discussion, the plaintiff and his attorney renewed his request for written specifications of the cause of his removal, including a request for a two week continuance so that he could properly prepare a response to those specifications. This request was disregarded, and the matter went to a vote on the motion to remove him for cause, which carried by a vote of five to four. The meeting then adjourned.

On the basis of article II, § 5, of the board's bylaws, specifically the requirement that removal from office for cause must be preceded by "reasonable notice and hearing"; see footnote 8 of this opinion; we conclude that, if the plaintiff were to be...