878 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 2004), SC02-775, Baker v. State
| Citation | 878 So.2d 1236, 29 Fla. L. Weekly S 105, 29 Fla. L. Weekly S 413 |
| Opinion Judge | Per curiam. |
| Party Name | Darrell BAKER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. Deryl Brooks, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Jamie Edward Sly, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. |
| Attorney | Darrell Baker, pro se, Crestview, Florida; Daryl Brooks, pro se, |
| Case Date | March 11, 2004 |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
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Rehearing Denied July 15, 2004.
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Darrell Baker, pro se, Crestview, FL; Deryl Brooks, pro se, Chipley, FL; and Jamie Edward Sly, pro se, Raiford, FL, for Petitioners.
No appearance, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioners Darrell Baker, Deryl Brooks, and Jamie Edward Sly have filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus, see art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const., collaterally attacking their noncapital convictions for various crimes committed in this state. We consolidate these cases for purposes of this opinion and dismiss the petitions as unauthorized. We further take this opportunity to explain how we will dispose of petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by noncapital defendants seeking relief that can be obtained only, if at all, by motion in the sentencing court under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Henceforth, we will dismiss petitions in which we can clearly discern either that the claims raised therein are procedurally barred or that the petition does not comply with the time requirements of the rule.
FACTS
In 1996, petitioner Darrell Baker was convicted and sentenced by the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida, for the crime of armed robbery. 1 Baker claims in his petition that his conviction should be vacated, and that he is entitled to a new trial, because the trial court failed to properly
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qualify the prospective jurors in his case during jury selection. Neither Baker's sworn petition, nor the attachments thereto, reveal whether he took an appeal from his armed robbery conviction and sentence and, if so, when any such appeal became final.
Petitioner Deryl Brooks was convicted and sentenced by the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, for various crimes. He appealed his convictions and sentences to the Fourth District Court of Appeal. That court affirmed without written opinion. See Brooks v. State, 636 So.2d 518 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (table case). Brooks asserts in his sworn habeas corpus petition that the mandate issued in his direct appeal in March of 1994. Brooks claims in his petition that he should be released from his "unlawful and unconstitutional detainment" because the trial court committed "fundamental reversible error" by failing to ensure that the prospective jurors in his case were properly sworn prior to jury selection.
Petitioner Jamie Edward Sly was convicted by the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, in and for Collier County, Florida, pursuant to a guilty plea, of first-degree premeditated murder and burglary of a dwelling with assault and battery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum term for the murder, and fifteen years' imprisonment for the burglary, both sentences to run concurrent to one another. Sly asserts in his unsworn petition that he did not appeal his judgment of conviction and sentence, but concedes that he has filed various unspecified "motions, applications and petitions in regard to his judgment of conviction." Sly claims in his petition that his convictions and resulting sentences should be vacated because his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and because there existed a conflict of interest between himself and his trial counsel. In his petition, Sly specifically challenges the sentencing court's use of the two-year time limitation set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 to deny, in December of 2001, a motion for postconviction relief filed by him in that court. Sly argues without supporting factual explanation in his petition that "it would be a fundamental miscarriage of justice for this Court to bar or foreclose [him] from attacking the voluntariness of his plea" based on the two-year limitation set forth in rule 3.850.
ANALYSIS
These cases are representative of an increasingly large percentage of the petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed in this Court. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we conclude that we should no longer transfer such petitions to the lower courts for consideration as motions for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. 2 We further conclude that we should not continue denying such petitions either on the merits or on grounds that the claims raised are procedurally barred from being considered in collateral postconviction relief proceedings. Instead, we conclude that we should dismiss such petitions as unauthorized.
History of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850
The history of rule 3.850, discussed in more detail below, indicates that
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it was intended to provide a procedural mechanism for raising those collateral postconviction challenges to the legality of criminal judgments that were traditionally cognizable in petitions for writs of habeas corpus. 3 Thus, this rule essentially transferred consideration of these traditional habeas claims from the court having territorial jurisdiction over the prison where the prisoner is detained to the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
We begin our review of the history of rule 3.850 in 1963, the year in which this state was faced with an impending postconviction crisis. That year, the United States Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), which held that the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel in criminal cases applied to state criminal prosecutions by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it was one of those fundamental rights essential to a fair trial and, therefore, to due process of law. See id. at 339-45, 83 S.Ct. 792. On April 1, 1963, this Court attempted to provide a mechanism for meeting the demands for postconviction relief in Florida, which were inevitable in this state following the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon, by promulgating the first rule of criminal procedure, rule 1, the predecessor of our current rule 3.850. See State v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892, 894 (Fla.1964); Roy v. Wainwright, 151 So.2d 825, 826-28 (Fla.1963); see also In re Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, 151 So.2d 634 (Fla.1963).
This Court explained the history of and reasoning behind the adoption of the rule in a decision issued soon after its promulgation:
When confronted by the impact of the Gideon decision this Court became immediately concerned over the procedural facilities available to state prisoners who might have belatedly acquired rights which were not recognized at the time of their conviction. When Gideon was announced, the only practicable procedures available in Florida for a post conviction assault upon a judgment were by habeas corpus, or writ of error coram nobis. On September 15, 1962, the Florida Judicial Council instituted a study of post-conviction remedies and the advisability of establishing some expeditious method of disposing of post-conviction claims of deprivation of organic rights which occurred at trial. At its meeting on October 27, 1962, the Council specifically recommended the adoption of a rule or the enactment of a statute which would facilitate and expedite the handling of postconviction claims.
The Division of Corrections reports that as of June 30, 1962, there were approximately 8,000 State prisoners in custody. Of this group 4,065 entered pleas of guilty without the benefit of counsel. Four hundred, seventy-seven (477) entered pleas of not guilty but were convicted without benefit of counsel. The announcement of the decision in Gideon made it obvious that a substantial number of prisoners would seek release or new trials because of this recently recognized constitutional privilege. This has become evident from a contrast of statistics before and after the Gideon decision. In 1962 this Court
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received 304 petitions for habeas corpus. Practically all of these were from allegedly indigent convicts in the State prison. Between January 1 and March 17, 1963, we received 82 such petitions. Between March 18, 1963, the date of Gideon, and April 5, 1963, we received 119 such petitions. This experience has served principally to suggest the essentiality of establishing a simplified, expeditious and efficient post-conviction procedure. We deem this important to the prisoner seeking relief, as well as to the public interest in the proper enforcement of the criminal laws. For many reasons, too numerous to enumerate at this time, many of these prisoners will not be entitled to post-conviction relief. Some will be.
In recognition of these concerns and in an effort to make adequate provision for the effective administration of justice, this Court took cognizance of its rule-making authority under Article V, Section 3, Florida Constitution. Pursuant to this authority we adopted and made effective on April 1, 1963, Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1....
Roy, 151 So.2d at 826-27.
Although not mentioned in the Roy decision itself, at least one commentator noted soon after the adoption of the rule that, absent its adoption, "thousands of prisoners in Raiford could [have been] expected to seek relief in the Florida Supreme Court, the First District Court of Appeal, and the Circuit Court of the Eighth Circuit." Gene D. Brown, Collateral Post Conviction Remedies in Florida, 20 U. Fla. L.Rev. 306, 306 (1968). Those courts, at the time the Gideon decision was handed down, had territorial jurisdiction over most, if not all, prisoners in the State of Florida. This commentator correctly noted:
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